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Introduction to the series 
By 
Niels Henrik Gregersen: 
 
 
 
The Human Project in Science & Religion is the first volume in a new 
series of Copenhagen University Discussions in Science and Religion.  
Copenhagen is often associated with two major figures in theology and 
science: Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), the forerunner of philosophical 
existentialism, and the physicist Niels Bohr (1885-1962). By happenstance 
this publication antedates the jubilee year of 2013, when Copenhagen 
University will celebrate the bicentennial of Kierkegaard’s birth as well as 
the centennial of Niels Bohr’s famous atomic model of 1913. Here, Bohr 
introduced the theory that electrons travel in orbits around the nucleus of 
the atom. While Kierkegaard spoke of leaps of faith, Bohr referred to 
electronic jumps between the orbits; in both cases discontinuity prevails 
over continuity.  
Against this background, it is perhaps more than a coincidence that the 
Copenhagen discussions on science and religion since 2001 have taken 
place under the name Forum of Existence and Science1– a somewhat 
unusual title, perhaps, but a very apt one in a Danish context. In general, 
Nordic philosophers, theologians and scientists tend to be sceptical about 
too high a claim for a unified world-view amalgamating science and 
religion. Existential first-hand perspectives cannot very easily be 
accommodated within a scientific third-person perspective. Thus, either 
models of complementarity (in the wake of Niels Bohr) or models of a 
discipline-based dialogue are preferred over and against more extravagant 
claims of grand-scale metaphysical synthesis in our Forum of Existence 
and Science. We prefer to speak about interdisciplinary inquiry than about 
trans-disciplinary unification.  
Since 2005, the Forum became part of the Copenhagen University Network 
of Science and Religion in collaboration with the Department of Systematic 
Theology and the Centre for Naturalism and Christian Semantics. This 
move was facilitated by two generous grants from the Metanexus Institute 
                                                 
1
 www.forumforeksistensogvidenskab.dk 
  
and the John Templeton Foundation. We are grateful to these institutions 
for supporting our research as well as for giving us the opportunity to be a 
part of the Global Local Societies Initiative. We also thank Teol. Dr. Anne 
L.C. Runehov, who in 2008 took over the leadership of the Network. 
Without her commitment this series would not have been initiated. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Anne L.C. Runehov 
 
Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species 
 
“Descended from the apes! My dear, let us hope that it is not true, but if 
it is, let us pray that it will not become generally known.”  
These are the words with which Patricia G. Horan opens the 
foreword of the Origin of Species (1979), thereby referring to the words 
of the wife of the Bishop of Worcester after she heard about this book in 
1859.  
In1881 the Swedish philosopher Lawrence Heap Åberg (1851-
1895) wrote that most people believed that Darwinism could not be 
harmonized with Christianity. In fact, they argued, this theory turns the 
history of human beings upside down. According to the Christian faith, 
humans are created as the masters of nature, as perfect beings, a position 
from which they have fallen in order to be reinstalled, not by way of their 
own efforts but by the grace of God. According to Darwinism, human 
beings work themselves upwards from the position of an animal. The 
human cradle is not situated in paradise; on the contrary, if there is 
something that might be compared to paradise in the Darwinian 
worldview, it is far away in the future and it is not a gift from God but 
the fruit of many battles and laborious fights. This way of thinking is 
wrong according to Heap Åberg. He was an idealist and made various 
efforts to combine Boströmianism (Swedish idealism) with natural 
sciences, not least with Darwinism. To him there is no conflict between 
Darwinism and Christianity because Darwinism, as is the case for all 
science, is only interested in human beings as beings of nature, i.e. 
interested in the animal part of the human being.  Darwinism (in the 
context of human life) is about the conditions for human life to emerge. 
Darwinism does not explain the essence or the final causes of things. 
(Heap Åberg 1881 in Broberg 1991: 1087-1090). What Heap Åberg 
means is that scientific and religious views are complementary; the 
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former takes care of the material world, the latter of the mind, spirit and 
soul. One could say that he was quite ahead of his time in his attempt to 
harmonize science and religion. Needless to say, his ideas were certainly 
not without criticism.  
One person who still believed that Darwinism had turned the world 
upside down was Anti Malin. In 1889, the year of Darwin’s death, she 
wrote, “I wish I could avoid tarnishing these pages with such a hateful 
name [Charles Darwin]; however, since this is not possible, I want to 
mediate some traits from this man’s life and doctrine” (Malin 1889 in 
Broberg 1991: 1144; my translation). Malin considered that from first 
wanting to become a priest, Darwin was depraved in both soul and body, 
due to his immoral life style on ships together with uneducated sailors. 
No one with a sound mind could ever believe such nonsense as “Adam 
and Eve”  being descended from apes. This was more typical of views at 
the time. However, such reactions are not very surprising. Even though 
the theory of evolution in biology was already old at the time Darwin 
continued it, the overall accepted theory was clearly that God created the 
heavens and the earth; that Earth was about 6000 years old and that God 
created every species separately and more or less the way they are now. 
Darwin was aware of this. He actually waited 22 years after he left the 
Beagle before he published his work, which unleashed a storm of 
criticism. However, it seems that he had expected it since he writes:  
 
I look with confidence to the future, to young and rising naturalists, 
who will be able to view both with impartiality. Whoever is led to 
believe that species are mutable will do good service by consciously 
expressing his conviction; for only thus can the load of prejudice by 
which this subject is overwhelmed be removed (Darwin 1979: 453). 
Today, 150 years later, we still find ourselves in a similar position. On 
the one hand, there are scientists, scholars and theologians (and laymen 
for that matter) who do not see a problem with harmonizing Darwinism 
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with religious faith while on the other hand, there are those still fighting 
for the separation between scientific and religious theories. More so, 
some still claim Darwinism (or the theory of evolution) to be entirely 
corrupt. As Horan writes, “Even now, Darwin remains the Bête noire of 
fundamentalist Christians […]” (Horan 1979: ix). Let me end this 
introduction with the last sentences of the Origin of Species: 
 
There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having 
been originally breathed into a few forms or into one; and that, 
whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of 
gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful 
and most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved (Darwin 
1979: 439-440). 
The present collection of essays results from several lectures organized 
by the Copenhagen University Network for Science and Religion during 
2009, in honour of Charles Darwin’s publication of the Origin of Species 
150 years earlier. This event was celebrated all over the world.   
 
Presentation of the Chapters 
 
Chapter one 
The term “metaphysics” has its origin in the Greek words μετά (meta, 
meaning beyond, upon or after) and φυσικά (physics). Later metaphysics 
became a philosophy concerned with explaining the nature of being and 
the world. The aim is to clarify the existence of the world and being in 
terms of its properties, cause and effect, time and space, probabilities and 
possibilities. This is done by investigating the basic categories of being 
and the world and how they relate to one another. A metaphysical system 
is hence a system of life through which all aspects and processes of life 
can be understood. It is as such, Momme von Sydow understands the 
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term and suggest that “Darwinian metaphysics” might be a suitable term 
for al historic or recent approaches claiming that Darwinian processes 
essentially offer a universal account of biology, culture and our very 
being. Von Sydow distinguishes between Darwinism and Evolutionary 
theory, between broad and narrow Darwinian metaphysics and between 
gene-Darwinism and universal process Darwinism. After having clarified 
these distinctions he raises the question “Are Darwinian theories 
metaphysical systems?” And ends his chapter with providing two 
theoretical reasons for assuming a Darwinian metaphysics. The first 
reason, he argues would be the problem of induction and the second the 
survival of the fittest.   
 
Chapter two 
In “The impact of Darwinism on Christian Theology, Christopher 
Southgate takes Darwinism to be Darwin’s own basic schema of descent 
with modification on the one hand and the combination of that scheme 
with genetics, molecular biology and the insights of developmental 
systems theory and self-organisation on the other hand. He considers five 
areas of Darwinism taken to be a challenge for Christian thought. The 
aim is to clarify if and to what extent these areas of Darwinism actually 
are a threat for Christian doctrines. The first one concerns the theory of 
evolution itself challenging the creation according to Genesis 1. The 
second challenge is related to the first, namely, gradually evolution vs. 
Divine design. The third challenge derives from Darwin’s The Descent of 
Man where he argues that the human species evolved from other from 
other species and hence challenge the Christian thought of the uniqueness 
of the human species. The forth challenge to Christian though is argued 
to be sociobiology, i.e. religion exists because it had its evolutionary 
purpose and that would explain its existence and its long persistence in 
the human psyche. The last one he calls the greatest challenge. This 
challenge has been discussed for centuries and is best known as the 
theodicy problem: why has there been and still is so much suffering of 
creators? Obviously all five areas of Darwinism are related to another in 
their challenge to Christian thought and the conclusion cannot be other 
that Darwinism is neither the disguised friend nor the enemy.  
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Chapter three 
In his response to Southgate’s reasoning, Andrew Robinson draws on 
René Girard’s theory of atonement, especially regarding the concepts of 
sacrifice and victimhood in order to show how this theory fits into his 
own work on semiotics and Trinitarian theology. According to Robinson, 
the semiotic processes in the world – processes of representation, 
meaning, and interpretation – correspond to the threefold being of God. 
In other words, the Son, or Word is different from the Father but is able 
to represent Him. The Spirit interprets the Word of the Father and makes 
the Word lively and intelligible by virtue of her role of mediation. The 
triadic patterns of semiosis in the world are “vestiges of the Trinity in 
creation”. Inspired by C.S. Pierce’s taxonomy of signs, Jesus is seen as a 
qualisign of the being of God, i.e. the embodiment of the exact quality of 
God’s being. This sign is, in turn, embodied by virtue of the fabric of 
human life. Thereafter, he shows how the approach of combining the 
theory of atonement together with the semiotic model of the Trinity, 
might tie in with Southgate’s approach to the tasks to which humans may 
be called in the fulfilment of God’s creative purposes. One of the 
important elements in such an approach is the recognition that when 
God-ness becomes embodied within the created order, it becomes so as 
failure and as victim. All of creation is in “the same boat” facing 
inevitable extinction. However, humans are able to recognize, interpret 
and respond to the sign of quality of God’s presence in the world and can 
therefore collectively embody that same quality. If that happens, creation 
would become free from its bondage and decay, from fear of death. 
 
Chapter four 
In Creativity through Emergence, a Vision of Nature and God, Antje 
Jackelén asks the question whether emergence can focus on dynamics 
and potentiality in such a way that the notion of levels is both validated 
and relativized. The answer is yes. However several steps are to be taken, 
firstly, the dualistic understanding of nature versus culture has to be 
abandoned. Secondly, design and order need to be revisited. Another way 
of talking about creation than in terms of design and order is presented. 
God can be seen as the “infinitely liberating source of new possibilities 
and new life” or as “serendipitous creativity” or as “the networker”. 
Furthermore, chaos is preferred over order, messiness over clarity. Even 
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though such views are not without problems, they are in consonance with 
scientific views of emergence and self-organization. In the next section 
on creation and emergence, Jackelén presents five critical issues to the 
theories of complexity and emergence and asks for the theological 
relevance of emergence. She argues for keeping the doctrine of creation 
ex nihilo but without its metaphysical restriction to the dualism of form 
and matter. By doing so, creation ex nihilo opens the doors for a 
theological understanding of processes of emergence. The last section 
presents six elements of her vision in light of emergence. In the light of 
emergence how can we talk about (1) nature; (2) human nature; (3) God; 
(4) natural evil; (5) sacramentality; and furthermore, (6) what bearing 
does a heuristic understanding of emergence have on theological method 
in general? 
 
Chapter five 
How should Christian Theology be understood? Is the question posed by 
Lluis Oviedo in Theology after Darwin and Beyond. Should we take the 
indifference stance towards scientific development, especially perhaps 
the theory of evolution, or should we study the relevance of this theory 
for Christian theology? And if so, to what extent can this theory be 
integrated into traditional Christian understanding of the world? What 
impact does Darwinism have on Christian understanding of human life 
and the world? Oviedo shows that adapting Darwinian thought to 
Christian theology has advantages as well as risks. One challenge is that 
the theory of natural selection might render God’s role as creator, 
maintainer and improver of the natural realm redundant. Another 
important theological doctrine that is challenged is the one stating that 
human beings are created in the image of God of love. However, he 
argues, that there are risks to take is not solely the case for theology but 
also counts for philosophy and ethics. For example, the theory of 
evolution might imply nihilism. On the side of the advantages, Oviedo 
put the meaningfulness of process of evolution when the divine is 
introduced into the process. This line of thinking adds purpose and hope 
to the open and dynamic process of evolution rather than seeing it as a 
random process. Another advantage is that the theory brings with it a 
better strategy to deal with the theodicy problem and the doctrine of 
original sin. While conflicts may be unavoidable, meeting the challenges 
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can result in opportunities, when properly understood. Indeed, current 
biological developments theology is called to integrate a more dynamic 
view of reality, conscious pragmatism and a consequent level of realism. 
Finally, moving beyond Darwin’s original theory, Oviedo proposes to 
take into account the recent developments in Christian anthropology.   
 
Chapter six 
Eberhard Herrmann takes us deeper into the argument of the relevance of 
pragmatism for the science-religion debate. He sees intolerance as a 
consequence of dogmatic truth claims that more often than not indirectly 
builds upon the philosophical standpoint called metaphysical realism. His 
aim is hence to try to show that this standpoint is philosophically 
untenable, that its comprehension of truth is particularly problematic, and 
that there is an alternative line of thinking which, inspired by Hilary 
Putnam is called pragmatic realism. The aim is also to try to show that 
pragmatic realism does not lead to intolerance and might be a more 
prosperous way of discussing the relationship between science and 
religion. In part one; he explains metaphysical realism and its 
implications for the science and religion debate. How then could such 
different views of reality, apprehended as entirely real, ever meet? In part 
two the concept of truth is tackled. Are truth and fact synonymous - “p” 
is true if and only if “p”: the sky is blue, if and only if the sky is factually 
blue. In order to tackle this philosophical problem, Hermann makes an 
important distinction between “concepts” and “conceptions”. This is a 
distinction which shows to be very useful not least when it comes to 
religious truth claims. After all, as social, biological beings, when we talk 
about reality, it is with necessity the reality that is given to us. Hence, if 
we want to talk about truth, we need to know how we distinguish 
between true and false in our different kinds of praxis. According to 
Hermann, this does, however, not lead to relativism because, regardless 
of whether it concerns scientific or existential praxis, humans share well-
tried (observational) experiences. Realizing that we reason from within 
our social-biological realm we realize that also other people do so. 
Realizing this, we are ready to advocate freedom of science and freedom 
of views of life, but also freedom from scientific and religious 
fundamentalism.  
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Chapter seven 
Responding to Eberhard Hermann’s pragmatic realism, Kees van Kooten 
Niekerk responds in a critical realist manner. It seems that metaphysical 
realism can be understood in different ways. Whilst Hermann’s 
understanding of metaphysical realism is equal to how Hilary Putnam 
understands it, i.e. an understanding that includes both an ontological and 
epistemological doctrine, van Kooten Niekerk’s understanding is more 
limited and only contains the ontological doctrine. Nevertheless, in van 
Kooten Niekerk’s view, Hermann must have presupposed metaphysical 
realism in this limited way also, because, he asks, how else could a 
reality exercise resistance and make us change our conceptualizations? 
So why cannot Hermann except critical realism? The reason, it seems lies 
again in how critical realism is understood. Even if critical realism 
implies metaphysical realism it does not imply naïve realism, which 
claims that external reality is “exactly” as we perceive it. Critical realism 
maintains that the knowledge we get is with necessity always “human 
knowledge”, i.e. it always dependents on the biological and mental 
human system. Where do Hermann and van Kooten Niekerk meet and 
where do they depart from each other’s view? With some minor 
differences, there are three points of agreement: (1) Aristotelian 
definition of truth; (2) language being the mediator of reality and hence 
that reality always is conceptualized reality (for us); (3) the relationship 
between reality’s resistance and our preconceived ideas. They depart 
however in the significance they attribute to the phenomenon of reality’s 
resistance. In van Kooten Niekerk’s view, reality’s resistance not only 
shows that there is an independent reality (how else could it exercise 
resistance) but also tells us something about what reality is like.  
 
Chapter eight 
A different approach to Darwinism derives from Lars Sandbeck who 
describes one of the consequences it had in Denmark, namely, the 
emergence of a new atheism. Even if the new atheism (one of the perhaps 
most famous advocates being Richard Dawkins) is a movement, 
consisting of different atheist societies, consisting again of individuals 
deriving from different backgrounds and aspirations, there are several 
commonalities between these groups. The similarities are pointed out by 
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analysing four articles (two negative and two positive), (1) Intolerance of 
ignorance, myth and superstition; (2) disregard for the tolerance of 
religion; (3) indoctrination of logic and reason; (4) advancement of a 
naturalistic worldview. In the Scandinavian countries, atheism and 
secularism has been victorious to a degree that of reducing Christianity to 
a symbolic and cultural heritage. Hence, one would expect that there is 
no great marked for promoting atheism anymore. However, such is not 
the case. Rather, the case is that the new atheists strive to remove religion 
from the public realm all together; its symbols, practices, etc. should be 
kept within the private realm only. This suggests that the public Danish 
society should be atheist or anti-religious. What is interesting is that the 
new atheism is not free from rituals and ceremonies (which actually are 
very similar to religious rituals and ceremonies). There seem to be a need 
to highlight special occasions in life (birth, marriage, communion, etc…) 
as well. How does this relate to “free and rational thinking”? There seem 
to be a need to celebrate certain life events as something larger and more 
meaningful. Can this be interpreted as fetish religiosity?      
 
Chapter nine 
The present article continues on the subject matter of atheism and deals 
with three arguments in contemporary new atheism: (1) It is false that 
God created life and humans; (2) it is also false that human beings are 
anything more than matter and (3) it is false that there is anything beyond 
matter. These assumptions are, according to Carl-Reinhold Bråkenhielm 
based on arguments coming from the natural sciences: (1) the theory of 
evolution implying that there is no need for a supernatural explanation of 
the world; (2) neuroscience has proven that there is nothing over and 
above neural activity and (3) physicists have shown that matter is the 
ultimate stuff of reality. One of the basic tenets of neoatheism is that 
Christian belief is incompatible with evolution. According to 
Bråkenhielm, one of the main reasons for this divorce is that Christian 
belief is equalised with creationism. But there are alternative 
interpretations, for example, Deism and what Bråkenhielm calls 
transnaturalism. However, one price to pay for Deists is that God does 
not intervene at all. God is passive. The transnaturalist on the other hand 
can claim that God is a “hidden variable” in, for example, the 
evolutionary development. Hence, whether Christian belief is compatible 
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with evolution or not depends on how one understands the Christian 
faith. The next question is whether all mental activity is merely neural 
activity? The answer is no. Neurological data is consistent with the 
theory of emergence, however, how mental processes emerge from 
neurological processes is still not understood. Finally, Bråkenhielm 
critically analyses scientific materialism, maintaining that the 
eschatology doctrine is unintelligible as a scientific hypotheses (it 
conflicts with the Epicurean hypothesis).  
 
Chapter ten 
In this chapter Ted Peters launches a new field of inquiry and reflection, 
namely, Astrotheology. Astrotheologians are interested in the discoveries 
within astronomy, cosmology, astrobiology, exobiology, astroethics, and 
ExtraTerrestrial Intelligence research (ETI). In order to understand the 
research attentions of astrotheologians, the first section explains 
astrobiology and its related space sciences, their subjects of research and 
methods. For the same purpose, pre-Copernican and post-Copernican 
versions of astrotheology are presented and explained in the second and 
third sections. Hereafter, Peters draws our attention to four essential 
questions concerning (1) the scope of God’s creation; (2) the possible 
amount of incarnation; (3) whether theology should criticise science and 
(4) whether we should prepare for contact. The Christian faith has been 
criticised for being geocentric and anthropocentric, anachronistic and out 
of date. According to Peters it is time to critically examine these ancient 
worldviews and values (especially the value attributed to intellectual 
capacity, intelligence and reason) and the assumptions involved. Hence, 
one task for the astrotheologians is to clarify and correct the regnant 
opinion on the matter of geocentrism by, for example, enlarging the 
scope of the concept of creation. The second item of investigation 
concerns single or multiple incarnation. Peter’s directive to 
astrotheologians is here that they should set the parameters for debating 
Christology and soteriology, because that some endorse multiple 
incarnations while others do not depends on how one thinks of 
soteriology as revelation or atonement. The answer to the question 
whether theology should criticise science is that scientific claims should 
be critically analysed on their presuppositions and assumption of 
theological issues as well as of the scientific enterprise in question. Are 
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the studies scientific or are they (or involve) scienticistic (arguments)? 
Are the studies methodological or ontological reductionist? Is there a 
hidden agenda? The last question of whether we should be prepared for 
contact is also answered by yes. One reason is that science is often seen 
as progressive and successful, religion is pictured as old-fashioned and 
obstructive. Be this the case or not, whether a day of contact comes or 
not, prospects of ET contact should prompt in the theologian a sense of 
responsibility.        
 
Chapter eleven 
Robert John Russell deepens the investigating of scientists’ search for 
ETI further by looking at the philosophical and theological implications. 
This is done in the first part of the article. In the second part, he 
investigated the philosophical and theological assumptions and 
presuppositions which lie within, and in some ways shape, the ongoing 
scientific research for intelligent life in the universe. The method he uses 
he calls Creative Mutual Interation (CMI), which implies that a critical 
philosophical analysis of the implications of science on theology is 
performed. Thereafter, new questions for scientific research based on 
theological insights are suggested. Since there is no clear answer to the 
question whether life in the universe is rare or abundant, we can only 
theoretically estimate a relative abundance of life in the universe. Even if 
such theoretical enterprises are controversial, they seem to stimulate 
scientists to search for ETI. However, it seems that these scientific 
enterprises are based on philosophical presuppositions. Russell discusses 
and critically investigates four of them: (1) ETI exists in relative 
abundance; (2) ETI can be recognized by their signal; (3) ETI wants to be 
discovered and (4) ETI is more likely benign than malevolent. In turn, 
these philosophical presuppositions are based on theological 
assumptions. (1´) God created the laws and constants of nature 
throughout the universe so that self-conscious creatures could evolve. 
(2´) This philosophical presupposition is based on at least the following 
theological assumptions. (a) The sign of the logos tradition; (b) creation 
in the imago dei. (3´) All life in the universe has been created by the God 
who is Trinity, a God who is intrinsically relational. (4´) Dei caritas est. 
Hence, similarly to Ted Peters, Russell invites us to be critical towards 
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scientific claims when these claims concern subject matters which are not 
specifically scientific.  
 
 
 
 
The mystery of the beginning of all things is insoluble by us; and I 
for one must be content to remain an agnostic. 
 
Charles Darwin 
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Darwinian Metaphysics 
Momme von Sydow 
 
Introduction 
 
‘Darwinian metaphysics’ may be seen as a compound of two antonyms, 
since Darwinism has often been treated as a scientific theory opposing 
religious and philosophical kinds of metaphysics. Correspondingly, the 
use of such a term may appear provocative, almost as if one were using 
‘Darwinian religion’ to designate a general Darwinian approach. The 
approach and the term itself, therefore, are bound to elicit criticism from 
positivistic as well as metaphysical positions. Nevertheless, ‘Darwinian 
metaphysics’ appears to be a suitable term for all historic or recent 
approaches claiming that Darwinian processes essentially offer a 
universal account of biology, culture and our very being. Although 
Charles Darwin did indeed mainly concentrate on biology, he speculated 
that his theory would at least “give zest […] to whole metaphysics” 
(Notebook B, p. 228). Before we discuss Darwinian metaphysics in the 
narrow sense, based on a radicalization of Darwinism, we will briefly 
discuss the proposition that in fact several quite different approaches may 
be interpreted as Darwinian metaphysics. 
Darwinian metaphysics in a broad sense is difficult to characterize, 
since throughout intellectual history ‘Darwinism’ has been presented in 
different forms and has been used to build syntheses with many other 
ideas. For instance, Darwinism, even if defined as a biological theory of 
natural selection, has had an influence on quite different kinds of social 
Darwinism, from laissez-faire capitalism to racism to anarchism. 
Likewise, historians have linked Darwinism to many philosophical 
systems—for instance, to that of Herbert Spencer, Ernst Haeckel, 
William James, and Charles Sanders Peirce. Furthermore, although 
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Darwinism sometimes seems to be linked to progress (at least in the 
sense of adaptation), Darwinism allows for local adaptation only and 
hence is generally considered to preclude the possibility of genuine 
progress (see, e.g., Gould 2002)—not least because the process 
underlying evolution is interpreted to remain essentially static (see, e.g., 
von Sydow 2012). Darwinism, with the central concept of struggle for 
life, particularly among conspecifics, appears to emphasize conflict over 
co-operation. Moreover, Darwinism at least probabilistically seems to 
have been correlated with materialism and atheism. Yet one should also 
note that from the very formulation of Darwinism there have been 
attempts to interpret natural selection in the opposite direction, linking 
natural selection to God’s invisible hand. Historically, the relationship 
between science and religion has been more volatile and intricate than the 
actual conflict today between a radicalized Darwinism and a radicalized 
religious fundamentalism would suggest. Darwin himself not only 
studied theology at the University of Cambridge, but he seems in fact to 
have aimed at retaining some aspects of William Paley’s natural theology 
in his elaboration of the theory of natural selection (even though the 
theory did indeed later contribute both to Darwin’s own increasing 
agnosticism and a quick decline in the estimation of Paleyian natural 
theology; see von Sydow 2005).  
 
Darwinism and evolutionary theory 
 
It is important to distinguish Darwinism from evolutionary theory as such 
(evolution was advocated in different schools in France and Germany 
before the publication of The Origin of Species). Furthermore, some 
philosophers (such as Teilhard de Chardin, Henri Bergson, and Alfred 
North Whitehead) made interesting proposals for a ‘metaphysics of 
evolution’ that must be seen in contrast to any ‘Darwinian metaphysics’. 
On the whole, the relevance of biological Darwinism to ethical or 
religious issues is highly controversial. There was reaction against the 
influence of Darwin in the fields of philosophy as well as theology, as 
well as objection on the part of several authors to the asserted direct 
relevance of biological theories to ethics (e.g., G. E. Moore) or revealed 
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religion (e.g., K. Barth). Whether one can postulate an epistemic 
autonomy of these disciplines, however, seems to depend on one’s pre-
existing logical, epistemic, ontological positions, and also on the details 
of one’s biological account. Correspondingly, different sub-paradigms of 
Darwinism displayed different views on the autonomy of culture or 
ethics. Theories that can been characterized  (at least partly) as 
Darwinian, such as Darwin’s first formulation of Darwinism; 
Weismann’s Neo-Darwinism; the early evolutionary synthesis; the late 
evolutionary synthesis; gene-Darwinian socio-biology; and multi-level-
Darwinism, held different positions with respect to reductionism and the 
autonomy of sociology and ethics (see, e.g., von Sydow 2012).  Overall, 
the heterogeneity of thought on Darwinian metaphysics has two main 
causes; first, the variation of underlying biological theories and 
reductionist leanings throughout history; and second, the fact that 
‘auxiliary hypotheses’ needed to link Darwinism to metaphysics sprang 
from various traditions and were relevant in the elaboration of 
metaphysical systems. 
Darwinian metaphysics in a more narrow sense is based on a 
“purer” Darwinism and (less pluralistic) understanding of the theory. K. 
R. Popper, D. Campbell, R. Dawkins, D. C. Dennett and (arguably) D. 
Hull may be cited as main proponents of this Darwinian metaphysics—of 
which two types need to be distinguished:  gene-Darwinism and 
(universal) process-Darwinism.  
 
Two types of Darwinism 
 
Gene-Darwinism 
The first type, gene-Darwinism, is a radical interpretation of Darwinism 
that became popular in the 1970s.  Its basic ideas have been popularized, 
particularly by R. Dawkins and G. C. Williams. Pure gene-Darwinism 
reduces living entities and processes in the biological and social worlds 
to single selfish genes in Darwinian processes struggling for survival (for 
a critical survey, see von Sydow 2012). Phenotypes as well as products 
of organisms, such as beavers’ dams or human habitation structures (so-
called ‘extended phenotypes’) are interpreted as mere ephemeral vehicles 
UNDERSTANDING DARWIN AND DARWINIAN UNDERSTANDING 
 
 
28 
of potentially immortal selfish genes (Hull and colleagues deviates on the 
issue of vehicles and sees them as interactors, Hull, et al., 2001). In the 
words of R. Dawkins, just as “Chicago gangsters, our genes have 
survived, in some cases for millions of years, in a highly competitive 
world. This entitles us to expect certain qualities in our genes. I shall 
argue that a predominant quality to be expected in a successful gene is 
ruthless selfishness. This gene selfishness will usually give rise to 
selfishness in individual behaviour.” (The Selfish Gene, 1976, p. 2; cf. 
Dawkins 1983).  
One reason to regard gene-Darwinism as a purification or 
radicalization of Darwinism is that one defining aspect of traditional 
Darwinism (at least Darwin’s Darwinism) is a reductionist stance in the 
units of selection debate by a primary focus on individuals (which, 
according to Gould 2002, is one of three defining aspects of Darwinism). 
The focus on selfish genes (gene-reductionism) thus radicalizes the 
reductive tendency inherent in traditional Darwinism as well.  
Moreover, just as Darwin’s Darwinism has been contrasted to 
earlier romantic accounts which stressed the evolution and “unfolding“ of 
nature and the role of form and structure, gene-Darwinism in a second 
sense radicalizes Darwinism in this respect as well, by degrading 
phenotypes to puppets or mere vehicles of genes (germ-line 
reductionism).  
Finally, whereas paradigms that were perceived as Darwinian 
(such as Darwin’s Darwinism and the evolutionary synthesis in its later 
phase) remained to advocate a limited process-pluralism, gene-
Darwinism reduces all evolutionary processes to the only truly Darwinian 
natural selection (process reductionism). For example, sexual selection 
from the perspective of single genes cannot be seen as a mechanism in its 
own right (referring to auto-selection); rather, the process becomes 
identical to natural selection (both equally referring to hetero-selection). 
It may even be argued that the entity ‘gene’—or, more abstractly, the 
entity of an atomic ‘replicator’ (see Dawkins 1983)—directly 
corresponds to or is equivalent to a Darwinian process of replication, 
blind variation and external selection (von Sydow 2012).  
However that may be, according to gene-Darwinism there is 
essentially only one entity— the selfish gene— and only one 
evolutionary process—a Darwinian process. God, according to universal 
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Darwinism is at best a blind watchmaker. The question of whether 
Dawkins’ and Dennett’s prominent critiques of religious thought are 
directly linked to this position may remain open (The God Delusion, 
2006; Breaking the Spell, 2006). Nevertheless, if one advocates a pure 
gene-Darwinian position and takes up the sociobiological battle cry to 
‘biologise’ social sciences and ethics (E. O. Wilson), one ought not to be 
surprised when several gene-Darwinian authors (despite R. Dawkins’ 
more cautious position on ethics) consider maximisation of gene-
replication as the only ultimate biological categorical ‘imperative’. 
 
Process-Darwinism 
The second type of Darwinian metaphysics is process-Darwinism, with 
roots going back to A. Weismann and C. S. Peirce. Whereas at first 
Weismann advocated the omnipotence (‘Allmacht’) of the one basic 
process of natural selection, he later postulated several levels of what are 
now referred to as Darwinian processes. During the course of the 
twentieth century the main contributions to process-Darwinism were 
made by R. Campbell, D. C. Dennett, D. Hull, H. C. Plotkin, K. R. 
Popper, and R. Dawkins. Process-Darwinism need not be committed to 
gene-reductionism; and yet it remains a defining characteristic of 
Darwinian process reductionism.  
Whereas gene-Darwinism allows for natural selection on the single 
level of selfish genes alone, process-Darwinism claims that these 
processes exist on several levels, and in fact constitute the only 
remaining processes of adaptation. D. Campbell (1960), in an early main 
contribution, advocated that Darwinian processes were the only processes 
of “knowledge acquisition”. Darwinian processes represented the 
algorithmic structure of natural selection (in a broad sense) as defined by 
the two-step-process of blind-variation-and-selective-retention (Campbell 
1960). The last of the two sub-processes may likewise be called ‘external 
selection’ or ‘environmental selection’, since it generalizes natural 
selection (in the narrow sense). Finally, Darwinian processes are 
normally assumed to lead to a gradual evolution.  
What are the main fields in which a process-Darwinian account has 
been explored? Even within biology, the revived multi-level approach in 
evolutionary biology, criticizing pure gene-Darwinism (Gould 2002; 
Wilson & Wilson 2007), assumes (at least in some of its proposals) full 
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Darwinian processes (for instance, on the level of species; cf. the work of 
M. T. Ghinselin and D. Hull). However this may be, the term “process-
Darwinism” is usually only used in accounts where Darwinian processes 
have been advocated outside of evolutionary biology as well. Proposals 
have been discussed in a number of areas, from immunology, neurology, 
and language-development to the three main areas of philosophy of 
science, psychology of trial-and-error learning and creativity, and 
economics (see Table 1 for an overview).  
 
Table 1. Process-Darwinism and specific Darwinian processes in 
selected disciplines 
Discipline Object  
of Evolution 
Darwinian  
Processes 
Authors 
Biology Genes Blind mutation 
and natural 
selection 
G. C. Williams,  
R. Dawkins 
Psychology Operants, acts, 
associations 
Trial and error B. F. Skinner,  
D. T. Campbell 
Philosophy of 
Science 
Theories Conjectures and 
refutations 
K. R. Popper, 
S. Tolmin 
Economics Firms, products, 
routines 
Innovation and 
market selection 
M. Friedman 
 
 
First, falsificationism, founded by Sir K. R. Popper, had a strong impact 
in the philosophy of science, but was first advocated without explicitly 
linking it to Darwinism. Popper’s original position is usually introduced 
based on asymmetry between verification /confirmation and 
falsification—a theory can never be fully verified by instances but may 
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be falsified by a single one. On this basis Popper opposed any form of 
inductive confirmation and argued that scientific theories can be falsified 
only. Yet in his book, Objective Knowledge – an Evolutionary Approach 
(1972), Popper in fact closely linked his postulated theory of conjecture-
and-refutations to Darwinian evolution. Correspondingly, for Popper, the 
development of ideas was irrational and analogous to chance mutation. 
Likewise, R. Dawkins (1976; cf. 1983) advocated that ideas evolved by a 
Darwinian process. He coined the term ‘meme’ as analogous to ‘gene’ 
for atomic replicating and mutating elements of thought that are the units 
of selection. Whereas Dawkins assumed a radically reductionist stance 
within biology, for the meme-level he appeared to advocate a degree of 
autonomy. Although the consistency of his position has been criticized, it 
nevertheless represents an interesting attempt at reviving the idea of a 
cultural level; here by replacing with Darwinian processes such 
traditional notions as ‘logos’, ‘spirit’ or ‘Geist’.   
Second, trial-and-error learning (or ‘operant conditioning’) in 
psychology has been central to the behaviourist concept of learning. 
Although one may interpret the rigid research program of behaviourism 
partly as a bulwark against biologism, paradoxically B. Skinner actually 
postulated that he was introducing a Darwinian process at a second level. 
Furthermore, at a later date the analogy of trial-and-error learning with 
mutation and selection (or, more correctly, with blind-variation-and-
selective-retention) was emphasized (Campbell 1960; Hull, et al. 2001). 
Likewise, psychological creativity has been interpreted as a Darwinian 
process (by D. Campbell and D. K. Simonton; cf. Campbell 1960 and 
Gabora 2005).  
Finally, analogies between neo-classical economics and neo-
Darwinian biology have been discussed. Some have treated Popper’s 
philosophy as founding a philosophy of radical capitalism (although in 
The Open Society he actually allowed for some degree of state 
intervention). Similarly, the work of M. Friedman, who backed the neo-
liberal policies of the last decades of the previous century, was inspired 
by Darwinian ideas. Moreover, several proposals in economics have been 
made that directly refer to the concept of universal Darwinism, where  
companies or routines have been interpreted as evolving by Darwinian 
processes, with innovations corresponding to mutations and given 
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consumer preferences to the natural selection by the invisible hand of the 
market (confer, e.g., Hodgson 2002).  
With respect to these Darwinian processes, it is debatable whether 
their postulated combination (in a process-Darwinian account) in fact 
yields implications that are quite non-Darwinian (e.g., non-blind 
variation at some level); also whether this leads to inconsistencies, thus 
transcending strict process-Darwinism (von Sydow 2012). Likewise, 
although process-Darwinism normally continues to stress competition 
(the struggle for life) over co-operation (particularly in its application to 
economics), it should be noted that process-Darwinism allows for the 
argument that our thoughts, ideas, and theories die instead of us (P. 
Munz), mitigating a nature red in tooth and claw. Finally, although 
advocates of process-Darwinism usually subscribe to a naturalistic 
research program, the emphasis on the algorithmic level of natural 
selection (cf. works of D. C. Dennett or P. Munch) may be interpreted to 
go beyond this commitment, basing the theory on a mathematical 
structure, a form or a principle, rather than on matter or observations.  
Are Darwinian theories metaphysical systems? 
 
Let us return, however, to the question of whether it is appropriate to 
treat these Darwinian theories as metaphysical systems. Depending on 
one's understanding of metaphysics, such labeling may either be too high 
an honour for these sometimes philosophically naïve Darwinian 
theories— metaphysics traditionally being the highest discipline of 
philosophy—or else it is too severe a discredit to them to be assigned to a 
philosophical discipline that concerns itself with “meaningless” 
questions. Many authors today, however, use the term ‘metaphysics’ in a 
more liberal way, neither necessarily referring to an all-embracing 
philosophical system set up a priori by a single author, nor accusing 
metaphysics of being a vacuous system of tautological claims. The term 
‘metaphysics’ is not restricted to continental philosophy, but rather has 
also come into use in what may still be broadly called “analytical 
philosophy” . Yet what would the response be if one were to argue that 
these Darwinian theories were the result of plain empirical induction 
involving no metaphysics?  
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First, historically, Darwin’s great synthesis was clearly not only a 
great empirical synthesis, but a theoretical one as well, formulated while 
ordering the evidence gathered during his journey with the HMS Beagle 
in the light of available theories of his day (being strongly influenced for 
instance by Malthus, Paley, Lyell, Grant, etc.). Interestingly, these 
influences extended to theological approaches (Rev. Malthus and Rev. 
Paley). Darwin himself acknowledged the influence of William Paley’s 
natural theology, and conceded that everyone with such metaphysical 
preconceptions would have exaggerated the belief in adaptation and 
“naturally extend[ed] too far the action of natural selection […]” 
(Darwin, Descent of Man, 1877; cf. von Sydow 2005, p. 154). This is the 
case, although Darwin’s theory of natural selection seems to have dealt a 
death blow to natural theology as well as to Darwin’s own belief. 
However, Darwin’s Darwinism in its initial formulation was even by 
Darwin’s own claims not based on ‘plain empirical induction’ but rather 
was influenced by theoretical and even theological considerations. Even 
were this not so, one could still question a presupposed rationalist 
understanding of metaphysics. Notably one also hears the term ‘empirical 
metaphysics’ today.  
Second, gene-Darwinism and process-Darwinism are not generally 
advocated in the context of a single specific discipline, but rather are 
universally advocated for all living entities. Attempts have been made to 
apply gene-Darwinism in order to “biologise” sociology and ethics. 
Process-Darwinism has developed in biology, psychology, the history of 
ideas, and economics. Hence the term “universal Darwinism”, introduced 
by Dawkins (1983), seems appropriate. If generality of the intended field 
of application is taken as a criterion for a theory's being termed a 
metaphysical approach, and if another criterion is the abstractness and 
simplicity of the basic explanatory concepts (for both types of Darwinian 
metaphysics: Darwinian processes), then we are clearly concerned with 
metaphysical systems.  
Finally, and most importantly, the claimed generality of Darwinian 
processes is to be classified as a metaphysical approach even if one 
adopts a rationalist understanding of metaphysics based on self-evident 
principles or a priori truth. In fact, major authors of Darwinian 
metaphysics (Popper, Campbell, Dawkins, and Dennett) present their 
approach based on principles or theoretical arguments, which in a way 
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constitutes a ‘fundamentalist’ position. Paradoxically, Darwinian 
metaphysics, often depicted as empirical generalization or a positivist 
“success story,” actually seems to revive the rationalist project of an 
ultimate theoretical justification of a metaphysical position based on first 
principles. It may suffice here simply to mention Popper and Dawkins. 
Popper did not argue inductively in favour of a high generality of 
Darwinian processes, but instead advocated their universality in 
principle. His argument is in fact based on logical considerations--the 
above-mentioned logical asymmetry of falsification and verification--and 
is linked to the fundamental problem of induction that is attributed to the 
philosopher David Hume (see below). It is only on this basis that he 
could argue in such a general way that the “growth of our knowledge is 
the result of a process closely resembling what Darwin called ‘natural 
selection’; that is, the natural selection of hypotheses: our knowledge 
consists, at every moment, of those surviving so far in their struggle for 
existence; a competitive struggle which eliminates those hypotheses 
which are unfit. [...] The theory of knowledge which I wish to propose is 
a largely Darwinian theory of the growth of knowledge. From the 
amoeba to Einstein, the growth of knowledge is always the same […].” 
(Popper 1972, p. 261). Dawkins also seems to be committed to a 
rationalist foundation of universal Darwinism, making it a truly 
metaphysical account (1983). He claimed that Darwinism is not only 
empirically, but also theoretically “probably the only theory that can 
adequately account for phenomena that we associate with life” [italics 
added]. Other explanations were “in principle incapable of [...] 
explaining the evolution of organized, adaptive complexity” (pp. 403, 
404). Dawkins has argued against any form of instructivism: “Even if 
acquired characters are inherited on some planet, evolution there will still 
rely on a Darwinian guide for its adaptive direction” (p. 409).  
 
Reasons to assume a Darwinian metaphysics 
 
In this last section, two theoretical reasons will briefly be considered for 
assuming a Darwinian metaphysics. 
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The problem of induction  
First, a main ‘metaphysical’ argument favouring Darwinian metaphysics 
is linked to the fundamental problem of induction often attributed to 
David Hume in the eighteenth century. This problem may have had an 
even longer history; for in scholastic philosophy, first formulations of the 
problem were paradoxically used to support religious or rationalist 
positions against empirical ones. Hume, however, with the goal of 
justifying empirical induction, showed that one cannot “prove that those 
instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which 
we have had experience” (A Treatise of Human Nature, 1739/1740, Book 
I, Part III, sec. VI). Nature may change its course and our inductions be 
rendered false. This in fact implies that all our knowledge, including such 
a simple and apparently well supported claim as “the sun will rise 
tomorrow”, may be fallacious. Popper concluded that no confirmation of 
a theory will ever make a theory ‘truer’ or more ‘probable’ than a less 
supported alternative (provided the alternative has not already been 
falsified). Accordingly, there are no true or probable theories—only 
theories that have or have not been falsified. Such a ‘negative solution’ to 
the problem of induction in Popper’s logic of discovery asserts that 
scientists in fact make blind conjectures and that they should rather aim 
solely at refutations (falsifications). This, moreover, supports a universal 
justification for Darwinian processes of blind conjectures and 
environmental refutations.  
The fundamental problem of induction is a highly intricate and 
hotly disputed issue in philosophy and cannot be treated in any further 
detail here. Yet it must be noted that Popper’s position is highly 
controversial in philosophy of science (starting with early criticism by W. 
V. O. Quine, H. Putnam and I. Lakatos). Several authors, for instance, 
have argued that the postulated asymmetry of confirmation and 
disconfirmation does not hold with regard to complex or compound 
theories (where it is not clear which aspect of a theory is to be falsified; 
nor with respect to probabilistic relationships (as they cannot be falsified 
by single disconfirmations).  Moreover, one may object to the link 
between the problem of induction and falsificationism: Although plain 
falsification of a formerly “valid” rule deductively proves that the rule 
does not hold overall, a falsification applied to the past rule does not 
logically prove that the rule may not hold in the future. If one assumes 
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that prediction is essential to organisms as well as to scientists, the 
problem of induction seems to apply equally to falsifications. Although 
the problem of induction remains fundamental, it may therefore be 
argued that this problem does not necessarily favour a falsificationist 
approach over a confirmatory one. Furthermore, in recent years there has 
been a revival of Bayesian approaches, both in philosophy of science 
(e.g., C. Howson and P. Urbach) and in psychology (e.g., M. Oaksford 
and N. Chater); that is, it is argued that people, when testing logical 
hypotheses, search for data in a rational, informed, and more active way 
than would follow on the basis of Darwinian processes alone.  
 
Survival of the fittest 
The second way Darwinian metaphysics may have gained plausibility (at 
least in popular writings) may be linked to the ambiguous meaning of the 
phrase ‘survival of the fittest’. Darwin borrowed this expression from H. 
Spencer in 1869 as a synonym for ‘natural selection’. Yet, although it 
appears on the surface to be both testable and plausible, it may also be 
interpreted as a tautology: that is, if fitness is interpreted in terms of 
survival, this results in the phrase of the ‘survival of the survivor’. More 
refined definitions are of course possible and have been proposed. For 
instance, “fitness” is often defined in terms of reproduction; but this does 
not in fact resolve the problem, since one would then be obliged to 
measure the term ‘survival’ in terms of reproduction as well (in order to 
avoid a formulation that is plainly false). Similarly, one may consider a 
probabilistic formulation of fitness. Once again one would need to look 
at both sides of the phrase which once again would produce a truism: 
“those organisms probably survive which probably survive”. The 
possible problems arising from these “improved” reformulations may in 
fact question whether “survival of the fittest” is always being used in a 
testable way. It is of course beyond reasonable doubt that evolution and 
Darwinian evolutionary theory provide a plethora of testable and very 
well tested theories. Nonetheless, it seems plausible that at times it is 
only more specific theories that are tested, leaving the ‘survival of the 
fittest’ as an explanatory framework rather than as a testable theory. 
Moreover, it is not claimed that “survival of the fittest” is always and 
necessarily used in a tautological way. Actually there seem to be 
falsifiable ways to define “survival of the fittest” (von Sydow 2006). 
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Nevertheless, the tautological meaning, broadly applied, may well have 
played a role at least in popular versions of universal Darwinism (von 
Sydow, in press). As such this seems connected to the observation of 
biologists Gould and Lewontin, that adaptive explanations are sometimes 
nothing but ad hoc ‘just-so-stories’. Interestingly, moreover, it was 
Popper who pointed out that a “considerable part of Darwinism is not of 
the nature of an empirical theory, but is a logical truism.” (1972, p. 69). 
This is particularly noteworthy, since he modeled his own approach on 
an analogy to Darwinism. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Outlined here are only a few possible discussions of the metaphysical 
arguments, with no claim at providing a definitive result. Significantly, 
the apparently positivist approach of a universal Darwinism appears to 
revive the philosophical disputes on metaphysical issues in a way that 
seems relevant to several scientific domains. Other interesting topics in 
Darwinian metaphysics (particularly for process-Darwinism) concern 
conceptual and empirical issues. Are mutations, trials, conjectures, 
innovations, and new ideas actually strictly blind? Is selection strictly 
external or environmental? Is variation sometimes supplemented by 
synthesis? These are controversial matters, partly raised concurrently in 
varying domains of process-Darwinism (e.g., Gabora 2005, Hodgson 
2002, von Sydow 2012). This, however, brings us back to the earlier 
point made about tautological definitions. That is, it may depend on our 
definition whether we define Darwinian processes so widely that 
Darwinian metaphysics becomes almost a truism, or whether we define 
them as rigidly as possible, with the result that they become false almost 
by definition. Within metaphysics, one generally preaches to the 
converted if one argues that – beside factual issues – definitional issues 
often decide over the truth or falsity of theories or even of metaphysical 
systems of theories. However, in Darwinian metaphysics it seems clear 
that a greater awareness of definitional practices and implications may be 
helpful.  
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There is a place where we are always alone with our own 
mortality, where we must simply have something greater than 
ourselves to hold onto – God or history or politics or literature 
or a belief in the healing powers of love, or even righteous anger 
… A reason to believe, a way to take the world by the throat and 
insist that there is more to this life than we have ever imagined.  
 
Dorothy Allison 
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 Darwinism’s Impact on Christian Theology1 
Christopher Southgate 
Introduction 
 
I shall take Darwinism to include not only Darwin’s own basic schema of 
descent with modification, which depends on the heritability of 
spontaneously occurring variation between individuals of a species, and 
on competition for resources, leading to natural selection, but also the 
combination of that scheme first with genetics and then molecular 
biology, and more recently with the insights of developmental systems 
theory and self-organisation. I shall also touch, not without certain 
scepticism, on the expansion of Darwinism into the areas of sociobiology 
and evolutionary psychology. 
It is widely supposed, particularly on the basis of the work of the 
boldest exponents of the latter two theories, that Darwinism is the arch-
foe of Christian thought, liable at any moment to put it out of business. 
E.O. Wilson writes that: 
 
[W]e have come to the crucial stage in the history of biology when 
religion itself is subject to the explanations of the natural sciences 
. . . sociobiology can account for the very origin of mythology by the 
                                           
1 This essay is adapted from a lecture given for the Copenhagen University Network 
of Science and Religion on June 2 2009. A version of part of this text will appear in 
‘Re-reading Genesis, John and Job: a Christian’s response to Darwinism’ in Zygon: 
Journal of Religion and Science, June 2011. 
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principle of natural selection acting on the genetically evolving 
material structure of the human brain. 
 
If this interpretation is correct, the ﬁnal decisive edge enjoyed by 
scientiﬁc naturalism will come from its capacity to explain traditional 
religion, its chief competitor, as a wholly material phenomenon. (Wilson 
1978, 192)  
And that sort of polemical statement has fuelled the fear driving that 
strange phenomenon, creationism, and its contemporary cousin, 
intelligent design. On the other hand, there has been willingness among 
some theologians - I think particularly of Arthur Peacocke to whom I 
personally owe so much - to try and reclaim Darwinism as ‘the disguised 
friend’ of Christianity. Peacocke draws on the work of the 19th Century 
theologian Aubrey Moore, who wrote: 
 
The one absolutely impossible conception of God, in the present 
day, is that which represents him as an occasional visitor. Science 
has pushed the deist’s God further and further away, and at the 
moment when it seemed as if he would be thrust out all together 
Darwinism appeared, and, under the disguise of a foe, did the work 
of a friend. It has conferred upon philosophy and religion an 
inestimable benefit, by showing us that we must choose between 
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two alternatives. Either God is everywhere present in nature, or he 
is nowhere.2  
Moore is claiming that evolution can liberate theology from too static and 
deist a view of the creator, and allow theologians to develop a view of a 
God who ‘makes the world make itself’. Such a view might also, it was 
thought by early Christian apologists for Darwinism such as Asa Gray, 
ease the problem of theodicy posed by the understanding, which grew 
steadily as science advanced, that nature is ‘red in tooth and claw’, 
characterised by competition for scarce resources, and therefore by 
widespread suffering and the extinction of most of the species that have 
ever lived. John Hedley Brooke, writing of this period, notes that ‘a 
process in which the laws were designed but the details left to chance 
might explain nature’s more repulsive products without having to ascribe 
them directly to divine action’ (Brooke 2003, 206). 
In the remainder of this essay I shall touch on five areas in which 
Darwinism may be – or is often thought to be – a challenge to the 
framework of Christian thought. I shall show that two of these areas need 
not be seen as problematic – if anything, they help clarify issues for 
theologians. On a third, the scientific explanation of religious belief, I 
think it is still too early to tell what the impact will be – though I shall 
offer some pointers. A related area is the question of early human 
evolution and what part religion played in it, and how and whether 
Christians can defend the notion that humans are in the image and 
likeness of God. The final issue is that same one of the problem of 
suffering in evolution that I mentioned above. This remains a huge and 
underexplored puzzle for Christianity, one which has received too little 
attention precisely because of the way polarised voices on the other 
issues have been able to shout louder. I shall indicate why some 
traditional theological moves will not work in relation to this problem, 
and just a few ways in which I think it might be explored.  
                                           
2  Quoted in Peacocke 2001, 136. This motif of Darwinism as the disguised friend of 
Christianity has been a particular influence on Peacocke, and is also found in the 
writing of John F. Haught – see Haught 2000, especially Ch. 4.  
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I shall conclude finally that Darwinism, understood in its broadest 
sense, is neither the death-knell of Christianity nor its disguised friend, 
but offers Christians a powerful and beautiful, but deeply troubling 
narrative, one which challenges theologians to probe more deeply and 
honestly what we can and cannot say about the God who made us. 
I write as a practising Christian, committed to a view of all created 
reality as made out of absolutely nothing through the loving purposes of 
a God who can be known as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, a God who has 
acted to save creation, and will ultimately transform it. In stating that I 
recognise that many of my readers may not share that conviction, or 
would express it in different ways.  
 
The first three challenges 
 
First and simplest, at least on initial inspection, the evolutionary narrative 
that unfolded in the 19th century - the biosphere having evolved very 
gradually over a vast length of time - makes unsustainable a literal 
reading of Genesis 1 in terms of a six-day creation. There are of course 
all sorts of other reasons for not reading Genesis 1 literally, including its 
internal puzzles about how one can have days before the creation of the 
sun, and its tensions with the second creation account in Genesis 2. So 
this matter, surely, need not delay us long. Except just to note for further 
discussion later that the reading of Genesis 3 in terms of a fall of the 
whole creation, occasioned by the sin of Adam, has been a very tempting 
way of accounting for suffering in creation, and that reading too comes 
under criticism in an evolutionary understanding. I return to this question 
below. 
The second and related problem is that of design, a term that the 
intelligent design movement has given a bad name. It is worth noting that 
neither of those two very different creation stories in Genesis 1 and 2 
describes God as designer of a mechanism. Indeed the first account, to 
which literalist interpreters seem principally drawn, uses two very 
different, characteristically theological expressions for the divine activity. 
First, the verb bara’ - in its Qal form only used for God’s activity, hence, 
by inference, for what God alone can do - bring an entity into existence 
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from absolutely nothing. Thereafter we read the sonorously repeated 
claim that God spoke a series of jussives, those great ‘let-there-be’s- by 
which creation unfolded, and in each case it was so. Both of these are a 
far cry from the careful mechanical artificer inferred by Archdeacon 
William Paley from his studies of biological adaptation. It is one of the 
curiosities of the contemporary debate on intelligent design that in an 
effort to demonstrate God by reasoning about the natural world it so 
seriously presumes upon the biblical text. 
The third challenge that was very important to the nineteenth 
century debate was Darwin’s indication, most explicitly in his The 
Descent of Man (1871), that the human being must be regarded as one 
evolved animal among many, rather than the utterly distinctive and 
distinctively ensouled creature that the Christian tradition had understood 
it to be.  The debate about human uniqueness rages to and fro. Of course, 
we can now accept, as thinkers 150 years ago would have found more 
difficult, that the way our bodies are put together is very closely related 
to that of many other creatures, our own nearest cousins the other 
primates, but also other mammals. The complete sequence of the mouse 
genome has recently been solved. It shows more similarities with the 
human than had been anticipated (interestingly it is in the areas relating 
to sexual expression that the differences are most marked). All this 
reminds us that we should be very grateful for the similarities between 
our biochemistry and physiology and that of other organisms, because it 
is on that that so much of medical research has been based. Having 
reached a stage of my life in which I take a whole variety of medications 
I am very much aware of the importance of all that work in bacterial and 
animal systems. I am inspired, too, rather than repelled, by the thought 
that the complex of genes that controlled my development as an embryo 
and gave me this body of mine, is profoundly ancient, and shared with a 
wide variety of vertebrates. So it is good that we are animals, and good 
too that we remember how dependent we are in all sorts of ways on the 
rest of the biosphere, from the bacteria in our gut to the photosynthesists 
that allow us to breathe, and even the marine organisms whose use of 
sulphur betaines to combat salt stress allows the recycling of marine 
sulphur back onto the land.  
So humans should celebrate our relatedness to other organisms, 
and not be threatened by it. What tends to threaten us, however, is not 
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biochemistry, but the thought that our moral and spiritual life might not 
be distinctive. Again, as I say, the science is fluid. For every 
development that tells us that other animals possess sophisticated social 
and even proto-moral behaviour, there is another that reminds us of the 
extraordinary powers of learning that humans possess, and the 
extraordinary sophistication of our self-consciousness and theory of other 
minds. Strangely enough, when I was drafting the lecture on which this 
essay is based, on a British train journey, I fell into conversation with a 
social psychologist who was telling me that humans are believed to be 
the only species in which adults use crying as emotional release and for 
the communication of emotion, and that there is recent work suggesting 
this might have been a great breakthrough in the evolution of human 
sociality.3 
So I fail to see that our distinctiveness is meaningfully threatened. 
It is moreover affirmed, for Christians, by the Incarnation. It was as a 
human that God, in the words of the Gospel of John, took flesh and dwelt 
among us. To record this is not to deny the very important concept of 
‘deep incarnation’ of which Niels Gregersen has written: Christ died an 
evolutionary victim – an organism without offspring (Gregersen 2001). I 
shall return to this point of Gregersen’s later. But humanity is forever 
affirmed and blessed by the Incarnation. Indeed, in the project Andrew 
Robinson and I are currently pursuing, the Incarnation offers us some 
very interesting questions to pose about human evolution. The project 
concerns an effort to understand God and creatures in terms of semiotics, 
the study of signs. So two very simple but intriguing questions present 
themselves when humans are understood as evolved animals, within such 
a semiotic understanding. First, what sort of sign of the life of God was 
Jesus, and what was it about the human as an evolved animal that 
allowed that sort of sign to be embodied? Here we can see how the 
scheme of Darwinian evolution, combined with the philosophical 
resources of semiotics, can allow traditional theological questions to be 
posed in new and generative ways.4  
                                           
3 I thank Dr Abi Millings for these insights. See also Tallis 2008, 37-44.             
4 Some of this work has been published as Southgate and Robinson 2010; Robinson 
and Southgate 2010a, b and c. See also Robinson 2010 for an extended treatment of 
these ideas. 
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There are other questions that an evolutionary scheme poses for the 
understanding of human beings, in particular in relation to the famous 
text in Genesis 1 about humans being created in the image and likeness 
of God. Note that the sort of interpretative move I made just now in 
relation to issues of literal reading will not help us here. It is one thing to 
dismiss the literal chronology of the Genesis 1 creation account, and 
quite another to try and avoid the issue of the status of humanity in 
relation to creation, which is a theological rather than a scientific 
statement, a statement about value and vocation. It is a statement that has 
properly become a foundational element in Christian anthropology, and 
much energy continues to go into exploring how the image of God might 
be understood. I do not have space here to explore the various options: 
seeing the image of God as substantive, as functional, as relational, as 
eschatological.5 But I offer here a suggestion that coheres with the 
theology of evolution I outline in my recent book. (Southgate 2008). 
This suggestion is based on an understanding of God’s nature as 
Trinity as being of perfectly self-giving love. There is no selfishness in 
God, but only the perfect transcendence of self in loving relation. And if 
we understand the image and likeness of God as being the imago 
Trinitatis, then we can understand it not so much as that perfect self-
giving, which is the life of God in Godself, but as the capacity to respond 
to self-giving love. Each of the persons of the Trinity responds to the 
self-giving love of the others, and each human is called to respond to, and 
be transformed by, the self-giving love of God as Trinity. This is a view 
which is substantive, in proposing that humans have evolved an attribute 
of being capable of responding to love by transcending our selfish 
impulses – and it is clearly relational, and it is functional – this response 
is our calling, to be worked in our relationships with each other and the 
whole creation, and it is eschatological – the image is only now being 
perfected by the transforming work of salvation in Christ.  
This formulation may help to address the questions that evolution 
poses about human nature – in particular the questions: when and how 
did the image of God arise; did it inhere in any of our hominid cousins, 
now all extinct; how does that relate to the question of whether those 
                                           
5 These options are laid out in Herzfeld 2002, Ch.2 – see also van Huyssteen 2006, 
Ch.3.     
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creatures can be ‘saved’ into the resurrection life of God? Wherever we 
see self-giving, costly relating to others for others’ sake, we see the 
image beginning to develop, and we should not be afraid to see this 
proto-image in other primates, or indeed in elephants and other animals. 
One of the few things we know of Neanderthals is that they looked after 
individuals past child-bearing age who had broken limbs, and severe 
arthritis – here we see, implicitly, signs of self-giving behaviour after the 
image of God, and hence, arguably, signs of Neanderthals being drawn 
up into the life of God. Such a view of salvation is not a narrow one; 
indeed I argue below that every creature has some sort of prospect of a 
resurrected life. So some of the theological drivers for a strong view of 
human uniqueness are simply not present in my scheme. 
Clearly, such a view of the imago Dei - as the capacity to respond 
to self-giving love - will suggest that it developed gradually in humans 
and is still developing, indeed that it needed for its full fruition the 
Incarnation and work of Christ. There was no sudden moment when God 
switched on the image in humans, though surely a theology of creation 
based on a Trinity of self-giving love will want to suppose that God is 
always seeking to call out self-transcendence from God’s creatures, each 
according to its own evolved capacities. And although we know so little 
about the way humans evolved their current sense of self, theory of mind, 
potential for altruism, there are some recent inferences as to the 
significance of what is often called ‘cave-art’ which may possibly help 
us. I am thinking of the work of David Lewis-Williams and others, and 
the theological reflections of Wentzel van Huyssteen in particular (cf. 
Lewis-Williams 2002; van Huyssteen 2006). Lewis-Williams has shown 
how cave-art is best seen not as representational art in the modern sense, 
but as a reaching into the spirit-world. Van Huyssteen has explored the 
possibility that religion was an important element in the development of 
the cognitive fluidity that characterises modern human intelligence. 
So an impulse to respond to the divine love of the creator comes to 
be seen, on this view, not as an extra, a spandrel, in Stephen Jay Gould’s 
terminology (Gould and Lewontin 1979), engendered by the evolution of 
human consciousness, but actually as a key catalyst in that evolution. Put 
theologically, this could be seen as a hint that responding to God’s 
calling helped to form the self-consciousness of the modern human, and 
hence an enhanced potential to respond in self-giving love – ultimately 
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the potential to recognise and respond to the sign of God that is the life, 
death and resurrection of Jesus. 
 
The Challenge of Sociobiology 
 
Readers will be well aware that the argument mounted above can be run 
the other way, to show that religion had its evolutionary uses and that 
that explains its existence and its long persistence in the human psyche. 
Here we are back in the territory of that passage from E.O. Wilson I 
quoted at the beginning of this essay, and very challenging territory it is 
for the theologian. If Darwinian science can explain why early humans 
needed religion, whether to enhance predator-detection, or to develop 
cognitive fluidity, or to ensure tribal cohesion, or to ward off the growing 
awareness of mortality, whatever theory is adopted, then there is a risk 
that Darwinian science can explain religion away. This is, effectively, the 
move that Wilson makes, and Dawkins has made a similar proposal, 
couched in his usual inflammatory rhetoric when he describes religions 
as ‘viruses of the mind’. (Dawkins 2003, Ch.3) They are interestingly 
different. Both reject the truth-claims of religion, yet Wilson has written 
movingly of the prophetic role religious figures could play in helping 
humanity respond to the ecological crisis, (Wilson 2002; 2006) whereas 
Dawkins is convinced that religion is an altogether pernicious lie, a virus 
of the mind, and must be eradicated if at all possible (cf. also Dawkins 
2006). 
In a sense the explaining-away of religious truth-claims is no more 
than a scientific elaboration of the challenges posed long ago by Marx 
and Feuerbach. Religion provides comfort, social cohesion, refuge from 
the existential terrors of being alive and conscious of being alive. But it is 
a telling elaboration, and as I said at the beginning I think it is too soon to 
see how these sociobiological accounts of human cognitive evolution will 
fare. Paleoanthropology is a frustrating science, necessarily profoundly 
underdetermined by its data, and lurching forward as different finds and 
different theoretical frameworks pull it about. We can be more confident 
that twenty years of combining contemporary genetics with real-time 
brain scanning will tell us a great deal about how genetic inheritance 
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might affect cognitive predispositions, and I think we shall be wise not to 
conclude too much too early on that score. I do not think that as a 
Christian I shall ever be able to persuade Richard Dawkins that the faith 
by which I live is not a toxic, pathogenic virus in my mind. But equally, I 
do not think that such theories can ever evacuate religious faith of its 
truth-claims. Believers do not offer objective, falsifiable scientific 
evidence for God, and their claim to the authenticity of their experience 
of divine revelation cannot be falsified by science. 
 
The Greatest Challenge 
 
That brings me to the last and what I would see as the greatest challenge 
Darwinism poses to Christian theology, the problem of the vast extent of 
suffering of creatures over several hundred million years, suffering 
moreover that seems intrinsic to the evolutionary process. Not that this 
can act as a falsifier of belief in the existence of a creating and redeeming 
God. We are no longer eighteenth-century natural theologians, seeking to 
demonstrate the truth of the core of our faith by what the natural sciences 
tell us about the world. But we do need to be in Ian Barbour’s phrase 
‘theologians of nature’, (Barbour 1997, Ch.4) taking very seriously the 
conversation with the sciences and allowing it honestly and profoundly to 
affect how we understand God’s ways with the world. 
How might a contemporary theologian of nature address the 
problem of suffering in evolution? The first step, I consider, is to affirm 
the reality of creaturely suffering, and of the disvalue that is the 
extinction of species. We need to be realistic about these things. Even in 
Copenhagen, so famous for the fairy-tale among other things, there must 
be no spuriously romantic fairy-tales about the suffering of non-human 
creatures. We must not imagine that it is like human suffering, or that it 
contains the sort of crushing of hope that advanced theory of mind makes 
possible. Nor should we imagine that pain, by itself, is necessarily a bad 
thing – it is a vital element in being alive as a complex organism. But 
acute observation of animals does show us something more than mere 
pain – it shows us the distress of creatures caught in severe trauma, 
especially as they experience trauma from which there is no possibility of 
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release. Death from predators is sometimes quick, but sometimes not. It 
may take a leopard over a minute to bring down a full-grown antelope. A 
whale may be literally eaten alive by sharks or killer whales, over a 
period of hours. On the BBC programmes narrated by David 
Attenborough for the ‘Darwin year’ of 2009, there was dramatic footage 
of young lions close to starvation, calling plaintively for their pride, who 
up ahead, out of earshot, were calling plaintively back. And one of the 
young lions just simply did starve to death, out on the open plain. It is 
impossible not to regard this experience as one of suffering. 
Neurophysiological studies on creatures in distress show similar patterns 
of hormone and neurotransmitter release to those found in humans. So – 
with all due cautions – it is reasonable to regard creaturely suffering as 
real, across a certain range of types of creature advanced enough to feel 
such. 
What of extinction? Again we must be realistic. Species, arguably, 
have natural spans of effectiveness, after which their viability disappears 
because of competition or environmental change. (As an aside, a chilling 
possibility in the current era is that the human species may be in such a 
phase. One of the tragedies of 2009 was the relative failure of the 
Copenhagen summit on climate change.)6 
But extinction removes from the biosphere, forever, a certain 
strategy of being alive, a certain way, to pick up an important motif from 
the Psalms, in which God is praised by God’s creation. So extinction is 
always a disvalue. Extinction may benefit a whole range of other future 
species - the loss of the dinosaurs meant that other possibilities could be 
explored, but it remains a tragic loss to creation, a loss therefore also to 
God’s own experience of that creation. 
So the Darwinian world is full of the disvalues of suffering and 
extinction, and an emphasis on natural selection will suggest that these 
are an inevitable part of the evolutionary process. That in itself is a 
challenge to the goodness of a creator God. How could the God of love 
give rise to such a world?7 
                                           
6 For a commentary see Deane-Drummond 2011. 
7 Aside from my own monograph The Groaning of Creation (Southgate 2008), there 
are very few recent studies of this problem of any length. A notable exception is 
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At this point I have to address the major answer that, classically, 
Christian theology has given to the existence of suffering in creation, 
namely the doctrine of the Fall. It was straightforward, and all too 
tempting, until the rise of an old-Earth evolutionary narrative, to ascribe 
the apparent distortion of all that God had made (and behold, in the 
words of Genesis 1.31, God saw to be ‘very good’) to the effect of 
human sin. We can be clear now that that is simply an understandable 
pre-scientific anachronism – yes it is true that modern humans have been 
devastators of their environments and precipitators of many extinctions, 
but we also know that processes of predation and disease, and other much 
larger extinction events, preceded the evolution of humankind. Human 
sin did not cause nature to be in Tennyson’s phrase ‘red in tooth and 
claw’ (Tennyson 1989, 399). 
There remains the possibility of a fall of creation caused by 
primordial angelic rebellion, or some other mysterious cause. This suffers 
from two major problems, one theological and the other scientific. 
Theologically, it places another power of comparable force to God at 
work in the processes of creation, a power capable of frustrating the 
purposes of the creator at every turn. Put simply, a narrative of creation 
that depends on such a frustrating power as the source of all violence and 
suffering in the creation implies that God desired to create straw-eating 
lions (cf. Isa. 11:7), and this power was able to prevent God from doing 
so. This is at variance with all that the tradition has wanted to confess in 
terms of God’s sovereignty and creation ex nihilo. Scientifically, a 
primordial fall is problematic because it ignores the point that it is the 
very processes that involve creaturely suffering that engender creaturely 
sophistication, and intricacy and diversity of function. 
Fall-thinking is such a strong instinct among theologians that a 
number have wanted to insist that God did not create processes of 
competition and predation. I myself think the arguments I give above are 
conclusive, and that one does fatal damage to the conversation between 
science and theology by dissecting out the evolutionary process into the 
bits one likes and ascribes to God and the bits one considers chaotic and 
                                           
Michael Murray's philosophical essay Nature Red in Tooth and Claw (Murray 2008). 
Significant short treatments include Rolston 2003; Attfield 2006; Edwards 2006. 
 
UNDERSTANDING DARWIN AND DARWINIAN UNDERSTANDING 
 
 
53 
meontic and ascribes to another power. But I admit there are problems on 
both sides. Because I say that the biosphere has always contained 
competition and predation, and therefore the possibility of the disvalues 
of suffering and extinction, I have to give some account of what Genesis 
1.31 might mean by asserting that all God made was very good. This was 
my suggestion in The Groaning of Creation: 
 
a strong emphasis within contemporary Christian theology is on 
creation as a continuous process, rather than something completed 
at the beginning of time. For this reason I am happy to accept John 
Haught’s point that creation is ‘unfinished’ [Haught 2000, Ch.9] and 
to side with Wolfhart Pannenberg’s conclusion that ‘Only in the 
light of the eschatological consummation may [the verdict ‘very 
good’] be said of our world as it is in all its confusion and pain.’) 
[Pannenberg 1998, 645]. Colin Gunton in his reappropriation of the 
theology of Irenaeus of Lyons claims that ‘good means precisely 
that which is destined for perfection.’ [Gunton 1998, 56] Creation 
then will finally be very good at the eschaton, when God will be all 
in all (1. Cor. 15.28), and God’s Sabbath rest will be with God’s 
creation (Southgate 2008, 17). 
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I also have to say – and this is the first plank in my constructive proposal 
in evolutionary theodicy – that a world of competition and natural 
selection was the only way God could give rise to creaturely values of the 
sort we know to have evolved in the biosphere of Earth. 
At once I hear an objection – that this too is a breach with the 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo – with the Christian confession that all that 
is came absolutely out of nothing solely by the fiat of God. What is this 
constraint that I have just invoked – that a Darwinian world was the only 
way to give rise to beauty, diversity and complexity in creation? Here is a 
constraint that seems to co-exist with God from eternity, so for the 
philosophical theologian it is problematic. Surely God could have made 
creaturely beauty and diversity out of any materials and processes God 
liked? Whereas for anyone trained in the natural sciences it’s a very 
plausible constraint – philosophers can dream up all sorts of alternative 
worlds, but the only way in which we know matter ‘works’ and gives rise 
to life is this way, and the only way this type of life evolves and gives 
rise to novel and excellent adaptations, creaturely selves of all types and 
ingenuities, is via Darwinian natural selection, driven by competition, 
predation and extinction. 
Is that enough, then? Can one simply retort to whoever complains 
at God that this is the best system for generating creaturely value, 
however great the cost? Most biologists would be inclined to respond in 
these terms, to say that nature is a ‘package deal’ (e.g. Gregersen 2001, 
201). You can’t have the values without the disvalues. End of story. But I 
have argued strongly that that by itself is not an adequate defence of the 
goodness of God. God is not merely the God of systems, but of 
individual creatures. It is not enough to say to the limping impala calf 
picked off by hyenas, or to the second pelican chick pushed out of the 
nest to starve by its stronger sibling, to creatures whose lives know no 
flourishing, that God is the God of the system and the system is a 
package deal, the bad with the good. So the first element in my theodicy 
of evolution, the ‘only way’ argument, cannot subsist by itself, despite 
the lucid efforts of thinkers such as Robin Attfield to advance it (Attfield 
2006, Chs 6-7). It needs to be supplemented by other theological 
resources.  
First, the need to invoke the co-suffering of God with all creatures, 
an increasing emphasis in 20
th
 Century theology, and applied to the non-
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human world in the work of theologians such as Arthur Peacocke and Jay 
McDaniel. (E.g. Peacocke 2001b; McDaniel 1989) Every theologian 
would concede that God is present to every creature both in its 
flourishing and its suffering, and that therefore no creature suffers or dies 
alone. In the Christian tradition this suffering is focused and exemplified 
at the Cross in a way that inaugurates the transformation of the world, 
and Niels Gregersen’s work on ‘deep incarnation’ emphasizes the 
solidarity of Christ not merely with humans but with all creatures and 
particularly the victims of evolution. (Gregersen 2001) So it is a short 
step from there to the supposition that God does indeed suffer with every 
suffering creature, and that that suffering, at some deep existential level, 
makes a difference, both to God and to the creature. 
Second, the need to suggest that creatures whose lives know no 
fulfilment may experience fullness of life in some eschatological reality, 
a ‘pelican heaven’ in McDaniel’s phrase (1989, 45). A number of 
theologians have explored this line recently, including Robert J. Russell, 
Denis Edwards and Ernst Conradie (Edwards 2006; Russell 2008; 
Conradie 2002). If we take altogether seriously the loving character and 
purposes of God I think we cannot believe that lives consisting of 
nothing but suffering are the end for those creatures that experience 
them. How many other animals there may be in heaven, other than those 
that are so evidently the victims of the evolutionary process, I am of 
course not able to say. All I can tell you is that I believe there is no 
shortage of room in heaven. This sort of thinking of course provokes the 
hard question – why then did God not simply just create heaven? That is 
always a hard question for the theist.8 
The final element in what I have called a ‘compound evolutionary 
theodicy’, relying on a number of different inferences in combination in 
order to understand the ways of a good God in a Darwinian world, is an 
account of the calling of human beings as co-redeemers with God. But 
just before I explore that, please note where this engagement with 
evolutionary theodicy has taken us. We have had to part company with 
the notion of a perfectly good initial creation, corrupted by some 
mysterious process. So we have had to accept the profound ambiguity of 
                                           
8 Posed with his characteristic sharpness by Wesley Wildman (2007). 
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that creation – as ‘very good’ in the words of Genesis but also ‘groaning 
in travail’ in the words of St Paul at Rom. 8.22.9 We have also had to 
abandon the perfect impassibility of God so beloved of classical tradition, 
in favour of a God who grieves and laments with suffering creatures, 
very possibly in the very same process in which God takes joy from the 
flourishing of other creatures. And we have had to abandon the 
conviction – also strong in the tradition – that animals have no souls and 
know no redemption, in favour of a view of a heaven rich in creaturely 
diversity. I claim that this sort of reflection on creaturely suffering is 
deeply troubling to the Christian thinker, and yet necessary and 
ultimately enriching, productive of a view of God as deeply engaged with 
every thread of the fabric of life. 
How then can we understand the calling of the human being, in the 
face of this engagement between Darwinian thought of the theology of 
creation and redemption? Is this last bit of the discussion above just a 
game for theodicists with not enough to do, or are there ethical 
implications for the way human life is to be lived in response to the 
Gospel of Christ? I have pondered long on the passage from the Letter to 
the Romans that I quoted above. It is a fascinating text, frustratingly brief 
and allusive. And to read Rom. 8.19-22 as a post-Darwinian modern is 
very different from responding to it in its original context. But I think one 
can safely infer that Paul sees the era beyond the resurrection of Christ as 
the eschatological era, one in which humans come into the glory of 
knowing their true freedom. And the Apostle says something very 
intriguing, which at the same time makes a huge amount of sense to 
humans trying to confront the extent of our ecological depredations. He 
implies, in the language of vv. 19, 21, that the glory of creation’s own 
liberation in some way depends on humans coming into their full glory as 
free creatures in Christ. So the ecologist’s prediction that creation will 
only cease to groan when humans can live harmoniously and sustainably 
with other creatures is matched by Paul’s theological instinct that our 
struggle to be transformed, in the words of 2 Corinthians, ‘from one 
degree of glory to another’ is necessary to the final freeing of the non-
human creation at the eschaton. 
                                           
9 See Horrell et al 2010 for a detailed exploration of the interpretation of this text. 
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What might this mean for ethics? Certainly human lifestyles 
liberated from the idolatries of greed and over-consumption, with the 
freedom to learn wisdom from the Spirit of God. And surely we have 
never stood so badly in need of wisdom, the wisdom that transcends our 
evolved instincts to care narrowly for ourselves, our kin and our tribe, 
and which is willing to work for the flourishing of the human race 
beyond the lifespan of our grandchildren. But I make a more radical 
suggestion – namely that as an eschatological sign we should seek to 
reduce the rate of biological extinction, below even its natural level. Note 
that this is a proposal that makes little sense within a naturalistic 
framework that merely reads off nature-as-it-should-be from nature-as-it-
is. Only in a theological ethic that holds that this is the last phase of 
creation, the one in which God is gathering all things together in Christ, 
does it make sense to believe that the old biological driver, extinction, is 
no longer needed. But I believe that within a Christian ethic using the 
Romans text as a springboard a proposal to reduce biological extinction 
makes abundant sense. We cannot have any purchase on getting leopards 
to lie down with kids, but we can, it seems to me, participate in the 
redemption of creation from its ‘futility’ by seeking to reduce the rate of 
extinction. Unfortunately our current activities are exactly in the wrong 
direction, and even modest assessments of the impact of a 2-3 degree rise 
in global mean surface temperature imply that we could be raising the 
natural rate of extinction by a factor of a thousand. All the more reason, 
then, to contemplate the possibility that our calling lies radically in the 
other direction. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I hope the above discussion conveys something of the richness and the 
ambiguity of the conversation between Darwinism and Christian thought, 
and also that evolutionary theory is not simply either the disguised friend, 
or yet the implacable enemy, of a reasonable faith.  
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God’s Quality and Creation’s Longing 
Andrew Robinson 
 
Introduction 
 
I would like to respond to Christopher Southgate’s lecture by making 
some very brief and tentative remarks connected with a direction that I 
have recently been following in my own thinking. Specifically, I will say 
something about an approach to the concepts of sacrifice and victimhood 
that draws on the work of René Girard, I will try to indicate how those 
ideas might fit with my own work on semiotics and Trinitarian theology, 
and I will then hint at how I think such an approach might tie in with 
Southgate’s approach to the tasks to which humans may be called in the 
fulfilment of God’s creative purposes. 
 
Sacrifice and victimhood 
 
I have come upon Girard’s thought via the Catholic theologian James 
Alison, and I hope the following couple of paragraphs do not too badly 
misrepresent the core of the latter’s approach.10 According to Alison’s 
reading of Girard, human groups and societies are universally 
characterized by a tendency to seek unity by defining themselves over 
and against other individuals or groups. The group then consolidates its 
own identity by excluding, victimizing or sacrificing these non-belonging 
‘others’. This process may lead to actual violence between groups and 
individuals, or it may become ritualized in the form of cultic sacrifices, in 
which the sacrificial offering is taken to in some way purify the offerers 
of the sacrifice. The concept of the ‘scapegoat’, deriving from the 
                                           
10
 See, for example, James Alison, Raising Abel, New Edition, London: SPCK 
(2010); Broken Hearts and New Creations: Intimations of a Great Reversal, London: 
Darton, Longman and Todd (2010). 
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Hebrew festival of atonement is paradigmatic of this ritualization of an 
underlying social and anthropological process.
11
 
According to Alison, Jesus’ sacrifice on the cross may be 
understood as the ultimate instantiation of this scapegoating mechanism, 
and also it’s undoing. Jesus, by virtue of being the perfectly innocent 
victim of the lynch-mob, brings to light the futility of the social drive to 
win God’s approval by sacrificing those whom we suspect of being less 
deserving of God’s love. Furthermore, in his resurrection Jesus is 
vindicated as having perfectly embodied the quality of God’s being in the 
fabric of the created order, and, crucially, he returns not seeking 
vengeance (as would most victims) but offering peace and forgiveness. In 
doing so he un-does the power of the scapegoat mechanism once and for 
all, and detoxifies the space of victimhood and death which hangs over 
all creatures. From now on, by turning to the one who has defeated death 
and has freed human beings from the self-imposed tyranny of survival by 
victimization, humans can live lives that are not run by the fear of death 
or the need to define themselves as those who ‘belong’, over and against 
those who do not.  
The above is the briefest of sketches of what I sense may well be a 
rather profound insight into the human condition and an associated way 
of understanding the redeeming power of Jesus’ life, death and 
resurrection. How does such an approach fit with my own work on 
semiotics and Christian theology? Briefly, I have been pursuing the 
hypothesis that the structure of semiotic processes in the world - 
processes of representation, meaning, and interpretation - is analogous to 
the threefold being of God known through reflection on the role of Jesus 
in the economy of salvation.
12
 To put it at its bluntest, the Son or Word is 
other than the Father and is able to represent him. The Spirit is the one 
who interprets the Word of the Father, making the Word lively and 
intelligible by virtue of her role of mediation. The categories of 
‘otherness’ and ‘mediation’ are, I suggest, primordial and fundamental 
categories, and together with another category, which is almost beyond 
naming but which might go by the word ‘ingenerateness’ or 
                                           
11
 Alison, Broken Hearts and New Creations, pp. 217-218. 
12
 Andrew Robinson, God and the World of Signs: Trinity, Evolution and the 
Metaphysical Semiotics of C.S. Peirce, Leiden: Brill (2010) 
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‘unoriginateness’, make up a Trinity of being which is the pattern of 
God’s eternal dynamic and which is reflected in analogous threefold 
patterns in the created order. To put this in terms of a concept with deep 
roots in the Christian tradition, the triadic patterns of semiosis in the 
world are ‘vestiges of the Trinity in creation’.  
This ‘semiotic model’ of the Trinity draws on the triadic semiotics 
and system of categories of the American philosopher, scientist, and 
semiotician, C.S. Peirce. Peirce developed a multi-dimensional taxonomy 
of signs, of which the best known dimension is that concerning the 
relation of signs to their objects, a relation which may be iconic (a 
relation of resemblance), indexical (a direct or causal relation), or 
symbolic (where sign and object are related by convention). But there is a 
less well known dimension of Peirce’s taxonomy which concerns the 
nature of the ‘sign-vehicle’ in itself. Thus legisigns are signs produced 
according to a rule (as when I use my pencil to form a letter A); sinsigns 
are signs that signify ‘singularly’ (in an instance by instance way, not by 
virtue of being formed according to a rule). Finally, qualisigns are signs 
that signify by embodying the quality signified. When we use a colour 
sample to choose a colour of paint or fabric we are using a qualisign: the 
colour chart is a set of qualisigns which embody exactly that which is 
signified, namely, the colour in question. Importantly, it may be that 
some qualities, and therefore some qualisigns, can only be instantiated in 
a particular kind of ‘fabric’.  
Southgate mentions two questions that he and I have grappled with 
together: what kind of sign is Jesus of God, and what enables that sort of 
sign to be embodied? The answer to the first question, according to my 
semiotic model, is that Jesus was a qualisign of the being of God - an 
embodiment of the exact quality of God’s being. As the letter to the 
Hebrews puts it, Jesus was “the exact reflection of God’s glory and the 
exact imprint of God’s very being (Hebrews 1:3). The answer to the 
second part of the question, according to this approach, is that the kind of 
fabric required for the embodiment of such a sign is the fabric of a 
human life. In Jesus’ case his whole life, including his willingness to 
suffer a victim’s death, embodied precisely that quality. In doing so Jesus 
showed himself to be the eternal Word of the Father, the expression of 
the Father that perfectly represented the Father’s being. In other words, 
Jesus was ‘the image of the invisible God’ (Colossians 1: 15). 
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Importantly, and consistent with Alison’s Girardian approach, it was not 
the Cross in isolation that was of redeeming significance. God did not 
wish a violent and unjust death on this innocent human being. Rather, the 
Cross was the culmination of the total quality of Jesus’ life, the ultimate 
and inevitable manifestation of his quality of self-giving love. In a 
semiotic perspective, this total quality of love is the in-breaking into the 
world of the sign of God’s being, an in-breaking that shows that death is 
not the last word, that humans can escape from the zero-sum game of 
survival by violence and victimization.  
Putting the Girardian perspective in semiotic terms, the Spirit 
enables us to turn to Christ, the qualisign of the Father, and in so turning 
to and interpreting that sign we become caught up and drawn into the 
very life of God’s own eternal self-expression and self-interpretation. 
And in being so caught up and drawn into God’s own self-expression and 
self-interpretation we become participants in the divine nature (2 Peter 1: 
4) and escape from the tyranny of the fear of death and the need to 
violate and victimize others in order to escape it. For the very sign that 
orientates us to God the Father is the same sign that detoxifies death by 
occupying the space of victimhood and returning from it offering peace 
and forgiveness.  
 
Girard and Southgate 
 
So finally I’m now in a position to give some tentative hints about how I 
would see this way of thinking playing out in the context of Southgate’s 
very rich account of the role of humans in the evolutionary project. I 
shall suggest one point of possible difference and another of potential 
integration. The point of difference relates to Southgate’s view of the 
intra-Trinitarian relations and the human relationship to those relations. 
Southgate says: 
 
And if we understand the image and likeness of God as being the 
imago Trinitatis, then we can understand it not so much as that 
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perfect self-giving, which is the life of God in Godself, but as the 
capacity to respond to self-giving love. Each of the persons of the 
Trinity responds to the self-giving love of the others, and each 
human is called to respond to, and be transformed by, the self-giving 
love of God as Trinity. 
This, I take it, endorses a ‘social’ model of the Trinity, in that the acts 
and responses of each ‘person’ are taken to be essentially similar: ‘each 
responds to the self-giving love of the others’. The alternative to a 
‘social’ model of the Trinity is usually taken to be some kind of 
‘psychological’ model, traceable back to Augustine’s famous 
psychological analogies. My proposal for a ‘semiotic model’ of the 
Trinity has affinities with, and differences from, both of those traditional 
approaches.
13
 Of course, if the debates about the relative merits of these 
various ‘models’ amounted to nothing more than speculative theorizing 
about the inner being of God then we would have drifted a very long way 
from the roots of Trinitarian thinking in reflection on the saving work of 
Jesus of Nazareth. But I think there is more at issue here than theoretical 
speculation. Specifically, I think that the semiotic approach makes it 
easier to understand, and therefore to enact, how humans may be drawn 
into the life-giving dynamic of the Trinity. For if the Trinitarian persons 
are all persons in essentially the same way, giving and receiving the 
perfections of divine love, then all humans can hope to do is to respond 
to that love, perhaps by (imperfectly) imitating it. In contrast, according 
to the semiotic model, the Word perfectly expresses the very quality of 
God’s-self, the quality of love that is God (cf. 1 John 4: 16), and the 
Spirit enables this sign of God (the Father) to be interpreted in such a 
way that the (creaturely) interpreter is drawn into the very life of God’s 
own self. The roles of Father, Son, and Spirit are therefore distinct 
(though inseparable). The response of the creature to the qualisign of 
God’s-self may indeed involve the creature in showing just the self-
                                           
13
 Robinson, God and the World of Signs, pp. 314-329. 
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giving love that was manifest in the life and death of Jesus. The 
difference between the semiotic and the social formulation of the 
significance of such creaturely  
 
imaging’ of God is that the semiotic approach gives a clearer sense 
of the way in which this creaturely response may be caught up into 
the self-giving, self-interpreting, life of God, and how the creature 
(or community of creatures) may then themselves constitute a new 
sign of God’s being, a sign that may draw further creaturely 
responses, and so on. That, in fact, is what I understand Paul to 
mean when he refers to the Church as ‘the body of Christ (1 
Corinthians 12: 27). 
And so to my point of integration with Southgate’s account. Here I wish 
to pick up his idea, arising from reflection on Romans 8, that humans in 
some way share the task of bringing creation to its eschatological 
fulfilment. Southgate’s suggestion is that one mark of this would be to 
attempt to reduce the rate of species extinction below the background rate 
of extinction that would be expected in the absence of human influences. 
Let me express this in terms of Alison’s Girardian approach. In the 
normal run of things, biological individuals and species compete with 
one another for food and other resources. They cheat death only at the 
expense of other individuals. Individuals and entire species become 
victims of the process, sacrificed for the ‘good’ of the survival of others. 
Non-human creatures are unable to step outside the circle of violence and 
victimization necessary to their (temporary) dodging of death. Only the 
human creature is able to respond to the embodied qualisign of God’s 
being by seeing that survival by the creation of victims and scapegoats 
leads only to a tyranny of futile acts of violence against those apparently 
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less deserving of survival. And only the human creature, who has been 
approached by the risen and forgiving victim, the sign inviting 
participation in the eternal life that is not defined by death, is in a 
position to intervene on behalf of the victims of the evolutionary process, 
even at their (the humans’) own expense, in order that the logic of 
victimization should cease to have the last word, even within the ongoing 
processes of biological evolution. 
Now it may well be objected that the types of victimhood that are 
relevant to a Girardian anthropology are quite different to those that 
pertain in the history of biological evolution: the former are (arguably) 
distortions of true humanity, whereas the latter (as Southgate 
unflinchingly emphasizes) are intrinsic to the evolutionary process. I 
accept that there is a genuine difference here. Nevertheless, I think 
Alison’s approach may point the way to a particular theological way of 
reading Southgate’s proposal. I suggest, in short, that if human 
relationships with non-human creatures fall short of the ideal for which 
creation is longing and groaning then this must ultimately be due to 
human idolatry. In other words, human complicity in the suffering of 
creation - to the extent that such complicity falls short of God’s creative 
purposes - must derive from our worshipping gods other than the one 
creator of all things. Idolatry can only cease when the one to whom all 
knees bend (Philippians 2: 10) is the one true God, and this can only 
occur when the very quality of God has been instantiated within the 
created order as a sign of the way that God is (cf. Philippians 2: 6).
14
 To 
say that every knee shall bend before such a sign is to say that this sign is 
to become the basis of the total orientation of our lives. I do not know 
exactly what such a reorientation of our lives ought to look like in respect 
of our relationship to non-human creatures, but Southgate’s work surely 
represents one of the most constructive and nuanced proposals so far. My 
tentative suggestion is that a synthesis of a Girardian theory of atonement 
with the semiotic model of the Trinity might prove to be a fruitful 
framework within with to read such a proposal.  
                                           
14
 For the relation between the hymn in Philippians 2 and the Hebrew rite of 
atonement that is central to Alison’s Girardian Christology see Broken Hearts and 
New Creations Chapter 13. 
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An important element in such an approach would surely be the 
recognition that when God-ness becomes embodied within the created 
order it becomes so as failure and as victim. As Alison emphasizes, the 
conclusion to be drawn from this is not principally that we should learn 
to value and live with the differences between ourselves and our out-
groups; rather, we should recognize that we’re all in the same boat - all 
subjecting ourselves to futility because of our orientation to things other 
than God.
15
 If we were to apply this way of thinking to our relationship to 
the victims of the evolutionary process, perhaps the efforts to reduce 
rates of species extinction that Southgate urges would not be regarded - 
as might be tempting - as the benevolent actions of the legitimate victor 
of the evolutionary battle. Instead, and I’m sure this is more along the 
lines that Southgate envisages, it might be understood as a recognition 
that the current form of our species has been achieved at the expense of 
making others - including possibly other species of Homo - victims of the 
process. Furthermore, like all other terrestrial species - unless we find 
ourselves another planetary home before the sun becomes a red giant and 
engulfs the earth, or some other catastrophe overtakes us - we face 
inevitable extinction at some point in the future. We are ultimately in the 
same boat as all other creatures. It is because we, alone among creatures, 
have the capacity to recognize, interpret and respond to the sign of the 
quality of God’s presence in the world that we have the potential 
collectively to embody that same quality - a potential which, if 
actualized, would be ‘the revealing of the children of God’ for which 
creation waits with eager longing (Romans 8: 19). Only then will 
creation be set free from its bondage to decay (v. 21). Presumably that 
does not mean that all death, or all extinction, will cease any time before 
the eschaton. What it means is that when the quality of God-ness 
becomes embodied and responded to in the world, then creatures may 
cease to be ultimately run by the fear of death and by futile efforts to 
avoid death by allowing others to become victims. 
                                           
15
 For example, Broken Hearts and New Creations, Chapter 3. 
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Creativity through Emergence: A Vision of 
Nature and God 
Antje Jackelén 
 
Introduction 
 
Can emergence talk help us as we today are groping for new visions of 
nature that include the best of scientific and theological knowledge, that 
are attentive to the groaning of an environmentally stressed nature, and 
that can tell the story of becoming we see unfolding in nature? In this 
essay, I will explore a vision of nature as creation that arises from the 
concepts of complexity and emergence. The appealing plasticity of the 
concept of emergence has its counterpart in some obvious difficulties, 
such as the absence of clear definitions, the lack of the predictability of 
outcomes and the risk of conflating description and value judgments. In 
light of my discussion of the possibilities and pitfalls of emergence, I 
will nevertheless conclude that the concept of emergence, in its concrete 
as well as in its metaphorical sense, can contribute some specific 
suggestions as to how to speak well of nature, God, and ourselves. Such 
talk, in turn, is a prerequisite for responsible action. 
 
The Emergence of Complexity: God or Nature? 
 
How then does complexity emerge—is it nature that does it or is it 
divine creativity that does it? Framing the question this way implies an 
antagonism that on and off has kept many good minds busy. Yet, as I 
will argue by way of discussion of complexity and emergence, this 
opposition is quite unnecessary. The work of creativity may be 
adequately described in ways that are both immanent to nature and 
transcend nature. In fact, views that attribute creativity to both nature 
and divine energy can be traced back to the early centuries of the 
Common Era.  
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In the late fourth century, the church father Basil of Caesarea, one of the 
three Cappadocians, delivered a series of nine sermons on Genesis 1:1–
25. In these homilies, known as the Hexaemeron, Basil included a lot of 
information about botany, zoology, geography, and astronomy, most of 
which reflects very well the level of scientific knowledge of his time.
1
 
With amazing ease, he moves between God and nature (physis) as actors 
in creation. It is nature that “encloses the costly pearl in the most 
insignificant animal, the oyster”;2 nature has placed the grain of the 
wheat “in a sheath so as not to be easily snatched by grain-picking 
birds”;3 nature has placed such powerful organs of voice in the lion “that 
frequently many animals that surpass him in swiftness are overcome by 
his mere roaring.”4 Animals follow “the law of nature strongly 
established and showing what must be done,”5 and so do humans: We 
have got “natural reason which teaches us an attraction for the good and 
an aversion for the harmful . . . implanted in us,”6 and we have “natural 
virtues toward which there is an attraction . . . from nature itself.”7 
Teachings about social order are not introducing anything new, 
according to Basil; they are merely a continuation of natural order. 
When Paul gives directions regarding the relationship between parents 
and children, he recommends nothing new; he just “binds more tightly 
the bonds of nature.”8 In this regard, if he were alive today, Basil might 
even go so far as to actually agree with Barbara King’s argument for the 
development of religious imagination from nature.
9
 Nevertheless, there 
is a point where King and Basil would part company. For him, 
immanence alone will not do. In spite of the active causal role Basil 
attributes to nature and the law of nature, he has no problem whatsoever 
seeing God in the same things. Basil praises the sea urchin for its 
capacity of forecasting calm or rough waters by its behaviour. By this, 
Basil concludes, “the Lord of the Sea and the winds placed in the small 
animal a clear sign of [God’s] own wisdom.”10 Hence: “There is nothing 
unpremeditated, nothing neglected by God. . . . [God] is present to all, 
providing means of preservation for each.”11 For Basil, God apparently 
acts “in, with and through” nature and there is no contradiction in that. 
What he observes is both natural and divine; it cannot be reduced to the 
dualism of either God or nature. Stated in more philosophical terms: 
God’s creativity works in both immanent and transcendent ways. 
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According to Basil’s view, processes of complexification can be as 
natural as they are divine and as divine as they are natural. 
 
Complexity and Emergence: A Paradox Made Plausible? 
 
It is a truism that the notion of complexity is far too complex to be 
caught in a simple definition.
12
 Emergence is part and parcel of 
complexity: Complexity theory is “an incentive for an emergentist 
worldview.”13 As programmatic as this statement by physicist Paul 
Davies may sound, there are problems and risks with an emergentist 
worldview. A problem is that complexity and emergence are notions 
that at present nobody fully understands. Both concepts may be fairly 
well-defined in specific scientific and philosophical contexts, but as 
soon as they migrate into the realm of general understanding they 
become increasingly fuzzy.
14
 Gregory Peterson addresses this problem 
by discussing the emergence of emergence and different kinds of 
emergence.
15
 Exploring a concept that until now has escaped full 
understanding and daring to go so far as to build some concrete 
suggestions on it, as I do in this essay, has its risks and leaves the author 
vulnerable. Yet, this vulnerability is a necessary part of a vision: Only 
time will tell whether this is a vision or whether it was a delusion. I am 
convinced, however, that, at the very least, here is some valuable 
material for further re-envisioning the creative relationship of nature 
(including humans) and God. 
Apart from many differences in definitions, it is a fundamental 
insight of complexity research that complexity is ontological; that is, it 
is inscribed in the order of being and is not a feature in the eye of the 
beholder. This means that, in spite of the elusiveness of its definition, 
there is something deeply objective about complexity. The fact that 
complexity research has strengthened the position of mathematical 
language, if at all possible, bears witness to this. The chaotic necessity 
that drives the idea of nature as emergent is firmly grounded in the 
language of mathematics.
15
 Ultimately, complexity research is about the 
attempt to show that systems as disparate as sand piles and anthills, 
earthquakes, immune systems, economies, and ecosystems conform to 
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common mathematical principles. There is a growing view that 
complexity is evident at all scales. If that is right, then the assumption 
that macroscopic complexity is always the result of simplicity at the 
microscale is mistaken.  
Complex systems are analyzed in terms of levels of complexity. In 
purely physical and philosophical terms, hierarchy seems to be the big 
gain of the deal. Precisely the idea that the whole order of being (and 
maybe even becoming) can be described in terms of a conclusive 
hierarchy of levels of complexity constitutes the core of the practical 
and aesthetic appeal of this concept.
17
 In that, however, it runs counter 
to some recent developments in philosophy and theology that have 
pointed out that the concept of hierarchy is charged with so many 
problems that it needs to be abandoned or at least submitted to radical 
critique. Feminist and liberation theologians are not the only ones to 
have analyzed hierarchical thought structures that result in hierarchical 
social structures, which, in turn, produce oppression of human and 
nonhuman nature. Half a century ago, theologian Paul Tillich pointed to 
the problems inherent in hierarchical descriptions. Dismissing the 
concept of levels, he works with dimensions, realms, and degrees 
instead.
18
 Whereas levels can hardly be imagined other than as ladder-
type structures, dimensions, realms, and degrees allow for the 
conceptualization of more complex patterns of relationship. One 
dimension—here understood in the colloquial sense of “scope” or 
“aspect,” rather than in its precise mathematical sense—can certainly 
govern and override the other in the same way as levels do. Yet, 
dimensions and realms can do more than that: They can succeed and 
precede each other, they can interact and be independent of each other, 
and they can overlap and complement each other. One can be superior to 
the other in some respects and inferior in others.
19
 Such a concept 
oscillates between continuity and discontinuity and comprises both. It 
may even be more in line with how hierarchy is understood in ecology: 
Ecologists tend to recognize that any top-down influence that may be 
exerted in natural systems is not as absolute as often assumed in the 
philosophical and sociological use of the term hierarchy. The neatness 
of philosophical and physical hierarchies does not have a one-to-one 
correspondence with the levels of order we see in the world of living 
systems. Nature in that sense is messier than many of its descriptions. 
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Evidently, here lurks the risk of a disconnect between emergence as an 
abstract philosophical concept and emergence as the description of 
concrete natural processes. 
Phrasing the problem as a question: Can emergence focus on 
dynamics and potentiality in such a way that the notion of levels is both 
validated and relativized? The answer seems to be yes, if one 
understands emergence as the coming into being of new modes and 
levels of (self-)organization and (co-)operation that transcend the limits 
of a system’s inherent causality. In that sense, emergence transcends the 
rigidity of the physical origins of life, which, of course, implies neither 
the absence of causality nor an understanding of causal chains limited to 
compoundity or complicatedness. As Paul Davies has noted, 
“Complexity reaches a threshold at which the system is liberated from 
the structures of physics and chemistry while still remaining subject to 
their laws. Although the nature of this transition is elusive . . . , its 
implications . . . are obvious.”20 In this sense, complexity is something 
like a paradox made plausible! Radical indeterminacy is understood as a 
very natural transition. Emergence is radically surprising, yet not totally 
enigmatic. 
Einstein, in his day, was very puzzled by the uncertainty implied 
in quantum physics. In fact, he found this indeterminacy repellent. Later 
interpretations have accepted this indeterminacy, however, and given it 
a positive spin, as it were, by understanding it as potentiality. Seen in 
this light, emergence can be interpreted as introducing—or better—
accounting for, potentiality on every scale from the subatomic to the 
macroscopic. In my view, it is this particular feature that constitutes the 
radical character of emergence.   
 
Culture and Nature: Abandoning Dualisms 
 
Much of traditional reasoning about nature, including human nature, has 
been anthropocentric and individualistic. This perspective has been 
noticeably challenged by bio- and ecocentric models of thought. 
Anthropology in general, and the question of human uniqueness in 
particular, have gained new theological, philosophical, and scientific 
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actuality in many respects––genetics, primatology, evolutionary 
psychology/behavioural ecology, and artificial intelligence research 
being the most prominent on the scientific side. In this process, the 
chasm between nature and culture suggested by modernity has been 
unmasked as illusory, requiring new visions of connectedness, as James 
Proctor argues  (“Environment After Nature: Time for a New Vision”).21 
Modern science has had a twofold input in framing the 
understanding of the relationship between nature and culture. On the 
one hand, it has strikingly contributed to the objectification of nature. 
The spirit of Baconian science offers graphic expressions in this regard. 
“The Beautiful Bosom of Nature will be Expos’d to our view: we shall 
enter into its Garden, and taste of its Fruits, and satisfy our selves with 
its plenty.”22 These are powerful metaphors that, as we know today, 
have deeply and often fatefully influenced modern views of nature and 
of human beings as “maîtres et possesseurs”23 of this same nature. 
Metaphors and concepts like these have served to justify the 
domination, the exploitation, and the rape of nature.
24
 Newtonian 
physics, with its concepts of absolute space and time, fostered an 
understanding of nature as the solid stage on which the drama of culture 
is performed. It seemed that nature is dominated by a cyclic order. 
Driven by repetitious cycles, nature forms merely the passive backdrop 
to the dynamic events in a culture that is developing linearly in history.  
On the other hand, both Darwinian and Einsteinian science have 
contributed to the abandonment of this dualism. With the theory of 
evolution through natural selection, nature gained part in linearity and 
historicity. With the theories of relativity, the polarity between passive 
nature and active culture was rescinded. Nature is not an object in a 
huge container called absolute time, but time is in nature. History is not 
the account of a universe now moving inexorably and uniformly through 
time. It is the account of a space-time continuum of crisscrossing light 
cones curved around fields of gravity.
25
 
When this problematisation of the subject-object relationship by 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century science is taken seriously, the way is 
open to think in terms of a differentiated relationality that blurs many 
clear-cut borders between nature and culture. Only a careless thinker 
will interpret this as a lowering of the standards of rationality and 
scientific accuracy. Accounting for complexity—that is, for processes of 
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becoming, multidimensionality, and relationality—clearly requires more 
than descriptions that limit themselves to states of being and one-
dimensionality. It is precisely this development that has set the stage for 
much of the interest in understanding processes in terms of emergence. 
In its wake, a number of concepts crave clarification. Design and order 
are two of those. 
 
Revisiting Design and Order 
 
Theology has always depended on non-theological models of thought in 
order to frame its discourse about nature and God. For ages, Christian 
theologians have drawn on philosophers, especially Plato and Aristotle. 
When philosophy of nature turned into science, it was science that 
contributed to the shaping of theological thought about nature. 
Generally, the assumption was not that science would lend objective 
truth to theological statements. More often, scientific theories would 
provide inspiring metaphors for the articulation of a theological 
language that matches contemporary contexts. Both areas of knowledge 
have in various ways contributed to the shaping of worldviews 
throughout the centuries.
26
 The following exploration of what it may 
mean to speak of nature as creation in light of emergence thought will 
serve as a current example of the interaction of theological thought with 
scientific concepts.  
Within a framework based on the fundamental distinction between 
binaries, such as matter and form or matter and spirit, the doctrine of a 
creation out of nothing (creatio ex nihilo) makes a lot of sense. It 
safeguards the sovereignty of God by allowing for nothing beside God 
at the moment of creation. It also emphasizes the goodness of all 
creation: If everything comes from the word of a good Creator, nothing 
can fall outside, in the domain of a potentially evil force. But the 
doctrine also has its downsides. In the end, divine goodness tends to be 
overpowered by the idea of divine omnipotence. The doctrine also 
leaves Genesis 1:2—about the Earth being a formless void and God’s 
spirit hovering over the face of the waters—without any intelligible 
interpretation. 
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Some theologians have pointed out that the notion of creation out of 
chaos is closer to the biblical sources than creation out of nothing. This, 
of course, does not decide the case, as the history of Christian thought 
knows of many doctrines that lack a clear scriptural foundation; but it 
provides, at least, motivations for considering alternatives. Mythically, 
chaos has tended to be understood as evil. Creation, then, is basically 
synonymous with the slaughter of the chaos beast. Theologian Catherine 
Keller identifies this understanding, which she calls tehomophobia 
(from the Greek phobos, meaning “fear,” and the Hebrew tehom, 
meaning the “deep, the sea, or the chaos”) as harmful.27 The creative 
potential of the tehom fell victim to a tradition demonizing it as evil 
disobedience.
28
 Order came to be understood as fully good and disorder 
as totally evil. By contrast, Keller points out that the biblical material 
also contains an often-neglected tehomophilic (from the Greek philia, 
meaning “friendship, love”) strand, which is less interested in 
hegemonic and linear order and that interprets creation as cocreation.
29
 
Waters and the earth do their own creation (Genesis 1:20–24), and God 
takes delight in the play of Leviathan, the chaos monster (Psalm 
104:26). The so-called wisdom literature, in particular, expresses views 
that are tehomophilic rather than tehomophobic and that are much less 
wedded to the dualism of order and disorder. 
This observation calls for a radical change of perspective, from 
understanding chaos as enemy only to an understanding of chaos as 
potentiality. In light of this shift, Keller suggests that creatio ex nihilo be 
complemented by creatio ex profundis, out of the profundity and womb 
of God, which is understood as the multidimensional continuum of all 
relations.
30
 Drying up the sea (tehom) of potentiality is fatal—as fatal as 
the emptying of the earth’s aquifers. Christian repression of the 
transitional and wild is not only bad for the environment, as Keller 
opines;
31
 it also eliminates the possibility of understanding complexity 
and emergence as significant features of the natural world, I would add. 
If this issue remains unsettled, we tend to build in yet another ostensible 
conflict between scientific and religious views of the world.  
It can be argued on theological, philosophical, and scientific 
grounds that the dualism of matter and form, or order and disorder can 
no longer constitute a sufficient framework for understanding nature, 
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creation, and creativity. The door seems open for a liaison between 
emergence and tehomophilic understandings of creation and creativity. 
It must not be forgotten, though, that such understandings come at a 
cost. They give up something of the clarity of distinction between matter 
and form or spirit, good and evil, order and disorder. Creation is a risk 
for everybody involved, including God; its story needs to be read as a 
narrative of transformation and of metamorphosis, as philosopher John 
Caputo claims, and not as a neat onto-theological metaphysics.
32
 
Keller is not the only theologian to choose messiness over clarity. 
Elizabeth Johnson has suggested that it was the fear of chaos that 
motivated an obsession with order in God, coming along with a support 
of hierarchical and oppressive structures.
33
 Or in the words of Ruth 
Page: “The axiom of Christian faith that God is a God of order and not 
of disorder has meant in practice that disorder has been ignored, or, 
explained away, or written off as sin. . . . But that has left Christianity 
speechless in the face of much disorder . . . The emphasis on order has 
never reflected the dual experience of stability and change, the 
disequilibrium inherent in present order in open systems . . .”34 A 
discourse obsessed with order has not been able to account adequately 
for development and creativity as they unfold in, with, and through the 
interrelatedness that marks nature and culture. 
As the work of Keller, Johnson, and Page shows, theology has 
resources to develop other ways of talking about creation than to focus 
on design and order. Although the replacement of “God the designer” 
with God the “infinitely liberating source of new possibilities and new 
life,”35 God as “serendipitous creativity,”36 or God “the networker”37 is 
not without problems, it is in accord with important elements of 
Christian theology, such as the concept of freedom, certain aspects of 
eschatology, the primacy of the possible before the real, and the notion 
of novelty.
38
 It has the additional benefit of demonstrating that the 
question of “intelligent design” does not deserve the place in the 
limelight of religion and science that it so often assumes. 
This reflection on design and order versus chaos and disorder 
suggests that there are good theological reasons to call into question 
some of the binaries and dualisms that have set the tone in much 
discourse for centuries. Moreover, it is striking how this theological 
development is paralleled by scientific and philosophical understandings 
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of emergence. With varying enthusiasm, scientists and philosophers 
interpret emergence as a way of letting go of binaries and transcending 
dualisms that seem to belong to a bygone era of intellectual history.
39
 In 
this case, developments in theological thought are in consonance with 
sciences that describe the natural world by using the terminology of 
emergence and self-organization. If emergence and self-organization are 
true marks of nature, then tehomophilic strands do indeed provide a 
more comprehensive understanding of creation and creativity than 
tehomophobic ones. 
 
Creation in Light of Emergence: Possibilities and Pitfalls 
 
When Catherine Keller states that “the wounds inflicted by certainty . . . 
will be better healed by a discourse of uncertainty than by just another 
sure truth,”40 this resonates perfectly well with the insight of one of the 
leading figures in complexity research. Contemplating the fact that we 
cannot even predict the motions of three coupled pendula, Stuart 
Kauffman exclaims: “Bacon, you were brilliant, but the world is more 
complex than your philosophy.”41 
Natural selection is not enough to account for the development 
from cell to organism to ecosystem, according to Kauffman’s theory of 
complexity. Kauffmann claims the insufficiency of natural selection for 
diametrically opposite reasons than the intelligent design movement, 
though. In his work, the energy that drives creative processes is called 
“self-organization,” instead of design. He concludes that we need both 
science and story to make sense of the universe.
42
 Evolutionary theory 
must be rebuilt as “a marriage of two sources of order in biology—self-
organization and selection,”43 suggesting that science in general should 
be regarded in terms of an “intermarriage of law and history.”44 This, he 
muses, may be the starting point of a general biology that can formulate 
laws for all biospheres.
45
 Kauffman is not alone: He draws heavily on 
Per Bak’s concept of self-organized criticality as a general mechanism 
to generate complexity. The Brussels school, under Ilya Prigogine, 
would substantiate Kauffman’s claim about history. We have reached a 
description of physics that brings a narrative element into play on all 
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levels, says Prigogine.
46
 Systems biology provides yet another example; 
it takes on many of these insights and is currently gaining influence in 
both research and teaching. 
Nevertheless, complexity theory and emergence are not 
undisputed. Critical issues can be raised in several respects. First of all, 
as already noted, there is a lack of clear definitions. The absence of 
consensus in this regard leads to a lack in clarity as to how to assess the 
potential of emergence. Second, the emphasis on the impossibility of 
predicting the development of complex systems is itself at odds with the 
traditional criteria for good science; namely, the ability to make testable 
predictions. Complexity theorists insist that at the poised stage between 
order and chaos, the unfolding consequences of the next step cannot be 
foretold. Will the next grain of sand falling on a sand pile evoke a 
trickle or a landslide? Nobody can tell. We can only be locally wise, not 
globally wise, as Kauffman puts it.
47
 The theory of complexity is of 
necessity abstract and statistical;
48
 furthermore, it appears to be 
insufficient. 
Both Bak and Kauffman draw support from Stephen Jay Gould’s 
theory of punctuated equilibrium and his emphasis on contingency in 
the evolutionary process. Other views, such as those embodied in Simon 
Conway Morris’s convergence thesis, seem to accord less weight to the 
contingency of evolutionary processes.
49
 This indicates a possible third 
difficulty: The conviction that large avalanches and not gradual change 
make the link between quantitative and qualitative behaviour and thus 
form the basis of emergent phenomena is central to complexity theory.
50
 
It seems, however, that the final word on whether evolution should be 
understood in terms of revolution, as Bak suggests,
51
 has not yet been 
spoken. 
A fourth critical issue pertains to the role of the “exactly right” 
level of criticality. The idea that supercritical, chaotic rules will wash 
out any complex phenomenon that might arise and that subcritical rules 
will freeze into boring, simple structures, while only the critical state 
will allow complexity, sounds plausible, if not seductive: Ecology must 
be posited precisely at the critical state separating the extremes, or rather 
at the phase transition between those extremes. The conclusion sounds 
appealing. “A frozen state cannot evolve. A chaotic state cannot 
remember the past. This leaves the critical state as the only 
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alternative.”52 However, caution may be called for. Cosmology provides 
an example of how fascination with just the right critical level (in this 
case, the exactly right level of matter density to slow down the 
expansion of the universe indefinitely) did not prove to be the right road 
to travel. The nonexpert craves an explanation that clarifies the 
distinction between the desire to detect teleology and the state of facts in 
this regard. The window of possibility for viable structures may be 
much wider than the fascination with the edge of chaos suggests. 
A fifth issue is, in my opinion, the most problematic one; namely, 
the conflation of description and implicit value judgments, which seems 
to come very easily with emergence, as also pointed out by Willem B. 
Drees. Careful and critical interpretation is called for, especially when 
emergence is used in order to justify social norms based on what is 
perceived as a universal, natural, and hierarchical order. In one breath, 
the editorial description of a recent book states that the emergence of 
new order and structure in nature and society is explained by physical, 
chemical, biological, social, and economic self-organization, according 
to the laws of nonlinear dynamics.
54
 The scope of this list is quite 
breathtaking. The author of the book, philosopher of science Klaus 
Mainzer, suggests that symmetry and complexity are not only useful 
models of science, but that they are universals of reality: “In the 
beginning there was a dynamical symmetry expanding to the complex 
diversity of broken symmetries,”55 which leads to the emergence of new 
phenomena on all levels from atoms to art. On the basis of his 
understanding of phase transitions, Mainzer argues that, in order to meet 
the challenges of globalization, “We should deregulate and support self-
regulating autonomy,” because “The sociodiversity of people is the 
human capital for a sustainable progress . . . in the evolutionary process 
of globalization.”56 Mainzer derives social and political norms directly 
from the scientific and philosophical study of emergence. A leap of such 
dimensions requires a careful and critical analysis; this need must not be 
hidden under the cover of emergence as an all-embracing theory.  
In light of these five issues, what is the theological relevance of 
emergence? Where is its place in theological reasoning? Does 
emergence argue for the existence of God? The answer is no. Even 
though Kauffman expresses the hope that the new science of complexity 
may help us to recover our sense of the sacred,
57
 it is as feeble a proof of 
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the existence of God as Thomas Aquinas’s five ways that build on the 
principle of simplicity rather than complexity. The laws of complexity 
do not allow for a deus ex machina; they build solely on dynamic 
interactions among elements of a system—the principle called self-
organization. No intervention from outside is needed. Complexity 
requires long processes of evolution, but it “can and will emerge ‘for 
free’ without any watchmaker tuning the world.”58 
Neither can emergence be claimed as a proof for the failure of 
materialistic accounts. Quite the contrary, the concept of emergence has 
gained considerable appeal just because it seems to underwrite a 
materialistic worldview.
59
 The least to be said is that there is ample 
wiggle room for interpretation here. For example, both Ursula Good 
enough and Terrence Deacon on the one hand, and Philip Clayton on the 
other, argue for strong forms of emergence. Yet, there is a fundamental 
difference between their proposals. Good enough and Deacon use 
emergence in order to argue that everything is perfectly intelligible 
within a naturalist framework, thus making any theist notion 
superfluous.
60
 Religious feelings like awe can be fully accounted for 
within the realm of the natural. They are not dependent on a God-
relationship; hence the possibility of a nontheistic religious naturalism. 
According to this view, nature is enough. Philip Clayton, on the 
contrary, uses emergence precisely to break open such a naturalist 
system by exploring how emergence may suggest transcendence. In his 
proposal, nature is not self-enclosed but, in principle, is upwardly open 
to divine influence on various parts of the natural world.
61
 According to 
him, nature is not enough. 
The conclusion following from this theological twilight is that a 
hermeneutical approach of methodological naturalism fits this area of 
science as well as any other. The theological relevance of emergence is 
not to be sought in the historical area of proofs for the existence of God. 
It is not in the field of apologetics. Rather, theological reflection on 
emergence has a heuristic function. It encourages a fresh look at old 
things by discussing the ways in which emergence thought can help to 
respond to the call for visions of nature that fulfil the criteria stated at 
the beginning of this essay: visions that include the best of scientific and 
theological knowledge, that are mindful of the groaning of an 
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environmentally stressed nature, and that can tell the story of becoming 
that we see unfolding in nature. 
 
As already mentioned, there are exciting parallels with regard to 
understanding how nature works and how we speak about nature as 
creation. There are points of contact between Keller’s talk of creation as 
co-creation and Kauffman’s and Bak’s terminology of coconstruction62 
and coevolution of interacting species,
63
 that is, the coordinated 
evolution of entire ecosystems.
64
 Emergence theorists talk about 
interacting dancing fitness landscapes and life as a global, collective, 
cooperative phenomenon. There is a direct affinity between such talk 
and the language of much of recent theology that often favours 
metaphors of dance and concepts of relationality.
65
 
My appraisal of creation out of nothing in light of emergence 
differs from the critique of process theologians who tend to see creatio 
ex nihilo as the most disastrous distortion of Christian faith.
66
 Instead, I 
argue for maintaining the concept for both its anti-Manichaean merits 
and its affirmation that everything created has an implicit God-
relationship. However, I also argue that the ex nihilo needs to be 
released from its metaphysical restriction to the dualism of form and 
matter so that it can be used as a lens for a theological understanding of 
processes of emergence. As cosmology insists, nothing is not nothing (at 
least with regard to quantum fluctuations): The metaphysical short-
circuiting of the nihilo can be overcome on rational grounds. Creation 
understood as the emergence of “something more from nothing but”67 
can be a legitimate interpretation of creation out of nothing. Such a 
reading comes with the additional benefit of lessening the gap between 
creatio originalis (original creation) and creatio continua (continuous 
creation). 
In sum, I agree with Peterson
68
 that emergence entails a critique of 
claims of completeness and closure. I am careful, however, to 
distinguish these claims from attempts of sneaking in a variation of a 
god-of-the-gaps argument and to avoid an overemphasis on the 
hierarchical levels of emergence. The latter neglects horizontal 
relationships at the expense of vertical ones and has a propensity to 
conflate description and values. Both these risks appear to be more 
imminent, when emergence thought is based predominantly on physics 
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and philosophy. Essays by Henderson, Proctor, and Ulanowicz lead me 
to the conclusion that the ecological scale seems to be the most 
appropriate one with which to gain an understanding of the scope of 
interrelatedness that is the hotbed of emergence. At the ecological scale, 
it seems easier to avoid the tyranny of the ladder metaphor that often 
comes with emergence talk, because ecology has a tendency to relativize 
distinctions between higher and lower levels. The ecological scale may 
also help to address the intricate relationships between facts and values, 
because ecology always needs to ask the question: What is a value for 
whom? 
As I now move on to sketch out some specific elements of a vision 
of human and nonhuman nature and God, I deliberately enter the grey 
area between a concrete and metaphorical use of emergence—a 
methodological move that in itself may count as emergent. 
 
Elements of a New Vision in Light of Emergence 
 
In my view, the following elements are conducive to an appropriate 
vision of nature in light of emergence—a vision that is informed by both 
science and a theologically reflected understanding of nature and God. I 
will sketch these elements as brief responses to six questions. Rather 
than providing definitive answers, these short statements are meant to 
provide material for further reflection. 
 
How can we talk about nature? 
In light of emergence, nature presents itself as shaped by two seemingly 
opposing tendencies. On the one hand, it is marked by an openness that 
facilitates evolution and complexification; on the other hand, it bears the 
mark of a restraint that imposes order. Consequently, we see a powerful 
inherent creativity in nature, provided by the laws of nature. Again, we 
see the paradox made plausible—yet not domesticated. This vision of 
nature suggests that the opposing tendencies are linked together; 
openness and restraint are one in nature.
69
 Theologically speaking, this 
would mean that Manichaeism has rightly been debunked as wrong 
teaching. Concepts that work with the unity of the hidden and revealed 
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God are better suited to express this vision. Nature is not a chain of sand 
grains or beings trickling from the hand of a supposedly almighty 
creator. It is better understood as the story of becoming and 
complexification. The mix of catastrophism and creativity has its 
correspondence in a creator who is present both immanently and 
transcendently and for whom creation also is a process of kenosis 
(Greek for “emptying”) and vulnerability. Creation is a “dicey business” 
for everybody, including God.
70
 
Concepts of complexity count on a phase space of potentiality linked 
to natural phenomena. This is an image for the idea that every event is 
“surrounded by a ghostly halo of nearby events that didn’t happen, but 
could have.”71 In terms of theological analogy, this could mean that a 
field of transcendence is coupled with factual reality. The “adjacent 
possible”72 has a role in processes of actualization; it can, in fact, be 
seen as a part of actuality. It is in this sense that I think Paul Tillich 
understood the eschaton (“the last, the ultimate”), when he spoke of the 
eschaton as the “transcendent meaning of events.”73This concept of a 
space of potentiality implies a beneficial disruption of simple notions of 
intervention. It entrusts to the rubbish heap of history the equation that 
identifies any divine action with a violation of the laws of nature. 
Searches for expanded concepts of causation are well justified and 
called for.
74
 
 
How can we talk about human nature? 
The concept of emergence is potentially helpful in addressing the 
question of human nature, and specifically the question of human 
uniqueness within a vision of nature that emphasizes the continuity 
between nature and culture. Traditional theological understandings of 
human uniqueness (imago dei) have often focused on cognitive traits, 
like human rationality and intelligence that have set humans apart from 
the rest of nature. On the contrary, an understanding of human 
uniqueness in terms of emergence, such as that suggested by Wentzel 
van Huyssteen, emphasizes both continuity and discontinuity with the 
rest of nature: It accounts for our close ties with the animal world as 
well as for the uniqueness in which symbolic and cognitively fluent 
minds bring about language, art, technology, religion, and science.
75
 It is 
a prerequisite for a comprehensive vision of nature to understand 
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humans as the part of nature they are, while at the same time articulating 
the specifics of human potential and responsibility. 
 
How can we speak about God? 
God is not the designer of outcomes; rather, God is the wellspring of the 
frameworks within which complexification can occur. The watchmaker 
image of God has given way to a networker image of God.
76
 This is the 
definite end of any deistic concept of a God who winds up a cosmic 
clock and then retires to watch the process of mechanical unwinding. In 
this vision, God is the transcendent creator as well as the immanent 
creative energy. This concept acknowledges both creatio originalis and 
creatio continua. The idea that God has created the world as self-
productive or self-organizing seems to offer a possibility of modifying 
concepts of God as a designer, so that they include evolutionary 
concepts, allowing for freedom and genuine novelty. God as the 
wellspring of complex autopoietic systems is Godself living a complex 
life, implying change, having freedom, and granting freedom. In light of 
this, problematic divine attributes, such as immutability and 
impassibility, can be revisited in a substantive way. Grace and freedom 
can be conceptualized without ruling out the notion of God’s 
transformative power. 
 
How can we speak about natural evil? 
Theories of complexity are relevant to the question of natural evil. Why 
do earthquakes happen if creation is meant to be good? As Bak remarks, 
self-organized criticality (the state of maximum slope in the sand pile) 
can be conceived of as the theoretical underpinning for catastrophism, 
that is, the opposite philosophy to gradualism.
77
 It implies that 
catastrophes happen and need to happen, and that they happen as a 
consequence of very small events. This thought has its theological 
counterpart in apocalypticism, which tends not to be a favourite subject 
of theologians. Often, its well-behaved cousin, eschatology, has been 
tremendously more popular than this unruly enfant terrible. Yet, as 
Keller rightly points out, from an ecotheological perspective, an 
antiapocalyptic stance that joins the tehomophobic strand and 
metaphorically and literally empties the dark sea (and thus creativity), as 
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tempting as it may seem, colludes with a conservative triumphalism so 
often detrimental to the environment.
78
  
Along these lines, the concept of emergence adds sophistication to one 
of the traditional ways of engagement with the unsolved problem of 
theodicy. It supports the pedagogical approach by suggesting that nature 
works so that there is a price to be paid for complexification, because 
conplexification needs both order and disorder. Nature displays 
criticality and catastrophes as well as creativity and stability. This does 
not diminish the role of pain and evil in the world, and does not explain 
the magnitude of evil. Even pain that is understood within a framework 
of emergence is no less painful, but not being able to feel and articulate 
pain would be an even greater evil. This is why lament is a vital element 
of religious practice. 
 
What can emergence contribute to an understanding of 
sacramentality? 
The concept of emergence has a theological parallel in the concept of 
sacramentality. Both emergence and sacramentality can be understood 
as having the capacity of expressing the continuity between the 
physical, mental, and spiritual in terms of a differentiated relationality. 
Both express the fact that the less complex can birth the more complex. 
Bread and wine emerge into shared communion with Christ; out of 
water and word emerges a new life in Christ. 
Properly understood, sacramentality is the radicalization of the 
idea that a phenomenon is more than it presents itself to be. It goes at 
least one step further than the emergentist understanding referred to with 
regard to human uniqueness and its emphasis on continuity and 
discontinuity with the rest of nature. It also moves beyond a general 
acknowledgment of the significance of potentiality. Rather than 
focusing exclusively on the actual, emergence encourages a view of 
reality as a blend of the actual and the potential. Sacramentality 
radicalizes this by declaring the potential to be part of the actual: For the 
human eye and tongue, bread is bread, and wine is wine; a sacramental 
view claims that the reality of communion in Christ surpasses the 
apparent actuality by turning that which according to human perspective 
is (merely) potentiality into reality. Bringing emergence thought 
together with the theology of the sacraments seems fruitful both for 
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Western theology as well as the theology of the Eastern churches and 
their understanding of sacramentality and divine energies. 
    
It is here, in the context of sacramentality, that I stretch the use of 
emergence toward a metaphorical maximum. The following statement 
about theological method reverts to a more concrete understanding of 
emergence. 
 
What bearing does a heuristic understanding of emergence have on 
theological method in general? 
Emergence presupposes the existence of clusters of networks. A word of 
caution may be in order, though. The human mind with its seemingly 
insatiable desire to recognize patterns has a tendency to imagine 
networks and clusters of networks as a state of order. However, radical 
interconnectedness implies much more disorder than a sanitized concept 
like clusters of networks suggests—especially to the layperson. 
Mathematically, one can clearly distinguish the ordered structure from 
the disordered—and both are there!79 Bringing emergence and theology 
together may therefore in praxis be much riskier than the theory would 
indicate.  
One of the less dramatic implications of viewing the practice of 
theology in light of emergence is the requirement that theology as a 
discipline needs to increase its attention to communal, ecumenical, and 
interfaith approaches. Developments in the religious landscape cannot 
be understood adequately by focusing on the religious experience of 
single individuals or the content of one specific religious tradition or 
geographic region alone. One has to take into account relations with the 
rest of nature, as well as a full societal scope. Global wisdom cannot be 
attained. Yet local wisdom cannot be attained without seeking global 
wisdom. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Many current intellectual pursuits across varied disciplines tend to be 
driven by the will to understand nature, science, and religion in terms of 
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dynamic systems, interrelatedness, discontinuities, and processes of 
complexification. In this situation, emergence serves as a fruitful 
concept that seems applicable over the entire spectrum of knowledge. 
Emergence is not easily defined, however, and its concomitant 
interpretations can be as flawed as any. In the scientific realm, ecology 
appears to be especially well-suited to enhance the understanding of 
emergence by describing the interplay of opposing tendencies in nature 
and the variety of interactions across levels and networks. 
In philosophy and theology, emergence contributes to the critique of 
ontological metaphysical statements. Narrative understanding is always 
necessary: Metaphysics cannot do without myth. Even here, opposing 
tendencies and binaries are seen in a perspective that is different from 
what usually goes by the name of Cartesian dualism. Reconsidering the 
role of the potential and the real allows for an understanding of binaries, 
such as immanent/transcendent, order/disorder, and nature/culture along 
the lines of what I have called a differentiated relationality. This, in turn, 
invites us to envision nature, God, evil, sacramentality, and theological 
method in the directions shown in this essay. 
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Theology after Darwin – and Beyond 
Lluis Oviedo 
 
Abstract 
 
Darwinian ideas have influenced many disciplines; it would be naive to 
deny the impact they had and still have within the field of theology. The 
present paper assesses this impact by considering both negative and 
positive influences, because often, challenges become opportunities. 
Furthermore, contemporary evolutionary biology has evolved in a way 
that provides a more pluralistic panorama, helping to reframe some of the 
old questions and challenges. 
 
Keywords: Darwin, Evolution, Anthropology, Religion, Christian 
Theology, Pluralism, Reductionism. 
 
Introduction 
 
Religious people used to feel rather scared when the name of Darwin was 
mentioned. It evokes a very different universe from the one we used to 
learn in the Biblical tradition; a diminishing image of humans, too much 
in line with the apes, and a world where God seems to fade away, as 
science can explain everything without resorting to divine intervention. 
Theology may share a similar mood, even if most of theologians tend to 
care little if at all about Darwin and evolutionary biology. Indeed some 
contemporary theologians take the “indifference” stance towards 
scientific developments; a position of incommensurability unassailable to 
any rational criticism.  
Other theologians believe that Darwin’s theory of evolution is 
profoundly relevant for theology and for Christian living. This is 
especially true for theological programs which remain open to science 
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and culture. A different form of religious reflection arises when it is not 
afraid of engaging with the best contributions of art, culture, philosophy, 
and science, but rather appreciates all that is positively human and learns 
from these disciplines to live a more mature and fruitful faith. Some 
theologians argue that religious faith can gain more than it loses when it 
takes science and other forms of human reason or creativity into 
consideration, in particular those issues that are most challenging for 
religious faith. 
Many agree that Charles Darwin’s understanding of the process of 
evolution through natural selection constitutes a milestone within 
science. His thinking reaches far beyond the realm of palaeontology and 
broad biology. He created a unique model of thought that helps to infuse 
dynamism into the way we view the living world, including its social and 
human dimensions. His theory means that everything is exposed to 
change, which implies that no one can predict with certainty what will 
last or become extinct. Nothing can be taken for granted, because the 
evolutionary process only ensures relative rates of success. Furthermore, 
those “victories” can never be seen as complete, however significant they 
may be, because the evolutionary triumph of today could mean the total 
extinction of entire species tomorrow. 
Theology and Christian thought should not ignore the 
consequences of Darwinism for understanding nature and the human 
condition. Especially because it inevitably touches on the meaning of 
faith, religious behaviour, and our understanding of what is divine. 
Simply put, since we currently live within a “Darwinian world,” and have 
come to inhabit a “Darwinian mind,” it is considerably more fruitful to 
study the Darwinian understanding of the world and its implications than 
to ignore its impact and avoid its challenges. 
The present paper is an attempt to analyse the impact of a 
Darwinian understanding of the world on Christian theology. 
Furthermore, its attempt is to evaluate the levels of reception of 
Darwinism within the theological milieu. The aim is also to investigate 
the new insights that are developed from a dynamic process of research, 
discussion, and theory building. It will be shown that Darwinian thought 
brings both risks and opportunities for theological reflection. In order to 
do so, the main challenges of Darwinism will be described, some of 
which are not solely challenges to religious faith, but also to philosophy 
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and ethics. Furthermore, it will be shown how evolutionary theory may 
help theology and even solve intractable old questions. Moreover, it will 
be disclosed how contemporary theology is affected by this theory and is 
called to change its mind and method. In the last paragraph, moving 
beyond Darwin, it is argued that the several lines of thinking around the 
theory of evolution should allow for a more diversified theological 
response. 
 
Challenges of Evolutionism for Christian Theology  
 
Three main challenges which need to be assumed when theology tries to 
seriously engage with Darwin’s legacy:  
 
1. How much the theory of “natural selection” renders redundant the 
role so far played by God as agent of creation and conservation or 
improvement of the natural realm (Dupré 2003)? 
2. Whether that same theory, in some analyses implies nihilism in the 
extreme (Sommers and Rosenberg 2003). This challenge affects 
not only theology, but the field of ethics as well.  
3. How far the theological representation of human nature becomes 
affected by the view that human beings are no longer created in the 
image of the God of love, but are similar to other animals striving 
for survival and reproduction.  
 
The first challenge has been described – among others – by John Dupré. 
This American philosopher states that “Darwin’s theory provides the last 
major piece in the articulation of a fully naturalistic world-view and 
hence would, if fully appreciated, deliver a death blow to pre-scientific, 
theocentric cosmologies” (Dupré 2003, 41). He is convinced, against the 
attempts to reconcile evolution and theology by Ruse, Gould, and many 
others, that “Darwinism undermines the only remotely plausible reason 
for believing in God, [namely the argument from design]” (Dupré 2003, 
56).  
Maybe Dupré is just rendering explicit what was affecting, for a 
long time and in a latent or implicit way, the set of convictions or basic 
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ideas of religious faith. Indeed faith in a provident and loving God could 
be justified in part, because of an incomplete knowledge of reality. Since 
ancient times, the apparent order of nature, the cosmic harmony, and the 
wonders of biological self-organization demanded explanations. For a 
long time, the idea of a divine agent provided the best cognitive model in 
order to build a coherent and complete representation of natural reality as 
well as to fill the gaps of unexplained causes and events. This view 
seems to have become no longer necessary, as nature may be rationally 
explained, i.e. without resorting to a divine agent able to bear order in the 
midst of chaos. God becomes “redundant,” or a hypothesis that does not 
add anything new or that does not improve the scientifically available 
model. One consequence is that people who based their religious faith 
upon that cognitive model, perhaps felt less motivated to continue the 
religious path. This is another version of the well-known Weberian 
analysis of the causes of the modern secularization process: modern 
times provide a more rational view of everything, and, as a consequence, 
religious beliefs appear as ever less rational and fitting in the new 
intellectual framework (Weber [1919] 1988, 598). 
 
Strategies to cope with the question of God’s redundancy 
 
Theology is currently trying several strategies to cope with the challenge 
that could be called “the question of God’s redundancy.” Three such 
strategies can succinctly be described.  
 
1. A strategy to overcome a “God of the gaps” mentality;  
2. Embracing a mystical approach to “the God of evolution”;  
3. Taking a new apologetic stance showing the radical limits of the 
scientific view.  
 
The first as well as the second strategy follows a traditional pattern that 
could be described – in Catholic Jesuit terms – as “making a virtue of a 
defect”: What apparently appears as a hindrance for faith, when observed 
from a different point of view may become an advantage.  
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The first strategy tries to overcome a religious concept that is almost 
completely based on the defects of reality. Such religion constitutes a 
kind of “negative faith,” a kind of religious instrumentalism. God 
becomes the “problem-solving” entity thereby taking away our concerns. 
A more mature religiosity would rather appreciate God not so much as 
the answer to what we lack, but rather as the Giver of what we already 
have and continually receive. 
The second strategy builds on the insight of an apparently 
redundant God in order to constitute “theistic evolutionism”. This line of 
thinking has been endorsed by several theologians, from Teilhard de 
Chardin to John Haught. All emphasize the loving creative power of 
God, revealed through the evolutionary process. Evolution then is 
perceived not just as a spontaneous unfolding of natural processes, but 
rather as a wise and mysterious course, full of beauty and inspiring awe. 
Perhaps Michael Dowd’s book Thank God for Evolution (2007) may be 
considered a successful attempt to render a “mystical view” of the 
evolutionary process popular. His aim is to invite the believers to 
appreciate the creative power revealed in the uninterrupted succession of 
new cosmic and living forms. In other words, what for atheists and 
agnostics, appears as a reason for avoiding religious faith becomes, for 
the believers, a reason to deepen their spiritual commitment, as they 
discover new ways to appreciate the immensely creative power of God, 
revealed in this awe-filled evolving world of infinite richness. As has 
often happened in modern times, new discoveries may give rise to deep 
ambiguity nourishing both scepticism and faith, religious disregard and 
deep devotion. 
The most severe criticism of these theological and spiritual 
approaches is that theology is not fair in dealing with science. In other 
words, these theological manoeuvres are seen as futile attempts to inject 
alien ideas into the Christian tradition in order to build a more science-
friendly version. Christian thought has throughout its secular history 
repeatedly shown its ability to integrate or assimilate conflicting theories 
and views. Indeed, several atheistic ideas have been reconverted or 
recycled into the Christian toolkit. For example, the attempts to 
“Christianize” Marx and Freud. So, why not also include Darwin and the 
theory of evolution? However, there is a difference worth considering. 
By including Darwinism, theologians do not have to deal with specific 
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philosophies or ideologies, which may or may not be accepted, but with 
“scientific evidence”, which has a different meaning.  
In any case, it seems difficult to contest that many theologians 
have revised their theology in a way that God and evolution become not 
only compatible, but even complementary. Furthermore, there is no doubt 
that many believers have managed to integrate both views in their lives. 
This clearly challenges those who claim that only creationism fits into the 
Christian doctrine as well as those who argue that the theory of evolution 
renders religious faith insignificant. 
The theological adoption of evolutionism into a Christian or other 
religious framework entails some gain or added value, because the divine 
is introduced into the apparently spontaneous process. Evolution 
becomes, in that way, a deeply meaningful course, because including the 
divine increases the plausibility of evolutionism while adding purpose 
and hope to the process of evolution. 
An example of this strategy is offered by John Haught. The 
evolutionary view is more in line with a theology of future and promise, 
and overcomes the “metaphysics of the past,” or total determinism 
(Haught 2000). According to Haught, evolution is rather an open process, 
in which divine freedom interacts with an indeterministic world in a 
creative way. Essential in Haught’s idea is that by including the divine 
into the process of evolution, this process is no longer random but has a 
purpose. Plain evolutionism, on the other hand, may provoke nihilism. 
Nevertheless, Haught’s position is not left without criticism. In the 
well-aimed words of Barbara Herrnstein Smith: “The New Natural 
Theology is largely a rhetorical enterprise, a matter of making a series of 
complex, somewhat paradoxical ideas credible through a skilful use of 
language” (Smith 2009, 97). 
Perhaps a stronger strategy is required in order to deal with the 
criticism expressed by Dupré and many others and in order to move 
beyond rhetorical constructions. The theory of evolution is a scientific 
theory with broader implications. It explains the unfolding of life in its 
multiple successive forms. It is a well proven scientific theory with high 
levels of heuristic power. Nevertheless, it does not provide a complete 
view of the world, human beings, or every aspect of a complex human 
life. Due to the criteria for doing science (simplicity, repeatability and 
testability) science cannot be complete in its explanations of reality. 
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Scientists deal with specific aspects of reality, i.e. those aspects that are 
measurable and observable. Therefore, many aspects of social and human 
life lie beyond the possibility of scientific investigation. The current 
means scientists have at their disposal makes it impossible for them to 
deal with other dimensions of human life, e.g. love, friendship, morality, 
suffering or meaninglessness. 
Also from an empirical point of view, it becomes obvious that the 
advances of scientific knowledge as well as the increase of scholarship 
amongst the average population have not made contemporary generations 
happier or more satisfied. It is sufficient to look at several indicators, 
such as for example family stability, mental health, social unrest, and 
educational struggles. 
To conclude what is said above, scientific evolutionism does not 
render religious faith redundant, as, by the same token, it does not render 
art, friendship, or morality redundant.  
Because of the ethical and anthropological consequences and even 
though they go beyond sheer theological implications, two issues deserve 
specific attention in order to deepen the path of apologetic argument.  
Firstly, if it is true that Darwinism implies nihilism, it’s not just 
Christians who are in trouble. Every moral proposal could become 
impracticable, because the underlying logic governing living beings 
renders any moral norm ineffective or, at best, irrelevant. Such an 
ontological reductive position would, in the long run, become self-
defeating, and would only satisfy those academics who endorse it. My 
concern is what would happen if the human person is merely conceived 
in biological evolutionary ways? What would happen if Darwin’s ideas 
are understood as a denial of any ethical program? Could the Darwinian 
program be pursued beyond its own theoretical frames? Furthermore, 
who would then take on the role of identifying the risks entailed by this 
position in terms of moral responsibility?  
Secondly, from a cognitive point of view, it can be asked whether 
our mind is satisfied with the nihilistic outlook that results from the 
radical understanding of nature governed by pure chance, or whether this 
mind requires additional cognitive frameworks in order to understand the 
world of which it is part. At the end, the issue turns out to be a 
hermeneutic one, requiring and calling us to make a conscious choice, 
i.e., for or against the reductive model of human existence. 
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The main point is that the human person is far too complex in 
nature and behaviour. Clearly, Darwinian criteria are not enough to shed 
light on the many aspects of human life. This point emphasizes a general 
deficiency in the most radical expressions of Darwinian anthropology, 
but needs to be added to the repertoire of apologetic arguments 
concerning how theology can survive and adapt to the new scientific 
context.  
 
How Evolutionary Theory Gives a Hand to Theology  
 
A good deal of what has been stated in the former paragraph could be 
understood as theological developments triggered by Darwinian Theory 
or by dialogues with evolutionists. This interaction has prompted many 
new theological insights. Trying to gather into some clusters the main 
contributions of evolutionism to theological development, I suggest the 
following three orientations. 
  
1. A better understanding of the relationship between God and 
creation, including an interesting reformulation of concepts like 
creation and providence.  
2. A much more realistic approach to human nature which is of 
crucial importance for the development of Christian anthropology.  
3. A way to rethink the questions of evil, suffering and negativity and 
hence, a better strategy to deal with the theodicy problem and the 
traditional doctrine of original sin.  
 
Regarding the first point, theologians should be grateful and embrace the 
theory of evolution, because it allows them to deepen their knowledge of 
reality and to better appreciate the role that the divine plays in the origin 
and development of the universe. John Haught is again one of the 
scholars who expressed this “novelty” brilliantly. He writes,  
 
“Moreover, evolution has allowed theology to acknowledge at last 
that the notion of an originally and instantaneously completed 
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creation is theologically unthinkable in any case. If we could 
imagine it at all, we would have to conclude that the initial 
creation, one already finished and perfected from the beginning, 
could be not a creation truly distinct from its creator. Such a ‘world’ 
would simply be an appendage of God, not a world unto itself; nor 
could God conceivably transcend such a world. It would be a world 
without internal self-coherence, a world without a future, and 
above all, a world devoid of life” (Haught 2000, 37).  
Haught’s main point, in my view, is that Darwinian representation 
renders a much more theologically adjusted idea of what a “created 
world” means, and this new orientation allows for a better representation 
of the relationships between God and the world, because both need to be 
thought of as relatively independent and, nevertheless, able to interact. 
However, there are more theological advantages when evolution is 
taken into serious account. Indeed, the evolutionary stance seems more in 
line with a dynamic theology that sees salvation as a process unfolding 
its healthy power through history, rather than a static event or just a 
divine property. Obviously, the historic-salvific theological model has 
been applied to the short human period in evolution; but taking the 
process of evolution into account makes it possible to extend the doctrine 
of salvation backwards to the first moments of the universe as well as 
forwards to its conclusion. The process becomes dynamic. The salvific 
work of God may be seen as a constant interplay between chaos and 
order, in the constraints of thermodynamic forces and its attempts to 
overcome entropy. Indeed, the application of thermodynamic categories 
could help to develop a more science-friendly account of creation, evil, 
and salvation. 
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The second level of positive contributions concerns the 
anthropological field. Besides cosmology, anthropology may be deemed 
as one of the most fruitful fields of theological enrichment. There are 
several points worthy of comment and exploration. In broad terms, 
Darwinian ideas have helped to gain a more realistic picture of humans 
as biological beings, deeply conditioned by their animal constitution. 
Even though an evolutionary perspective does not provide the full story, 
it nonetheless contributes enormously to better understand humans. Some 
important issues at stake are, firstly the tension between self-affirmative 
instincts of survival and social-altruistic tendencies; secondly what has 
been coined “natural law” for understanding life, suffering, and death; 
thirdly the question of freedom and its constraints; lastly the meaning of 
humans as in the “image of God”.  
Trying to theorize human nature has never been easy, as very often 
human complexity has challenged any reductive approach and affected 
its explicative power. The Christian tradition has often tried to explain 
human beings along a dual model, i.e. as good and bad, altruistic and 
egoistic, loving and hating, virtuous and sinful. True Christian 
anthropology tries to establish an appropriate balance between positive 
and negative traits. A theology of human creation states that humans, 
since they are created by God, are good, because as such they reflect the 
goodness of the divine. However, the Christian tradition also states that 
human beings have “fallen”. Hence, a theology of grace contributes to 
reconstruct, or to promise a regeneration of, a fallen and corrupted 
nature.  
The question is now in what way Darwinism could contribute? The 
answer is manifold. Firstly, a Darwinian perspective helps to understand 
and explain human duality, granting Christian theology a possibility for 
development and insight into the human race. Indeed, traits such as 
selfishness and altruism, for example, are essential characteristics for 
successful human evolution. Humans, as do other animals, strive to 
improve their survival chances, to gain a reproductive advantage and 
optimize offspring. Hence, selfishness is a necessary trait for the survival 
and fitness of the species. However, so is altruism, because it allows for 
construction of societies, something that has become very complex for 
the human species. Building such societies requires a huge amount of 
mutual investment and trust, self-sacrifice and helping behaviours. For 
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instance, “Post-Axial religions” can be perceived as the result of a 
broadly felt need to reach a new balance between the contrary tendencies 
mentioned, allowing for better-integrated social units, or in other words, 
more adapted to the demanding conditions of human aggregations ever 
more organized and interdependent. This balance, reaching a more 
plausible coordination between selfish and altruistic trends, has been the 
basis for more stable and vigorous societies, giving rise to further stages 
of development. 
When this complex anthropological pattern is taken into account, a 
more coherent view of human nature emerges, which helps to better 
understand the traditional Christian picture, namely, the selfish and the 
altruistic traits are deeply entrenched as the result of an evolutionary 
process in which such complex duality was selected. Nevertheless, 
adopting a biological view does not – once again – render a theological 
view redundant. Rather, this complex human nature, and its apparent 
amount of imbalance so frequently observed, requires a mechanism able 
to supply both a profound and meaningful reading of human duality, 
which also provides a solution for re-balancing human nature and life. 
The question is, however, whether this mechanism leading to renewed 
balances is “self-organized”, resulting from a spontaneous process, or 
whether human and cultural evolution have prompted a religious mind in 
order to reach fruitful and effective anthropological equilibrium?  
The issues concerning human nature suggest that a productive 
openness to evolutionary theory can be fruitful for theology. From such a 
perspective, the traditional idea of “natural law,” which is narrowly 
linked with the other classic topic of the “order of love,” acquires new 
relevance. Some scholars have already developed theological proposals, 
adopting the theory of evolution (Pope 1994). Their research looks 
primarily for convergence between scientific insights and Christian 
semantics and doctrines. Hamilton’s well-known theory of “kin 
altruism,” for example, helps to explain the usual preferences in 
addressing our compassion and love: close relatives are usually preferred 
to distant or unrelated people (Hamilton 1964). The convergence 
between theological and biological insights becomes even more apparent 
when “natural law” can be linked to “biological traits” necessary for 
survival and reproductive success. 
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Once again, the problem is not that an evolutionary perspective 
contradicts the traditional Christian views. Providing a naturalized 
understanding of subject matter such as ‘natural law’ and the ‘order of 
love’, the biological perspective not only confirms the inherited moral 
religious intuitions, but also provides a firmer basis for establishing these 
principles. In other words, in order to understand the importance of 
preserving human life, establish a family and engender children, to love 
your relatives and friends, and help those in need, no longer requires a 
religiously grounded set of moral rules or a religious anthropology. It 
seems that we can arrive at the same conclusions without the help of 
religious thought. The question is however, is an evolutionary 
metaphysics enough? 
Darwinism seems to confirm well-established Christian doctrines 
as well as to challenge their theistic basis. In my opinion and in spite of 
the challenges, well-understood Darwinian insights may prove to be 
fruitful for theology and give theology the possibility to grow and 
revitalize. However, from an empirical point of view it is doubtful as to 
whether the awareness of the biological roots of our social constructions 
is enough to defend such theology or to implement old-fashioned ‘natural 
law’. From a demographic point of view, it can be argued that 
evolutionary theory does not provide enough evidence or heuristic power 
to explain the decreasing birth rates in most European countries; 
something that threatens the long-term survival of these societies. It 
seems clear, as the philosopher Immanuel Kant once observed, that it is 
not enough to be aware of some basic human and social traits in order to 
feel motivated to behave in a particular way, especially when this 
decision entails a degree of self-sacrifice. Critics of Enlightenment often 
emphasized the limits in the moral programs rising from modern 
awareness of self-reliance. Evolutionary thought can sometimes be taken 
as both a kind of new Enlightenment or as a form of “religion” (Midgley 
2002
2
). The problem is that the same mistakes may be repeated, 
providing a moral program that simply does not work in the real world. 
A third important contribution of Darwinism to theology has to do 
with the hard question of unjustifiable suffering in the world. In some 
way, it may be considered one of the most fruitful “gifts” of Darwin to 
religion, as Francisco Ayala claims (2007). I have already introduced this 
idea above by accounting for the dual constitution of the human nature. 
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However, Darwinism also helps to better understand the doctrine of 
“original sin.” (Domning and Hellwig 2006). Indeed, the idea of a 
“universal sinfulness” is linked to the selfish traits required to ensure the 
survival of our species at the cost of endangering other species and the 
environment. Christological redemption is then perceived as a subversion 
of this selfish trait, i.e. as a perfect altruistic trait beyond every other 
conceivable natural development. The teachings and life of Christ 
provide a model that disapproves of selfishness and instead suggests an 
unselfish form of love that is needed if the balance of human nature that 
has been lost is to be recovered or in order to avoid the tendency to 
overstate selfish inclination. It seems that the biblical narrative associated 
with the issue of original sin makes more sense when the biological 
background is taken into account. 
To summarize, evolutionary science can become a good 
companion to traditional theology, not just a concurrent or destructive 
force requiring the sacrifice of deeply rooted beliefs. It is interesting how 
old issues such as God’s providence and the idea of atonement in Christ 
(Shults 2008) find new expressions through new biological 
understanding, enriching the repertoire of available theological insights.  
 
Theology Changing Format, Assumptions, and Method  
 
Taking Darwin’s legacy seriously implies some modifications of the 
theological mind, because it is somehow affected by this theoretic 
“evolution”. Similar to the way other disciplines have done, the 
discipline of theology is called to evolve. Needless to say theology is 
affected by the knowledge that the theory of evolution provides, despite 
some loose ends of the theory and the criticism it receives in different 
scientific and philosophical environments. Conflicts are unavoidable, but 
at the same time, well-met challenges can be turned into opportunities, 
when properly understood.  
At least three suggestions deriving from the current biological 
development invite a revision of the theological mind:  
 
1. a more dynamic view of reality;  
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2. a conscious pragmatism; and  
3. a consequent level of realism.  
 
Theology is called to integrate a more dynamic view of reality, instead of 
the traditional static one. The world and everything in it has evolved. 
This is a kind of “axiom” derived from the theory of evolution and 
dominates the scientific perspective of reality. It has obvious precedents 
in Hegelian philosophy as well as in other philosophical thinking of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, e.g. Alfred Whitehead’s “process 
philosophy”. Theology needs to be aware of the challenge the theory of 
evolution poses to its traditional static versions deriving from ancient and 
medieval theologies. A world of “essences” needs to give way for a 
world of “processes”. Where a harmonic and stable order was once 
perceived, now instability, entropy, and new adaptations constitute the 
building blocks of our permanently unsteady situation. A different 
theological paradigm needs to be supplied, after taking into account the 
state of things and its corresponding well-established theoretical 
framework. Perhaps, only the doctrines (semantics) of love and mercy of 
God remain unchanged. Possibly, this changing universe calls for an 
external fixed point, not only in the form of a designer, but also an 
external frame of reference which can give the world what it needs, 
namely some minimal certainties providing purpose and hope. In my 
opinion, the evolving world is compatible with a stable and trustworthy 
God.  
The rules governing reality appear to be largely pragmatic: the 
better things work, the better the chances are for survival; the better the 
performance is, the greater chances are given. This view goes against the 
Christian line of faith of freely given, undeserved rewards. The 
Darwinian model, even though if it does not entirely explain all causes of 
evolution, consecrates a view in which success is measured by the 
degrees of adaptability and fitness. Some lessons may be drawn. 
Christian proposals or ideas, models of Church and of other religious 
communities are submitted to similar selective pressure. The fittest will 
survive; the others, even if they have a long history of dominance and 
power, will gradually become extinct. Social and cultural processes may 
not follow the same kind of evolutionary pattern of the biological world, 
but it would be naïve to pretend that social realities could avoid this 
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scenario. This means that, beyond ideologies and rhetorical profusion, 
what counts in the end is the ability to avoid the entropy that leads to 
extinction. Churches, pastors, and theologians are called to learn this 
seemingly hard lesson, if they want to prevail. Perhaps Christian faith 
may be rediscovered as a necessary or useful element of contrast, an 
alternative point of view needed for reasons of complementarity. Indeed, 
the “way of grace” does not necessarily adhere to the strongest or the 
fittest. 
The Darwinian view introduces a healthy amount of realism into 
Christian anthropology, plagued by excessive idealism in recent years. 
Starting from a more realistic account of human nature, it yields a better 
scope for humans to be able to cope with their problems and distress. 
Several modern theological developments have been affected by this 
fallacy, namely to assume an ideal universe in order to be able to 
comfortably challenge the most painful facts bound to our biological 
nature. By doing so, the logic of the evolutionary process that affects 
human life is ignored with the consequence that theology becomes 
unable to deal with the real needs of human beings and is limited to work 
on the basis of inadequate prognosis. The present point complements the 
former one, because pragmatism is closely related to a more realistic 
perspective of reality. As a result of its contact with biology and other 
sciences, theology should become much more “empirical” or even 
“experimental.” Theology still has a lot to learn from the way in which 
scientific research proceeds, starting from the observation of real, 
concrete human life, and developing models with the highest possible 
explanatory power. In a similar vein, theology is called to adapt a 
research method that renounces excessive security based upon aprioristic 
ideas, but instead accepts a certain degree of probability similar to that 
used within contemporary science. However Christian faith is called to 
provide an alternative view, a view open to imagination, promise, and 
hope, where new forms of life may be conceived beyond the narrow 
framework of scientific knowledge. 
In a nutshell, theology can learn from Darwinian thought how to 
assimilate useful insights. At the same time, it is invited to rediscover 
dimensions of Christian faith that are highly relevant for solving the 
problems caused by contemporary secular worldviews. Faith provides 
hope, purpose, and courage, all of which are needed precisely because 
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otherwise all that is left are the laws of evolution. Darwinism does not 
necessarily render religion redundant. In the wake of the evolutionary 
understanding of reality, the divine becomes more necessary in order to 
make sense of that empty panorama. 
The theory of evolution will not constitute a dominant paradigm in 
contemporary theology, but it will help to offer much more nuanced 
thinking for a generation deeply conditioned by Darwin’s thought. To fail 
to take Darwin into account amounts to removing the rational roots of 
Christian reflection, and putting at risk the entire Christian message with 
the hope that is preached in the name of Christ and in his Church.  
 
Beyond Darwin 
 
Evolutionary Pluralism and the Manifold Expression of Christian 
Anthropology 
A radical evolutionary perspective clearly states the redundancy of every 
attempt to insert a religious or divine agency in any human process, 
because its origins can be fully explained in natural scientific terms. At a 
methodological level the application of the “principle of exclusion” or 
“parsimony” rules out additional causes or reasons for a process already 
explained at a physical or biological level. However there are other 
points at stake too, even if these can more easily be negotiated. Take for 
example, the philosophical/theological theory of dualism, i.e. the body-
mind/soul problem. Indeed many theologians do not feel comfortable 
with traditional anthropological dualism and try alternative approaches to 
overcome what they consider a metaphysical encroachment into the 
original Biblical world view. 
Moving beyond Darwin’s original theory, it is time to ascertain the 
impact of recent developments in Christian Anthropology, taking into 
account the plurality of proposals and research programs derived from 
the Darwinian paradigm. To this end, three lines of study are proposed. 
The first consists of an exploration of the internal pluralism of the way 
evolutionist thought is currently interpreted and aims to show how this 
insurmountable pluralism may affect theological understanding. 
Secondly, the study of human complexity may provide a better 
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application of Darwinian ideas. Thirdly, recalling Christian theological 
pluralism may lead to a healthy move when both the issues of Darwinism 
and theology are being addressed.  
 
How Darwinian Pluralism is Relevant for Christian Anthropology? 
Traditional Darwinism or evolutionism becomes problematic in view of 
some late developments of this theory. Indeed, recent discussions 
concerning how to interpret Darwin’s legacy invite reconsideration of its 
theological impact. Different models compete in presenting the complex 
phenomenon of natural evolution in a more plausible manner. This 
evolutionary pluralism was one of the topics that were addressed at the 
III STOQ (Science, Theology and the Ontological Quest) Conference: 
Biological Evolution: Facts and Theories; held in Rome, 3-7 March 
2009. Indeed, the audience became acquainted with a diversity of views 
on the way evolution and natural selection may be understood, 
represented and modeled. 
The standard position obviously defended the principle of natural 
selection, the survival of the fittest and the principle of genetic 
inheritance of personal traits by subsequent generations. The later 
principle – consideration over a long period of time – could explain the 
emergence of different biological types. Indeed, the combination of 
genetic variations and natural selection may lead to new and better 
adapted forms of life. Nevertheless, endeavours to obtain such a broad 
consensus ended at an early stage because of the competition amongst the 
diverging theories to provide better explanations of the process of 
evolution. 
Perhaps one of the sharpest lines dividing the field of cosmic 
evolutionary studies distinguishes between those pointing to a more 
open, unpredictable, and chance-governed (stochastic) universe, and 
those stressing a more closed, convergent universe, governed by 
(deterministic) attractors and self-organizing systems. This is clearly a 
metaphysical question entrenched with the sheer scientific understanding 
of reality, but is nevertheless of interest for theology. Theoretical 
ecologist Robert Ulanowicz (2009), defends the open model, which is 
rather probabilistic and anti-deterministic, allowing for divine 
intervention. Others, like for instance palaeontologist Simon Conway 
Morris (2004), defend the idea of a convergent universe, which can be 
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interpreted – from a theological perspective – as a sign of purpose or 
providence. 
The second line of reasoning clearly separated those who stressed 
an almost exclusive role for natural selection like Douglas Futuyma 
(2009) and Francisco Ayala (2010); and the group of scholars who 
argued for an evolutionary model based on more factors, like those 
pointing to epigenetics: Scott Gilbert and David Eppel (2008); Stuart 
Newman (2003) and Anne Dambricourt-Malassé: or those who stressed 
the role of symbiosis like Lynn Margulis (1998). 
Furthermore, a third line of demarcation distinguished between 
positions that defended gradualism and those who defended Stephen 
Gould’s theory of punctuated equilibrium. The list of factors involved in 
the evolutionary process can still be enhanced by applying proposals that 
stress levels of complexity and by way of applying the systems theory. 
For instance, the work of theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman (1996), 
Italian biologist Ludovico Galleni (2003), mathematician and 
philosopher of science Dominique Lambert (2004) are good examples. 
As one would expect, the question of the units of selection was 
discussed. Different proposals stretched from the molecular level (e.g. 
the Swiss microbiologist and geneticist Werner Arber), and the gene 
level, to the group level (e.g. biologist David Wilson), beyond the 
traditional view stressing the role of individuals. 
In the area of anthropological theory, the stress was placed on the 
molecular level (Olga Rickards and Gianfranco Biondi), the 
physiological or behavioural level (Robin Dunbar), or on the cultural 
level (Colin Renfrew), being distinct factors that affect human 
evolution16. 
The panoramic view presented above gives us an idea of the 
current debate and illustrates the complexity of the field. Perhaps this 
                                           
16 It is better to avoid, for the moment, dissident voices of those who openly 
challenge the dominant line of thinking such as Jerry Fodor. His aim is to deconstruct 
the entire selectionist model and to highlight the more “channelling” forms of 
evolution (Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini 2010). Nevertheless it is good to keep in 
mind that the presence of such mavericks constitutes evidence for significant 
unresolved questions about evolution and its mechanisms. 
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helps us to avoid simplifications. The question now is what are the 
consequences of such pluralism for Christian theology? 
A prime consideration is that the biological worldview is less 
deterministic than the one provided by Newtonian (or classical) physics. 
Indeed, the biological worldview seems to be more probabilistic. This is 
because it often needs to be understood through competing models. 
Because human biology has to deal with very complex reality, it belongs 
to what Jerry Fodor coined “special sciences” (1974). As such, its status 
and methods are difficult to include into a purely bio-mechanical 
“naturalistic” model. Any attempt to reduce some phenomena of human 
life to the physical and mechanistic levels of reality risks missing the 
complexity and “emergent” levels specific for human reality. In Stephen 
Horst’s own words, “reduction is not a good strategy” (2007). Does this 
imply that biology, especially its studies of evolution, as a science has 
weakened? Absolutely not. Rather, such practice enriches and challenges 
biology. However, the observant theological eye may perceive an 
interesting development that is useful for its anthropological program. If 
evolutionary biology were to recognize a statute of irreducible 
complexity beyond the mechanistic level as well as an unavoidable 
pluralism of interpretations, its theological impact would be better 
buffered. That did not used to be the case with the standard 
understanding of evolutionism pleading for a mechanical and simplified 
view of the world, including human beings and their social structures. 
Understanding non-reductive evolutionism is helpful in order to obtain a 
more nuanced reception of its anthropological consequences.  
There are some motives related to the former point, which can be 
seen from a theological perspective. One of the most relevant is the end 
of the “consilience dream”, as Edward O. Wilson (1998) put it; i.e. the 
end of the utopia of an all-encompassing theory able to embrace all 
different levels of reality in order to obtain “unity of knowledge”. Such 
unity does not exist at the level of biology, let alone when other still more 
complex levels are involved: anthropologic, cognitive and social. Human 
nature cannot entirely be understood from a macro-level-theory only. 
Rather, it needs appropriate methods commensurate with a proper level 
of complexity and characteristics of its object. 
To conclude this section, more can be said about theology coming 
to terms with new and emerging scientific theories. The number of 
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interlocutors continuously increases which implies that theologians may 
apply different approaches when they adopt evolutionary science in their 
theologies. Some of them emphasize freedom while others focus on 
determinism; some emphasize the individual dimension while others 
emphasize the importance of community as the unit of selection. Some 
are more concerned with individualistic behaviour while others are more 
concerned with cooperative or symbiotic processes. To ignore this level 
of complexity and the many choices to be made could inhibit a much 
more fruitful interaction pointing to richer outcomes that benefit both 
science and theology. 
 
What about Human Nature? Does it Make Any Difference? 
The second issue worthy of a deeper look concerns human nature as the 
subject of evolutionary dynamics. To deny that humans are a product of a 
process of evolution similar to what gave rise to the other species would 
invite severe criticism, as many proofs point to a long development from 
earlier hominids to the Homo Sapiens. For instance, there is enough 
evidence for this view from palaeontology (fossils), and genetic biology. 
However, this realization does not imply that our non-human ancestors 
had all the characteristics of contemporary human beings. There are some 
species-specific traits in humans, such as advanced cognitive abilities and 
the ability to use symbols, to communicate in an advanced and complex 
manner and to create societies, artefacts and other realities. This is what 
makes humans unique.  
What are the consequences of human uniqueness for the 
evolutionary view? To start with, humans have most likely followed a 
standard path of evolution and have been subjected to usual types of 
species-unique selection pressures similar to other species. According to 
the standard Darwinian evolutionary theory, living beings are driven by 
the forces of survival and reproductive success; humans are in principle 
not an exception in this. However, new factors or variables have 
gradually been added to the evolutionary process of the human species. 
When they reached a critical mass, they elicited a change of the pattern 
that governs the common evolutionary process. This implied that human 
life became less deterministic, especially where human behaviour is 
considered. In other words, it would be a presupposition that all human 
behaviour is driven only by the simple forces of survival and 
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reproductive success. There are many human-unique factors that this 
simple survival-of-the-fittest model does not accommodate. 
Humans have evolved to a state where many new variables need to 
be considered, given our capacity for intelligence, self-reflection, 
complex emotions, planning, goals and desires, to name but a few. Once 
human symbolic capacity reached its critical mass (Deacon 1998), human 
intelligence and all its power for better representing its environment, for 
establishing alliances, or foreseeing the future, the subsequent rhythm of 
human evolution accelerated exponentially. It would not be exaggerating 
to affirm that in human beings the purely biological program is surpassed 
by the growing influence of these new factors, specific to the human 
constitution. This is not to say that some of these factors are not present 
in other species to some extent, i.e. the great apes. 
Regarding the question posed in the title of this section, it becomes 
clear that the specific traits of human nature introducing new elements to 
it render difficult a possible application of the standard evolutionary rules 
that govern other species. One principle of the theory of evolution 
dictates that the fittest genes become over-represented in subsequent 
generations. However, for what concerns the human species, this 
principle explains only a component of the multiple factors intervening in 
the human-evolutionary process. For example, emotions, symbolic 
capacities, social and cultural dimensions are also involved. Indeed, the 
emotional or affective human capacities are not to be neglected, which 
discourages any attempt to reduce these capacities to by-products of 
biological pressures. Very often the shared feeling in our culture is that 
emotions drive and govern behaviour in a way hard to predict. This drive 
certainly goes beyond deterministic rules governing other types of 
biological patterns and the physiological or biochemical levels. 
When social and cultural factors are considered, things become 
even more complex, implying that the evolutionary process becomes 
more open and uncertain. Recently, several authors have stressed the 
need for a broader view of human evolution and suggest that a “co-
evolution” of nature and culture must have taken place (Richerson and 
Boyd 2006). Other studies stress the importance of the social or 
distributed nature of human cognition for human evolution (Hutchins 
1995). In other words, the cultural dimension has played and does play a 
crucial role in human development and the success of the species. This 
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cultural dimension is complex and includes art, religion, morality, and 
meaning, amongst other things. Humans constitute the only species in 
which its individuals can consider such issues as the meaning of life. 
Once more, the theological consequences of these perceptions are 
crucial. Recent scientific anthropology can provide a kind of “buffer” to 
a reductive version of evolutionary theory. In other words, when the new 
complexity of evolutionary factors is taken into account, theological 
reflection finds a firmer basis from which it can develop its own view 
without the constrictions imposed upon it by the traditional version of 
evolutionism. A more fruitful hypothesis is that the theory of evolution, 
which may be able to predict the behaviour of non-human species, 
requires a modification when applied to humans. Indeed, the theory 
would need to be able to take the complexity of variables involved in 
human evolution into account. The biological program is limited to 
highlighting some of the dimensions of human life. It can explain some 
aspects of human behaviour, i.e. biological altruism, biological love, 
protection of the offspring/family/society...  But it cannot by itself 
explain more advanced and complex human traits and behaviour such as 
conscious reflection, romantic love, philosophy, and religion. 
Modern Christian anthropology does not stand aloof from 
biological evolutionary principles but it also has the possibility to 
account for the non-biological aspects of human evolution. 
 
More than one Theology: The Issue of Theological Pluralism 
If scientific pluralism affects evolutionary studies, theology is no less 
concerned by this trend, as theology has a rather similar predicament of 
its own. Indeed, there is more than one way to represent the mystery of 
God and to model God’s relationships with the world (Campbell 2006). 
Hence, it would be more accurate to talk about “Theologies and versions 
of Darwinism”, than merely about “Theology and Darwinism”. 
At conferences on science and theology it often happens that the 
dialogues are held on four different levels: theology A and theology B on 
one side; and science C and science D on the other. In other words, 
different competing theological traditions dealing with different 
competing scientific traditions are presented. Some examples can help to 
clarify this increasing amount of complexity. 
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Theological pluralism requires addressing the complexity of how 
the different available models or interpretative frameworks developed out 
of their own history are organized. One way to do this is to place the 
different models around axes of coordinates. This counts for both 
theological and Darwinian pluralism. One of the main axes distinguishes 
between more liberal and more orthodox theological positions. In more 
technical language, it makes a distinction between more incarnate and 
more redemptive versions, applying a more theologically inspired 
semantics.  Obviously, liberal Christian theologies will try to relate to 
scientific ideas in a different way compared to more orthodox Christian 
theologies. The more radical Christian theologies will tend to assimilate 
scientific understandings, while the moderate Christian theologies rather 
tend to be more discrete, negotiating in a limited way the content of their 
professed beliefs. 
A different and perhaps more plausible model places different 
Christian anthropological positions around an axis in order to 
discriminate between levels of negativity and corruption that affect 
human nature as a consequence of the doctrine of original sin. Such 
theological models have the advantage of being able to account for 
contrasting anthropological representations; namely, humans as 
irremediably selfish and unable to do good on the one hand; and humans 
as perfectible beings, less affected by original corruption, and constantly 
regenerated with the help of divine grace, on the other hand. Such models 
can also account for the issue of freedom. Indeed, on the one hand there 
is the theological tradition pointing to a deep alienation of human nature 
as well as its inability to make the right choices because human freedom 
is polluted or deeply biased. On the other hand there is the view that 
stresses an unalienable level of freedom, making humans similar to or 
“images of God”, able to accept or refute His salvific help. The issue of 
love and community is, amongst other characteristics, yet another trait 
this model could account for. While one tradition argues that the life of 
faith is something personal and private and reminds us of the dangers of 
community or social environments, another tradition defends a loving 
and communitarian vocation of all humans, called to social reciprocity 
and mutual support. 
Taking into account the outlined distinctions it becomes relatively 
easy to establish a complex network of plural and possible relationships 
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between evolutionary theories and theological anthropologies. For 
example, those showing the openness and indeterminism of the process 
could feel in good company with theologies of freedom; while those 
stressing its predictable and closed character seem to converge with 
deterministic theologies and theologies of predestination. 
Scientific accounts of evolution of the individual will seem 
plausible to individualistic theologians while accounts of symbiotic 
processes and group selection can be reflected in more communitarian 
theologies. Accounts of the evolutionary principle the survival of the 
fittest, could find a great degree of agreement from pessimistic 
theologians; while accounts of biological altruism could fully satisfy the 
expectations of more positive theologies, because these theologians focus 
upon the good side of the human nature. Indeed, sometimes theologians 
feel closer to friendly scientific positions than to competing theological 
traditions. 
All this means at least one thing. We cannot reduce the complex 
issue of the relationship between science and theology to a simple 
discussion of two bands, or even worse, to a zero-sum relationship. This 
is especially the case where the impact of contemporary Darwinian 
thought on a plurality of Christian models is debated. Scholars and 
scientists working within the field of Science and Theology are called to 
map the territory and to classify the different positions in order to show 
the multiplicity of complex interactions between the sciences and 
theologies. Only then will they do justice to a multicultural- and 
academic panorama. 
As a brief conclusion, the three aims of the last paragraph can be 
formulated as three theses: 
 
1. Evolutionary studies come in a large variety of versions and can 
therefore not be reduced to one “standard version”. Consequently, 
this pluralism helps to soften its theological impact. 
2. The evolution of the human species includes emergent factors 
rendering its outcome much less predictable, more complex and 
irreducible to only biological models. 
3. Also theology is a plural enterprise and hence allows for many 
ways of interaction with the large variety of interpretations of the 
theory of evolution.  
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The expectation is that these theses may help to better assess the issue of 
the impact evolutionary studies have on the field of Christian 
anthropology, beyond the usual simplifications reflected in the media and 
present a more nuanced version of this relationship. 
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Pragmatism and its Relevance for the 
Science/Religion Debate  
Eberhard Herrmann 
Introduction 
 
I suppose philosophers are like most people in that there are things we 
are afraid of and things we value. Personally, I am afraid of advocates of 
scientism who claim that we should look to the sciences alone to answer 
all our questions, including moral and existential ones. I am also afraid of 
religious people who claim that their right to their own religion is 
unrestricted. I am afraid of intolerance since it goes hand in hand with 
oppression, marginalisation, and even violence. Intolerance forces people 
to put up with what they do not like, do not believe, or do not appreciate; 
thus, it offends their integrity and autonomy, which, in my opinion, are 
highly valuable. I suspect that intolerance, as a consequence of dogmatic 
truth claims, more often than not indirectly builds upon the philosophical 
standpoint called metaphysical realism. So, if it could be shown (1) that 
metaphysical realism is philosophically untenable, (2) that its 
correspondence conception of truth is particularly problematic, (3) that 
there is actually an alternative, which, inspired by some of Hilary 
Putnam’s writings (Putnam 1981, 1994, 1999, 2004), I will call 
pragmatic realism, and (4) why pragmatic realism and its conception of 
truth does not tend to lead to intolerance, then perhaps a more prosperous 
way of discussing the relation between science and religion can be 
developed. My own contribution to the debates on realism and the 
relation between science and religion is situated within this framework. 
Although this pragmatically realist way of discussing the relation 
between science and religion is a kind of naturalism, it is not naturalism 
in the metaphysical realist sense – as in scientism –, but rather in the 
sense that it does not presuppose specific religious beliefs. 
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Metaphysical realism 
 
As far as I know, the usual and accepted perspective on truth in religion, 
as well as in science, is that which I will call metaphysical realism. 
Roughly speaking, by ‘metaphysical realism’ I mean the claim, first, that 
things in reality have properties and stand in relation to each other 
independently of language and concepts and, second, that these language 
and concept independent properties and relations determine which of our 
judgements on reality are true, i.e. which judgements correspond with 
reality. Most likely, nobody would deny the claim that a judgement is 
true if and only if it is the case as is maintained in the judgement. The 
philosophically crucial question, however, is what conclusions can 
reasonably be drawn from the idea of truth as a correspondence relation 
with reality. 
 To conceive of truth in a metaphysically realist manner is to 
conceive of religion and science as dealing with the same thing, namely 
reality as it is in itself. The metaphysically realist conception of truth 
implies that when a truth claim is raised, there can be only one true 
description: either reality is as it is claimed to be, or it is not. Let us first 
imagine a metaphysical realist who claims that true descriptions of reality 
can only be found in science – either in practice or in principle. Such a 
claim implies that religion, if it cannot be eliminated through education, 
can be no more than a private matter. Second, let us imagine a 
metaphysical realist who claims that true descriptions of reality can only 
be found in religion and, furthermore, that real truth has been exclusively 
revealed in his/her own religion. According to this position, one’s own 
religion, and only one’s own religion, should dominate every aspect of 
life, and if this is not practicable for political reasons, then other religions 
can be tolerated to an extent but no more than that, and non-believers are 
not tolerated at all. Third, let us imagine a metaphysical realist who is 
cautiously inclined since we seem unable to determine decisively, either 
in religion or in science, which judgement of reality is true. Scientific as 
well as religious truth claims should therefore be given space to compete 
with each other. This kind of metaphysical realism is also called critical 
realism. 
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Although I sympathise with the latter attitude, I object to the 
metaphysically realist presuppositions underlying it. My first objection to 
metaphysical realism is that it leads to scepticism. If it is reality as such, 
irrespective of how we conceptualise it, that determines which 
judgements, descriptions or theories of it are true, then we can never 
actually be sure that we are right, since we rely on concepts in order to 
know something about reality and in order to say something true of it. 
Although errors and mistakes are made, it is nevertheless obvious that we 
have at least some justified truth claims about reality at our disposal. 
Furthermore, we do not happen to run into justified truth claims only by 
accident but also as a matter of conscious theorising and testing. 
Otherwise, humans would probably not have survived. Thus, if 
metaphysical realism leads to scepticism, and if scepticism – in the sense 
of never being sure whether our judgements correspond with reality – is 
not an option in our lived lives, then there is something problematic 
inherent in metaphysical realism. This brings me to my second objection, 
which is closely related to my first. Since we do not have a God’s Eye 
point of view, we cannot even imagine what such a perspective would be 
like, apart from the fact that it would not be ours. The metaphysical 
realist’s claim that truth corresponds with reality as it is, independent of 
human conceptualisation, either tells us nothing or amounts to the 
incoherent claim that we can identify reality before we can actually 
identify it. We cannot identify reality without drawing on our 
conceptualisations of it. 
Some philosophers have excessively stressed the crucial role 
conceptualisations play in our search of truth, thereby choosing an 
extremely relativist manner of dealing with the truth question. Since we 
can never actually decide which judgements correspond with reality, as 
shown by the fact that metaphysical realism leads to scepticism, there is 
no point in asking for the objective truth of any judgement at all. If we 
nevertheless want to use such a term as truth, we must relate it to some 
context. Whether a judgement is true depends on the conceptualisation 
and the life world that the judgement is part of and it also depends on 
how useful or attractive these conceptualisations and life worlds are to 
us. All truth claims, whether they are raised in religion or in science, are 
relative to their context. No truth claim as such can demand ontological 
or epistemological priority. Seen from this relativist perspective, all 
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judgements of reality appear to be, in principle, equally legitimate. 
However, seen from another perspective – the perspective of the lived 
human life – not everything in religion and science is equally legitimate 
for the simple reason that sciences as well as religions exercise a deep 
influence on human life, for better or worse. 
In order to protect the objectivity of truth, it would therefore be 
tempting to fall back on metaphysical realism and its correspondence 
conception of truth. Let me show how the objectivity of truth can be 
defended, without presupposing metaphysical realism, by distinguishing 
between one concept of truth and different applications of the distinction 
between true and false in different practices. This will be the next step 
towards a pragmatically realist conception of truth. 
 
The concept of truth 
 
The traditional correspondence theory of truth tries to conceive of how a 
judgement relates to reality in terms of how it corresponds with what 
reality is like irrespective of how we conceptualise it. Sometimes it is 
said that the truth of a judgement lies in its correspondence with facts, 
but when is something a fact? Facts are not objects existing in reality. 
Instead, “we call a thought a fact, if the thought is true.” (Tugendhat and 
Wolf [1983] 1993, 232). In that sense, we sometimes use ‘fact’ and 
‘truth’ synonymously, which has given rise to the so-called redundancy 
theory of truth. According to this theory, the phrase “it is true that p” is 
equal to p. The question is whether this is really the case.  
When a thought is claimed to be true, i.e. when a judgement is made by 
somebody, for instance, the judgement that the sky is blue, a specific 
truth claim is implied. This truth claim is made explicit in the phrase “It 
is true that the sky is blue.” As a truth claim it marks a relation to reality: 
If a person asserts that the sky is blue, then he or she asserts that it is 
really the case as he or she claims it to be. The redundancy theory fails to 
claim that it is really the case as it is asserted to be. Thereby, the 
redundancy theory fails to make a distinction between a thought p and 
the claim that it is true that p. This distinction is closely linked to the 
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distinction between the truth claim and the issue of whether the truth 
claim is justified or verified. 
There is a distinction between what is true and what is verified 
because something can be true, i.e. something can be the case, for 
instance, the claim that Caesar woke up on his right side on his first 
birthday, even if we have no possibility of verifying or justifying it. 
Furthermore, whereas verification is always someone’s verification, truth 
is not claimed to be relative in that way. (By the way, even the extreme 
relativist claim that truth is always truth-for-me or truth-for-us, 
presupposes non-relativist truth for this relativist claim.) However, in 
order to understand what it means that a certain judgement is true, we 
need to know what it means to verify or justify it. We will get back to 
this distinction, but first, let us have a look at Aristotle’s definition of 
truth – that a judgement is true if and only if it is as is claimed in the 
judgement – as Tarski has applied it in his so-called truth scheme that 
‘‘p’ is true if and only if p’. 
Following Tugendhat and Wolf’s interpretation of Tarski 
(Tugendhat and Wolf [1983] 1993, 226-229), I want to emphasise some 
aspects of his truth scheme that are important for my orientation towards 
a pragmatically realist conception of truth. According to Tarski, the 
sentence ‘‘p’ is true if and only if p’ tells us in the meta-language under 
which conditions the object language sentence p is true. For instance, in 
the meta-language sentence ‘‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is 
white’, it is indicated under what conditions the object language sentence 
‘snow is white’ is true, namely, when snow is white. The point of the 
scheme is that every true sentence has to fit it. 
Because of the paradoxes that are present in everyday language, 
Tarski restricts his discussion to formal languages with given postulates 
and determined rules of deduction. The aimed-at definition of truth is 
characterised as semantic in the sense that it is valid only for sentences 
that are truth functional; in other words, the truth of a sentence is strictly 
related to the truth of other sentences. In order to reach a definition of 
truth, one must first analyse the compound sentences into singular 
predicative ones of the form Fa, which include singular and general 
terms. Fa, for instance, ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if the object 
snow, characterised by the singular term ‘snow’, falls under the concept 
white, characterised by the general term ‘white’. In order to be able to 
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determine whether that is the case, and this is the second requirement for 
a definition of truth, two lists are needed. On the first list, all the singular 
terms in the object language relate to the objects. On the second list, all 
the general terms in the object language relate to the concepts. In formal 
languages, these lists are finite. 
The next step towards a pragmatically realist conception of truth is 
to relate Tarski’s truth scheme to reality. We remember that according to 
Tarski’s truth scheme, ‘p’ is true if and only if p. Considered a 
judgement, that which is named ‘p’ is claimed to be true. After analysis 
into singular predicative sentences, we get Fa, Gb, et cetera, claiming, 
that is, that an object F, G et cetera is a, b et cetera. Fa is true if and only 
if the object F, characterised by the singular term, falls under the concept, 
characterised by the general term. Now, in order to know which objects a 
singular term can be applied to, one has to know the rules governing the 
identification of the objects, and in order to know what a general term 
means one has to know the rules governing the use of this general term. 
And the rules are different depending on what praxis we are dealing with 
– for instance, science or religion. So let me now present a pragmatically 
realist conception of truth. 
 
Pragmatic realism 
 
In order to forestall any misconceptions, I want to emphasise, first, that I 
distinguish between conceptions of truth and the concept of truth. The 
latter, i.e. the formal Aristotelian definition of truth, that a judgement is 
true if and only if it is the case as is claimed in the judgement, functions 
as a formal claim whose requirements must be met in order for an idea to 
be a conception of truth. For instance, a conception of truth such as that 
which your peers let you get away with saying does not meet the 
requirements of this formal claim since what you say may be false, even 
if your peers let you get away with saying it. Second, I want to emphasise 
that my proposed pragmatically realist conception of truth does not 
amount to the so-called pragmatic theory of truth according to which a 
judgement is true if and only if acting upon it yields satisfying practical 
results. Such kinds of truth definitions are doomed to fail. Even when 
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acting upon a judgement yields satisfying practical results, one can 
always ask whether the judgement is really true. Thus, being useful and 
being true are different things entirely. 
Nevertheless, how we conceive of truth has to do with our different 
kinds of praxis and the different conceptualisations combined with them. 
In pragmatic realism, the truth question is important since not all our 
conceptualisations of reality work. However, when we raise truth claims 
about reality in its different aspects, we refer to reality as already 
conceptualised by other humans. We cannot develop and apply other 
concepts of reality than those which suit us as the biological and social 
beings we are. If we were birds or had eyes on our knees, we would need 
other concepts to help us orientate ourselves in the empirical world. If we 
lacked the ability to be aware of the reality of death, we would have other 
concepts to help us mould our social world. 
This does not diminish the plausibility of the claim that the 
question of which judgements are true has to do with what is actually the 
case. A judgement, whatever it is about, is true if and only if it is the case 
as is claimed in the judgement. The philosophically crucial question is 
what conclusion we can reasonably draw from the concept of truth 
together with the insight that although reality is more than we can 
conceptualise, nevertheless, when we talk about reality, i.e. about what 
there is and in what way it is given, we do it from the perspective of our 
human condition. In that sense, ontology is dependent on us being the 
biological and social beings we are. This means, among other things, that 
we cannot discuss what we mean by truth and how we decide what is true 
unless we relate those questions to how we actually learn to distinguish 
between true and false in our different kinds of praxis. In contrast, 
according to the metaphysical realist, the fact that we live with different 
kinds of praxis has no relevance for what we mean by truth and how we 
conceive of what determines whether our truth claims are justified. 
Therefore, still according to the metaphysical realist, there is, in 
principle, no difference between the truth claims raised in the religions 
and the truth claims raised in the sciences. Truth claims refer to reality as 
it is, independently of language and concepts, and it is this reality with its 
properties and relations, independent of language and concepts, which 
determines which of our judgements on reality are true. 
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The pragmatic realist views things differently. On this view, reality 
for us humans is always conceptualised reality, conceptualised by means 
of concepts that humans have developed in their different kinds of praxis 
in interaction with reality; therefore, the pragmatic realist cannot 
disregard how we humans actually conceptualise reality by 
conceptualising our experiences of reality offering resistance in different 
ways. Roughly speaking, we can distinguish between observational and 
existential experiences. We experience reality offering resistance, not 
only in our observational experiences, but also in our existential 
experiences of the inevitabilities of life, such as suffering, guilt and death 
as well as joy, love and happiness. In the sciences, observational 
experiences are transformed into knowledge about those aspects of 
reality which can be inquired into empirically, knowledge which, in turn, 
determines how we conceptualise our observational experiences. 
However, the circle is not completely closed since, for instance, 
unexpected experiences of how reality offers resistance empirically may 
lead us to revise a certain way of conceptualising reality, i.e. a certain 
theory, or to introduce a new one. 
Similarly, existential experiences of the inevitabilities of life are, in 
religions and their secular counterparts, transformed into insights into 
what it means to be human, insights that in their turn determine how we 
conceptualise our existential experiences. When the conceptualisations 
are not existentially adequate any more, this may lead us to revise the 
existing conceptions, images and narratives, to introduce new 
interpretations of them, or even to introduce a new religion or ideology. 
Both concerning observational and existential experience, we are dealing 
with shared experience because of shared praxis. This means that how we 
conceptualise our experiences of reality offering resistance in different 
ways reflects different kinds of praxis. Science and religion are such 
different kinds of praxis in our lives. 
The pragmatic realist concedes that the metaphysical realist has a 
point in emphasising that we cannot cause truths about reality just by 
introducing certain concepts. According to the metaphysical realist, the 
reason why we cannot do this is that it is reality that, independently of 
language and concepts, determines which of our judgements on reality 
are true. According to the pragmatic realist, this kind of reasoning 
disregards the fact that, in making such a metaphysical realist claim, we 
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already have a certain conceptualisation of reality in mind. According to 
the pragmatic realist, the reason we cannot cause truths about reality just 
by introducing certain concepts is instead our constant interaction with 
how reality offers resistance. It is not only physical, but also existential, 
empirical resistance. In our different experiences of the resistance reality 
offers, we learn that not all our efforts of conceptualising reality are 
successful. We cannot just walk through a wall of concrete presupposing 
the conceptualisation that we are disembodied spirits. Our bumping into 
the wall reminds us that this conceptualisation is not reasonable for us 
humans to have. Moreover, we cannot deal with the inevitabilities of life 
by introducing definitions that minimise their significance. Even if it can 
be explained, by pointing to certain chemical processes in the brain, why 
a person is attracted to certain persons and not to others, requited and 
unrequited love is still part of reality. We cannot deny love by 
introducing definitions that minimise its significance. The resistance 
reality offers in this regard reminds us that the exclusive 
conceptualisation of love in terms of chemical processes in the brain is 
not reasonable for us humans to have. 
Referring to the resistance reality offers, the pragmatic realist can 
also maintain that reality is independent of us; however, this does not 
force the pragmatic realist to say anything about what reality is really 
like. This is also true with regard to, for instance, our ideas about what 
Earth was like before we humans entered the scene as a result of 
evolution, according to the scientific explanation, and/or as created by 
God, according to the religious explanation. As soon as we say 
something about reality, even if we are talking about reality before 
humans existed, it is conceptualised reality we are dealing with, and this 
reality is conceptualised differently by different shared experiences in 
combination with different kinds of shared praxis. As the biological and 
social beings we are, with a body, a brain, emotions, knowledge, insights, 
expectations, values and fears, we interact with reality in different kinds 
of praxis combined with different conceptualisations of reality. Science 
and religion are such different kinds of praxis, dealing with different 
experiences of how reality offers resistance. 
According to the metaphysical realist, such distinctions have no 
relevance for the question of reality and truth. According to the 
metaphysical realist who argues in favour of scientism, i.e. the view that 
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the natural sciences have both ontological and epistemological priority on 
all questions raised by humans, the domain of the natural sciences is the 
only reality there is. According to the metaphysical realist who argues in 
favour of religious fundamentalism, the only reality is that which God’s 
revelation refers to and which concerns all aspects of human life. 
According to the cautious metaphysical realist, or critical realist, there is 
only one reality, which we try to come as close to as possible in our 
scientific and religious descriptions, and this reality determines which of 
our religious and/or scientific descriptions are true, even if we may never 
know which descriptions really are the true ones. 
I have already presented the reasons why it is impossible for me to 
accept metaphysical realism, even in its cautious version. In a certain 
sense, we humans live in one and the same reality, a reality which offers 
us resistance in different ways, empirically as well as existentially. Our 
different ways of interacting with reality, in science and in religion, must 
then merge in the lives we live in order for us to survive and live a good 
life. This is not about whether there are inconsistencies between scientific 
and religious propositions. It is about merging different practices in our 
lived lives. For that, we humans need to conceptualise how reality offers 
resistance, both in our observational experiences of reality and in our 
existential ones. We need both perspectives since we are organisms that 
consciously and intentionally have to relate to our surroundings in 
different ways. 
Humans have developed the sciences on the basis of shared and 
well-tried observational experiences and the different kinds of praxis they 
are combined with. Empirically adequate scientific theories help us say 
what is true about the observable. Also when it comes to the existential 
experiences and the different kinds of praxis they are combined with, we 
have a basis of shared and well-tried experiences. We can tell when 
people are in grief and, in the best case scenario, provide them with 
existentially adequate conceptions, images or narratives. These 
conceptions, images and narratives do not take away the causes of grief 
but they may help people live with the inevitabilities of life by saying 
something true about what it means to be human. We humans have 
developed religions and ideologies on the basis of shared and well-tried 
existential experiences and the different kinds of praxis they are 
combined with. If their conceptions, images and narratives are 
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existentially adequate, they provide us with insights into what it means to 
be human. 
Seen from this pragmatic realist perspective, the sciences, on the 
one hand, and the religions and their secular counterparts, on the other, 
have different functions in our lives and thus cannot compete as to which 
can offer the one and only true description of reality. In spite of this 
difference in function, there is nevertheless an important connection 
between the sciences, on the one hand, and religions and their secular 
counterparts, on the other. The connection manifests itself when we 
consider the fact that we humans, since we are the biological and the 
social beings we are, are also moral subjects, i.e. morally responsible for 
the good life of other beings. The responsibility displays itself, for 
instance, in our love of people close to us so that they, too, can live a 
good life. Certainly, not everyone can or wants to take this responsibility. 
Different kinds of egoists propagate against the view I am advocating 
here. However, unless these egoists choose to live a life in complete 
isolation, they forget that, for the sake of survival and the possibility of 
them living the lives they want, they are dependent on other people who 
give them the right to be part of a social context in spite of their being 
egoists. 
Religions and their secular counterparts help us express our 
predicament as moral subjects, a predicament which is also characterised 
by failure when it comes to living a good life and helping others do the 
same. In practice, an individual’s concrete moral responsibility for the 
good life of other beings can only apply to a minority. In order for this 
responsibility to apply more widely, there must be political ideologies. 
Whether these political ideologies are religious or secular, they help us 
transform the love of individuals into collective solidarity. Furthermore, 
this transformation requires knowledge of causal and other kinds of 
relationships. By providing us with such knowledge, the sciences help us 
make better choices with regard to personal moral responsibility and 
collective solidarity, thus contributing to the realisation of everybody’s 
right to a good life. Against this background, I now want to show why, in 
my opinion, pragmatic realism is not only philosophically preferable to 
metaphysical realism, but also does not tend to lead to intolerance. 
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Pragmatic realism does not lead to intolerance 
 
I will do so by discussing what this talk of love and solidarity has to do 
with realism and the truth question. Concerning the truth question, it 
should be obvious by now why I cannot accept a correspondence 
conception of truth in the sense that truth is defined as a correspondence 
relation between judgements on reality and reality as it really is, 
irrespective of how we conceptualise it. Instead, I want to advocate a 
correspondence conception of truth that takes account of our human 
predicament in which reality, for us humans, is always conceptualised 
reality. Since reality offers resistance in different ways, empirically as 
well as existentially, truth claims can be of different character. I want to 
emphasise that we are dealing with the same concept of truth, i.e. that 
which has historically been called the formal, Aristotelian definition of 
truth, according to which a judgement is true if and only if it is the case 
as is maintained in the judgement. At the same time, however, it is about 
different substantial determinations of truth, depending on what kind of 
experience of resistance we are dealing with. Roughly speaking, it is 
about observational and existential experiences. The observational 
experiences are transformed, in the different sciences, into empirical 
knowledge of reality. The existential experiences of the inevitabilities of 
life are transformed, in the different views of life, into insights into what 
it means to be human. In the first case, a judgement is true if and only if 
it corresponds with how reality conceptualised by us offers resistance in 
our observational experiences. In the second case, a judgement is true if 
and only if it corresponds with how reality conceptualised by us offers 
resistance in our existential experiences. 
Reflecting on truth in the pragmatically realist manner I have 
advocated in this paper requires freedom of science as well as freedom of 
views of life, whether religious or secular. The question of what is true 
when it comes to observational experience is a matter for the sciences to 
sort out between themselves. In that regard, science should be free from 
religious and other ideological interference. The issue of what is true 
when it comes to existential experience is a matter for the views of life to 
sort out between themselves. In that regard, views of life should be free 
from interference by advocates of scientism who claim that all problems, 
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including non-scientific moral and existential problems, can and must be 
solved by the sciences. By the way, it is obvious that scientism is not 
science but a view of life which can be criticised both from a scientific 
perspective, as going beyond what the sciences can achieve, and from the 
perspective of views of life, as being unreasonable, since moral and 
existential problems require another kind of solution than science can 
offer. Empirical knowledge is certainly relevant to the solution of moral 
and existential problems, but this is another matter. 
The example shows that although there is a division between the 
function of the sciences in our life, on the one hand, and the function of 
religion and its secular counterparts, on the other, this does not prevent 
the sciences from being open to criticism by views of life – in situations 
when normative issues are reduced to empirical ones – nor does it 
prevent views of life from being open to criticism by the sciences – in 
situations when their claims contradict confirmed scientific explanations. 
In this regard, no sciences, not even high-status ones, and no views of 
life, not even one’s own, can be claimed to be immune against criticism. 
Being aware of this makes one more tolerant. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I have shown that the metaphysically realist conception of truth implies 
that there can be only one true description of reality. The crucial 
presupposition is the idea that reality as such makes our judgements of 
reality either true or false. Since this approach leads to scepticism but we 
nevertheless have our sometimes very specific beliefs and convictions, 
the risk is that what is just one’s own truth, knowledge or reality claims is 
dogmatically claimed to correspond with reality as it really is. The risk of 
intolerance becomes imminent. I have argued that the presupposed God’s 
Eye point of view in metaphysical realism is not tenable. Instead, I have 
sketched a pragmatically realist conception of truth, the crucial 
presupposition of which is that reality for us humans is always 
conceptualised reality. Conceptually speaking, there is no possibility of 
exposing reality as it really is. Since we have different ways of coping 
with the resistance reality offers, in different kinds of experience, more 
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than one description of reality is needed. This means that different ways 
of justifying truth, knowledge and reality claims must be developed – by 
means of communication and cooperation which, in turn, presuppose that 
people are free to find out what theories are empirically adequate and 
what religion or secular ideology is existentially adequate. 
The pragmatically realist conception of truth is an alternative to 
both dogmatism and relativism. In response to dogmatism, the pragmatic 
realist claims that no truth, knowledge or reality claim is privileged, and 
in response to relativism, he or she claims that the experienced resistance 
reality offers manifests that not all of our conceptualisations of reality are 
actually true to reality. First of all, this requires freedom of views of life, 
religious as well as secular, since religious conceptions, images and 
narratives are not existentially adequate for everybody; second, it 
requires freedom from scientism and its false claim that all problems, 
including existential and moral ones, can be solved by science alone; and 
third, it requires freedom of science since a good life presupposes not 
only existentially adequate conceptions, images and narratives but also 
empirical knowledge which cannot be provided by religions or their 
secular counterparts. As far as I can see, we can only achieve this if we 
give up metaphysical realism and accept a kind of naturalist and 
pragmatic realism as presented here. Such a change, I think, would 
provide us with a more prosperous way of discussing the relation 
between science and religion – more prosperous, since the discussions 
would be less focused on positions and more on problem-solving. 
 
A version of this essay was presented at a meeting at the Centre for 
Naturalism and Christian Semantics, University of Copenhagen, 
Denmark, December 7, 2009. 
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Einstein said:  
Reality is merely an illusion, albeit a very persistent one 
 
But he also said: 
When a man sits with a pretty girl for an hour, it seems like a 
minute. But let him sit on a hot stove for a minute – and it’s longer 
than any hour. That’s relativity. 
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A critical realist response 
Kees van Kooten Niekerk 
 
Introduction 
 
In his paper Herrmann advocates a form of pragmatic realism. He does so 
in a critique of metaphysical realism, which he regards as philosophically 
untenable and, even worse, as tending to intolerance. Now, I advocate a 
form of critical realism, which presupposes metaphysical realism. Thus it 
would seem that I should be very critical of Herrmann’s paper. However, 
this is not the case. On the contrary, when reading it I often found myself 
in agreement, sometimes even in happy agreement, with its ideas. How 
could this be? 
The main reason is that Herrmann and I understand something 
different by metaphysical realism. Therefore I shall begin my response 
by explaining what I understand by it. As far as I can see my conception 
of metaphysical realism is in line with some key tenets of Herrmann’s 
paper. That is why I could agree with him in so many respects. At the 
same time our presumed concordance offers a good point of departure for 
a comparison between his pragmatic realism and my critical realism. I 
shall make such a comparison with a special view to the relationship 
between science and religion. 
 
Metaphysical realism 
 
According to Herrmann metaphysical realism combines three theses:  
 
(1) Things in reality have properties and stand in relation to each other 
independently of language and concepts;  
(2) These properties and relations determine which judgments are true 
in the sense of corresponding with reality;  
(3) There can only be one true description of reality.  
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Herrmann’s main critique of metaphysical realism in this sense is that it 
has the consequence that we are not in a position to determine whether a 
judgment is true or false, because we have no access to reality in itself, 
independently of conceptualization. Therefore it leads to skepticism. To 
be sure, Herrmann sticks to the Aristotelian definition of truth as 
correspondence between a judgment about what is the case and ‘what is 
really the case’, as he puts it. However, following Tarski, he specifies the 
determination of truth with reference to rules for identification of an 
object and rules governing the use of general terms. Thus the formal 
concept of truth as correspondence is made manageable by linking it to 
procedures of identification and linguistic conventions. At the same time, 
this specification of the determination of truth opens up the possibility of 
different conceptions of truth dependent on different practices, e.g. 
science and religion. In this way Herrmann’s pragmatic realism seeks to 
avoid the problems connected with what he regards as metaphysical 
realism. 
Herrmann’s definition of metaphysical realism is equal to Hilary 
Putnam’s (Putnam 1981, 49; cf. Putnam 1992, 30), whom he mentions as 
a source of inspiration for his pragmatic realism. However, Putnam’s 
definition is by no means generally accepted. A more common definition 
is given in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Here metaphysical 
realism is defined as “the view that (a) there are real objects (usually the 
view is concerned with spatiotemporal objects), (b) they exist 
independently of our experience or knowledge of them, and (c) they have 
properties and enter into relations independently of the concepts with 
which we understand them or of the language with which we describe 
them" (Butchvarov, 1995, 488). This definition is more limited than 
Herrmann’s, because it confines itself to his thesis (1).In my opinion it 
has the advantage that it only contains an ontological doctrine without 
mixing it up with epistemological ones, as does Herrmann’s (and 
Putnam’s). 
I subscribe to metaphysical realism in the limited sense, as most 
philosophers do (cf. Butchvarov, 1995, 488).
17
 I am rather sure that 
                                           
17 I have given some arguments for my subscribing to metaphysical realism in 
Niekerk, 1998, 52-55. 
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Herrmann subscribes to it too. For when he speaks of the resistance of 
reality, which may lead us to revise our conceptualization of it, the 
presupposition must be that there exists a reality that is independent of 
our knowledge of it and has its own characteristics. How else could it 
exercise resistance and make us change our conceptualizations? Thus I 
take it that Herrmann and I agree that metaphysical realism in the limited, 
ontological sense is true. If I am right in this I think we have an important 
common ground for further discussion. 
 
Critical realism 
 
Herrmann writes that he sympathises with critical realism. Yet he cannot 
accept it because of its metaphysically realist presuppositions. I agree 
with Herrmann that critical realism presupposes metaphysical realism, 
but only in the ontological sense defined above. Since Herrmann seems 
to accept metaphysical realism in this sense, the fact that it is a 
presupposition of critical realism need no longer prevent him from 
pursuing his sympathy. But of course he may have other reasons for 
rejecting critical realism. A comparison between critical realism and 
pragmatic realism will perhaps shed light on this. Before I make such a 
comparison I have to explain what I understand by critical realism and 
why I subscribe to it, at least with regard to science. 
The term ‘critical realism’ is used as the designation of various 
views about the nature of knowledge. This is not the place to give an 
account of these views.
18
 I confine myself to explaining what I 
understand by it. Generally speaking, critical realism is the view that it is 
possible to acquire knowledge of an external, mind-independent reality. 
That is why it is called realism. This view presupposes metaphysical 
realism in the ontological sense. The qualification critical distinguishes 
critical realism from so-called naive realism, which claims that external 
reality is as it is perceived. Critical realism recognizes that we have no 
direct access to this reality. Knowledge is always human knowledge, 
                                           
18 For such an account see my article ‘Critical realism in theology and science’ in 
Encyclopedia of Sciences and Religions, ed. Anne L.C. Runehov & Lluis Oviedo, 
Springer, forthcoming 2012. 
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dependent on the human mind. In this connection language is of crucial 
importance, because it is the principal medium for understanding. Our 
linguistic concepts both enable and limit our comprehension of the world. 
The recognition of the limits of our knowledge entails a critical attitude 
to the claim that it can ‘mirror’ external reality. Here critical realism is in 
line with Kant’s critique of knowledge. Yet, unlike Kant, critical realism 
claims that it is possible to know something about reality as it is in itself. 
Critical realism is especially relevant with respect to science. The 
reason is that modern science is characterized by a methodological 
openness to experience. I think of the central part played by rigorous 
empirical testing of hypotheses and theories, not least in the form of 
experiments. Einstein has characterized this testing as directing questions 
to nature, to which it mostly answers ‘no’ and only occasionally 
‘perhaps’. This may be an exaggeration, but it expresses an essential 
feature of science, namely that the subjective ideas of its practitioners are 
confronted with experience as an external authority, which often prompts 
them to revise their ideas until these have acquired a sufficient degree of 
empirical adequacy. By virtue of this method science has increasingly 
been successful in making us understand and predict natural processes 
and use them technologically. 
A number of philosophers of science argue that this success can be 
explained best by the idea that empirically adequate scientific hypotheses 
and theories have a substantial realist bearing. This idea may give rise to 
a critical realist view of scientific knowledge, which accepts the realist 
explanation of the success of science but at the same time takes account 
of the mental and limited nature of all human knowledge. Then 
correspondence between scientific knowledge and reality is usually 
qualified as approximation. Stathis Psillos, for example, states that 
scientific realism “regards mature and predictively successful scientific 
theories as well-confirmed and approximately true of the world” (Psillos, 
2002, xix).
19
 I agree with Psillos, especially because I think that the 
success of science to a great extent is due to its methodological openness 
to experience. In my opinion, the corrective function of experience (its 
                                           
19Psillos’s ‘scientific realism’ can be regarded as critical realism applied to science. 
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‘resistance’, as Herrmann calls it) can only be explained satisfactorily as 
the result of a substantial input from nature. 
I should like to add one remark. Usually critical realism is 
discussed with regard to scientific theories. Insofar as they postulate 
hypothetical entities (e.g. quarks), structures and processes to explain a 
manifold of natural phenomena, these theories are intellectual creations 
that may be far remote from the experiential world. In such cases it may 
be problematic to vindicate a realist bearing. We should not forget, 
however, that science is more than theories. Olaf Pedersen, the late 
Danish historian of science, has made a useful distinction between 
observation statements (reporting single events), statements of primary 
relations (e.g.: ‘The specific gravity of lead is app. 11.4.’) and scientific 
theories (Pedersen, 1988, 127). Especially with regard to statements of 
primary relations a strong case can be made for a critical realist 
interpretation: once established they almost always stand firm over time 
and it is hard to imagine that a number like 11.4 should be due to a 
hidden apriori of the human mind. The only reasonable explanation is 
that such statements correspond to characteristics of the external nature.
20
 
 
Critical realism and pragmatic realism 
 
On the basis of critical realism as I understand it I agree with Herrmann’s 
pragmatic realism on three points: 
 First, Herrmann subscribes to the Aristotelian definition of truth as 
correspondence between a judgment and ‘what is really the case’, as he 
sometimes puts it. I agree with Herrmann on this definition of truth. The 
question is, however, what is meant by ‘what is really the case’. 
Herrmann specifies it as ‘conceptualised reality’. I agree with him insofar 
as this specification is a part of my understanding of correspondence.
21
 
At the same time, in a critical realist context I mean something more: a 
judgment’s correspondence with conceptualized reality may at the same 
                                           
20A more detailed argument for critical realism with regard to science is given in 
Niekerk, 1998, 58-68. 
21 Cf. Niekerk, 1998, 55-57. 
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time be a correspondence with reality in itself, because there may be a 
kind of correspondence between our concepts and reality too. Here 
‘correspondence’ should not be understood as ‘mirroring’, but, more 
loosely, as a match that tells us something about reality as it is in itself. 
Whilst Herrmann remains within the circle of conceptualization, I 
venture to transcend it in cases where I think that approximate 
correspondence with reality in itself offers the best explanation of our 
experience. I return to this point below. 
 Second, Herrmann emphasizes that our access to reality is mediated 
by language so that reality for us always is conceptualized reality. This 
view is in accordance with critical realism. As I have set out above the 
qualification ‘critical’ concerns the fact that our access to reality is 
mediated by the human mind and that this implies the recognition of the 
role of language in our understanding of reality. There may be a 
difference between Herrmann and me with regard to the exclusivity of 
linguistic access (doesn’t feeling tell us something about reality too?), but 
no critical realist would deny the importance of conceptualization. In this 
connection it should be remarked that Herrmann has interesting things to 
say about the dependence of our conceptualization on human nature and 
shared social praxis. Critical realists can learn something from pragmatic 
realism on this point. 
 Third, Herrmann points to the resistance reality often exercises to 
our preconceived ideas, both in observational and existential experiences, 
and he proceeds by stating that this may make us realize that not all our 
conceptualizations are successful. Again, the critical realist agrees with 
this. As we have seen it is precisely this resistance, as for example 
expressed in Einstein’s dictum that nature mostly answers ’no’ and only 
occasionally ‘perhaps’, that provides the main argument in favor of 
critical realism. Both Herrmann and I recognize the phenomenon of 
reality’s resistance. We differ, however, on the significance we attribute 
to this phenomenon. Hereby I have reached the point at which our ways 
part. 
 As to reality’s resistance, Herrmann states that “the pragmatic realist 
can also maintain that reality is independent of us; however, this does not 
force the pragmatic realist to say anything about what reality is really 
like”. I interpret this statement such that resistance justifies the 
assumption that there exists an independent reality (which is 
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metaphysical realism, as I have defined it), but that it does not convey 
any knowledge of what reality is (reality as it is in itself). The reason is, 
Herrmann continues, that reality as we know it always is conceptualized 
reality and therefore fundamentally contingent on various ways of human 
conceptualizing.  
 On this point critical realism differs from pragmatic realism. For a 
critical realist such as me reality’s resistance (and the consequent success 
of science) not only shows that there is an independent reality, but also 
tells us something about what reality is like. The reason is that reality, 
conceptualized though it may be, again and again forces us to revise our 
conceptions. Now, Herrmann admits this, as we have seen. However, he 
leaves this fact unexplained. In the eyes of a critical realist this is 
unsatisfactory. The critical realist goes on to contend that we have a good 
explanation for this in the thesis that reality’s own character gets through 
in our experience. How else could it be explained that the specific gravity 
of lead repeatedly turns out to be app. 11.4? Or how else could we 
explain the empirical success of quantum theory, regarding that it 
contains several counter-intuitive ideas? To be sure, the critical realists 
do not claim that the specific gravity of lead or quantum theory mirror 
reality as is it in itself. But they are bold enough to claim that there is a 
kind of correspondence. Otherwise it is incomprehensible that we should 
be able to acquire such empirically successful beliefs. 
 Herrmann blames critical realism for leading to skepticism, because 
it is impossible to make sure that our ideas mirror reality as it is in itself. 
However, critical realism does not assert the possibility of such an ideal 
correspondence. It makes do with the possibility of an approximate 
correspondence with reality in itself and thinks that this is sufficient to 
keep skepticism at bay. Rather, in the eyes of a critical realist 
Herrmann’s pragmatic realism implies a kind of skepticism. To be sure, 
this realism enables its adherents to make a distinction between truth 
claims that are justified and truth claims that are not – because they meet 
resistance from conceptualized reality. In other words, it allows for the 
distinction between valid and invalid knowledge. However, this validity 
can never be more than a relative validity within the circle of human 
conceptualization, without reference to the character of reality in itself. 
With respect to reality in itself pragmatic realism is fundamentally 
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skeptical. Here critical realism is less skeptical, because it affirms the 
possibility of an approximate correspondence with reality in itself. 
 
Religion and science 
 
So far I have confined myself to discussing critical realism and pragmatic 
realism in connection with science. Now it is time to link the discussion 
with religion. Herrmann takes his point of departure in the concept of 
truth as correspondence between judgments and reality, which must be 
differentiated into different conceptions of truth, depending on different 
kinds of praxis and their concomitant conceptualizations. One such 
praxis is science, where truth consists in correspondence between theory 
and the observables, another religion, which is concerned with existential 
experience. It is the function of religion to provide a “view of life” 
consisting of “existentially adequate conceptions, images and narratives”, 
which “may help people live with the inevitabilities of life by saying 
something true about what it means to be human”. 
 I agree with Herrmann that religion is concerned with existential 
experience and that, at least among other things, it has the function to 
provide people with conceptions, etc. that may help them live with the 
inevitabilities of life. However, I have a problem with the specification 
“by saying something true about what it means to be human”. The reason 
is that it suggests that this is the only way in which religion can fulfil its 
function. If this is what Herrmann means, I would point out that religion 
not only provides a view of life but also a ritual practice, which may be 
just as important as a view of life for living with the inevitabilities of 
life.
22
 Moreover, the existential adequacy of a religious view of life is not 
merely dependent on its ‘theoretical’ truth, but also on its practical 
significance. Finally, as for the latter we must distinguish between 
significance for the religious person’s own good life and moral 
significance, which, as Herrmann points out rightly, has to do with 
responsibility for the good life of other beings. Religion is a complex 
phenomenon and its adequacy should be judged by different criteria, not 
                                           
22 For the importance of ritual in religion, see for example Bellah, 2011. 
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only truth as correspondence between a religious life view and human 
existence. Now, this is hardly what Herrmann means. For example, he 
also states that “moral and existential problems require another kind of 
solution than science can offer”. However, the problem is that, by 
making the Aristotelian concept of truth the overarching point of view, 
he can hardly avoid limiting the question of the existential adequacy of 
religion to the question of theoretical correspondence between religious 
life views and human existence. If this was not his intention, it would 
have been helpful if he had specified what other criteria for religious 
adequacy he thinks there are. 
 Against the background of what I have said about religion it should 
be clear that, in my eyes, critical realism can only have limited 
significance for religion. It can only have relevance in connection with a 
religious view of life, and only with regard to the cognitive aspects of 
this view of life. Let me exemplify this with a statement that expresses a 
central aspect of the Christian view of life: “Life is a gift from God”. At 
least at face value this statement makes cognitive claims, say, that God 
has created human life and that he has created it such that it is worth 
living. Thus we have to do with a truth-conditioned proposition of which 
it makes sense to ask if it corresponds to reality. At the same time it is 
obvious that it is by no means easy to justify such a correspondence, even 
if we confine ourselves to the claim that life is worth living. This 
example may suffice to show that justification of critical realism for 
religious statements is not a straightforward matter. It cannot invoke 
something similar to the empirical success of science.
23
 Therefore, if 
critical realism in connection with religion is a viable option at all, in my 
opinion it can only be a critical realism within the context of faith.
24
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Let me conclude with a few words about the relationship between 
religion and science. I think Herrmann is somewhat ambiguous on this 
                                           
23This has rightly been pointed out by McMullin, 1985. 
24 Cf. my argument in Niekerk 1998, 68-78. 
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point. On the one hand he says that the sciences and the religions have 
different functions in our lives and therefore cannot compete as to which 
can offer the true description of reality. He seeks the connection 
elsewhere, in the fact that, in the exercise of its moral function, religion 
should take account of scientific knowledge. This line of thought 
suggests that there is no cognitive, only an ethical connection between 
science and religion. On the other hand, however, Herrmann says that 
views of life, including religious ones, should be open to critique from 
the sciences when their claims contradict confirmed scientific 
explanations. Here the presupposition must be that there is a cognitive 
connection – otherwise it would be impossible to subject views of life to 
scientific critique. Now, whatever Herrmann’s ‘real’ view, critical 
realism sides with the latter. To be sure, it recognizes that science and 
religion have different functions in our life, as has been illustrated by my 
specification of the complexity of religion above. However, this does not 
prevent religion from making cognitive claims. And even though these 
claims are quite different from scientific statements, they deal with one 
and the same world. Therefore they may be in harmony or conflict with 
one another. Here lies the background for a dialogue between science and 
religion on critical realist conditions. And it seems to me that Herrmann 
by his affirmation of the possibility of scientific critique of life views 
implicitly acknowledges the meaningfulness of such a dialogue, albeit on 
pragmatic realist conditions. If I am right in this, there exists agreement 
between us on this point too. 
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Is this Tree of Life a God one could worship? Pray to? Fear? 
Probably not. But it did make the ivy twine and the sky so blue, so 
perhaps the song I love tells a truth after all. The Tree of Life is 
neither perfect nor infinite in space or time, but it is actual, and if it 
is not Anselm’s “Being greater than which nothing can be 
conceived,” it is surely a being that is greater than anything any of 
us will ever conceive of in detail worthy of its detail. Is something 
sacred? Yes, say I with Nietzsche. I could not pray to it, but I can 
stand in affirmation of its magnificence. “This world is sacred”. 
 
Daniel C. Dennett 
UNDERSTANDING DARWIN AND DARWINIAN UNDERSTANDING 
 
 
151 
 
 
The New Atheism in Denmark 
Lars Sandbeck 
Introduction 
 
The emergence of the so called “New Atheism” seems first and foremost 
to have had its impact on the Anglo-American world. Since 2004 
numerous atheist conferences, happenings, debates, and various other 
activities, have been organised in Britain and the United States. 
Alongside these activities readers in Britain and the US have witnessed 
the publication of a vast number of strongly atheist anti-religious 
books.25 
The new atheists are proud despisers of “religion” – which they 
usually speak about in this generalising manner – and their ultimate hope 
is that religion one day will disappear from the face of the earth. Even 
though the new atheists present themselves as fearless adversaries of 
religion, I find it rather dubious whether their anti-religious publications 
actually merit the name of critique of religion. It seems to me that 
religion-bashing is a much more fitting description. The fine academic 
tradition of critique – whether literary critique, critique of religion etc. – 
requires a certain amount of knowledge about, and perhaps even a certain 
amount of respect towards, the subject one wishes to engage critically. 
But it is one of the uncontested characteristics of the new atheists that 
they are no experts in theology or the history of religion, and that they 
definitely do not want to pay any respect to any kind of religious faith. In 
contrast to criticism of religion, religion-bashing is an intellectually 
                                           
25 See, for instance, Sam Harris, The End of Faith (2004), and Letter to a Christian 
Nation (2006); Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (2006); Daniel Dennett: 
Breaking the Spell (2006); Christopher Hitchens, god is not Great (2007); Victor J. 
Stenger, God: The Failed Hypothesis (2007), and The New Atheism (2009); Russell 
Blackford and Udo Schuklenk (eds.), 50 Voices of Disbelief (2009). 
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unchallenging activity. By and large it consists in the launching of a 
series of insulting jokes about religious people, like, for instance, that 
they represent an undeveloped, infantile species of the human race; that 
they are infected by a malicious and contagious virus; and that faith in 
God is no different than belief in the Tooth Fairy or the Flying Spaghetti 
Monster. As opposed to religion, atheism is often described as a token of 
mental health (for instance by Richard Dawkins), the atheist being an 
intelligent, independent grown-up, who doesn’t need to cling to the 
religious delusion in order to live a prosperous and flourishing life. Two 
of the leading figures of the new atheist faction, Richard Dawkins and 
Daniel Dennett, have therefore founded ‘The Bright Movement’, an 
American atheist movement that allows the atheists to assume the 
convenient position of the victim by identifying themselves with the 
repressed homosexuals from ‘The Gay Movement’ of the 1980s. 
In Denmark atheism in general and the new atheism in particular 
have not had a similar impact on recent public debates. However, several 
of the new atheist books have been translated into Danish, which has 
spawned some debate in the media, but not in academia. Furthermore, the 
two Danish atheist societies, Ateistisk Selskab (Atheist Society) and 
Humanistisk Samfund (Humanist Society), have proved very efficient in 
bringing public attention to their agendas. My aim in this essay is to 
provide a critical description of the Danish version of the new atheist 
movement. But before looking more closely into the Danish context, I 
find it necessary to start out with a general characterisation of the 
international atheist movement known as the “new atheism”. 
 
A Very General Description of the New Atheism 
 
First of all, it is important to note that there is no specific organisation or 
tightly knotted network known as “the New Atheism”. Rather, the new 
atheism is a movement, that is, a loosely knotted network, which consists 
of various local (or web-based) atheist societies and various individuals 
with very different backgrounds and aspirations. This movement 
appeared immediately after the terrorist attacks on New York and 
Washington DC September 9
th
 2001. A few days after these attacks, 
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Oxford professor of popular science, Richard Dawkins, published an 
article in The Guardian claiming that religion was to blame for the 
atrocities. Religion is like a weapon, Dawkins maintained, and to fill the 
world with religion “is like littering the streets with loaded guns. Do not 
be surprised if they are used” (Dawkins 2001). In the wake of the attacks 
Dawkins was widely praised for his statement, and other well-known 
commentators joined him in the accusation against religion. 
However, the critique of religion partly initiated by the 9/11 
attacks did not develop into a unified anti-religious organisation. Instead 
we have witnessed the appearance of various atheist books and activities, 
which are not very coordinated, or intelligently designed, but which often 
simply reflect the opinions and proclivities of various atheists who may, 
or may not, associate themselves with the new atheist movement. The 
great variety of recent atheist voices, of course, compromises any 
oversimplified talk about the new atheism. Nevertheless, it is still 
possible to point out several commonalities between the various atheist 
publications, which allow for a more general description of the new 
atheism. 
In my general description I will take as my clue the motto from the 
website newatheism.org. This motto, it seems to me, beautifully 
encapsulates the central doctrines of the new atheism. The motto goes 
like this: “Intolerance of ignorance, myth and superstition; disregard for 
the tolerance of religion. Indoctrination of logic, reason and the 
advancement of a naturalistic worldview.” In passing on to the 
interpretation of the text, let us casually note the doctrinaire confessional 
tone of the motto. For some reason, these new atheists find it relevant to 
confess their beliefs in a way that isn’t all that different from what we 
would expect to find in most religious congregations. Nevertheless, the 
motto contains four creedal articles, two negative and two affirmative, to 
which I will now turn. 
 
Intolerance of ignorance, myth and superstition  
The first distinctive mark of the new atheism is its refusal to distinguish 
between faith and superstition, liberal religion and fundamentalism, 
religious faith and ignorance. All of these are by the new atheists 
indiscriminately classified as belonging to the same category of “things 
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we atheists don’t like” or simply “religion”. According to the new 
atheists, there really aren’t any particularly good reasons to attempt to 
distinguish between different religious traditions, or between different 
traditions within the same religion, since all of them are based on the 
same delusion anyway, namely the delusion that “God” or some 
supernatural equivalent exists. One of the consequences of this 
unwillingness to distinguish between various kinds of religious faith is 
that the new atheists’ rhetoric becomes full of exasperating over-
generalisations. It is not merely creationism or radicalised Islam that 
“poisons everything” (see Hitchens 2007); no, the new atheists declare, it 
is “religion” as such that does that. It is rather like a dentist claiming that 
since one tooth is causing toothache, it is necessary to yank out the entire 
dentition. 
 
Disregard for the tolerance of religion  
The second negative doctrine reveals a more disturbing feature of the 
new atheism – its aversion to the tolerance and freedom of religion. The 
ideals of tolerance and freedom of religion, which are clearly stated in 
various human-rights declarations and in article 67 of the Danish 
constitution, are intended to secure the freedom of individuals to believe 
and practice whatever religion – or non-religion – they choose. 
According to the American new atheist Sam Harris the “very idea of 
religious tolerance – born of the notion that every human being should be 
free to believe whatever he wants about God – is one of the principal 
forces driving us toward the abyss” (Harris 2004, 14-15). A logical 
inference of such an observation would properly be to grant the secular 
states the power to make it criminal for its citizens to endorse certain 
beliefs. Not all of the new atheist protagonists are willing to go as far as 
Harris, but the disregard of the tolerance and respect of religion is 
nonetheless a feature common to most of them (see for instance Dawkins 
2007, 306 et passim). 
 
Indoctrination of logic and reason  
It is somewhat puzzling that the new atheists are not dismissive of 
indoctrination as such, for one of Dawkins’ frequently evoked 
accusations against religion is that the main reason for its transmission is 
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that small children are being indoctrinated by their religious parents 
(Dawkins 2007, 5); this, according to Dawkins, adds up to a severe kind 
of child abuse. But apparently it is entirely acceptable to indoctrinate 
people with logic and reason – even in the most restricted “scientist” 
sense of these words. Whatever we are to make of this obvious 
inconsistency, it is clear that the new atheists wish to take a stand for 
science and reason, and that – at least some of them – are willing to 
spread the good news of reason and science or logic by means of 
indoctrination. 
 
Advancement of a naturalistic worldview  
The new atheists are scientific naturalists, that is, they firmly believe that 
matter and energy – in a single word “nature” – is all there is, and that the 
natural sciences are the only effective means of achieving knowledge 
about anything. Therefore, sociology can be reduced to psychology; 
psychology to biology, biology to chemistry, and chemistry to physics. 
Intrinsic to a naturalistic worldview is the idea that life is ruled by blind, 
purposeless natural forces, for instance natural selection, which implies 
according to Dawkins that there is “no design, no purpose, no evil and no 
good, nothing but blind pitiless indifference” in the universe (Dawkins 
1995, 133). This worldview is to be advanced – presumably through 
indoctrination? – to the whole human race. As it is based on a naturalist 
worldview, the new atheism represents a specific type of so called 
“evidential atheism” (Westphal 1993, 13). The main reason for not being 
religious, according to this type of atheism, is the apparent lack of any 
scientifically testable evidence for the existence of God. God is a 
hypothesis that lacks sufficient evidence to make it a reasonable 
explanation for any appearance in the world (Stenger 2007). Evidence is 
what makes a belief reasonable; but since belief in God is without 
evidence it is unreasonable and, hence, should be discarded. Evidential 
atheism is the natural outcome of a naturalistic worldview, which, on the 
one hand, privileges science as the best (or only) epistemological 
method, and, on the other hand, precludes references to any supernatural 
or transcendent reality. 
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The New Atheism in Denmark 
 
I suppose that the Danish atheists that I associate with the new atheism 
would affirm the four doctrines mentioned above with no further 
reservations. It is difficult to know for sure, since none of the Danish 
atheists I am going to discuss in the following have produced any 
comprehensive books like those of the international new atheists. 
However, in some of the few recent Danish atheist publications we do 
encounter a rhetoric and an argumentation very similar to that of the 
Anglo-Saxon predecessors. Thus, for instance, in a very short essay 
printed in a “humanist anthology” the former associate professor in 
genetics, Erik Bahn, claims that science actually offers an explanation of 
the bewildering fact, that so many people keep on believing in “that 
religious nonsense” (Bahn 2007, 21). Science tells us, Bahn maintains, 
that religion is a product of our old, primitive reptile brain. Evolution 
predisposes us for a “dinosaur-god”, a “living fossil”, which is utterly 
irrelevant to our newly developed big brain. The good news, at least for 
atheists, is that they, in contrast to religious people, are “recently evolved 
mutants”, whom nature has favoured and made into “independent free 
human beings” (Bahn 2007, 22). Atheists, one understands, are people 
with well functioning big brains, while religious people remain stuck 
with the old obsolete reptile brain. Another example of Danish new 
atheist literature might be biologist Lone Frank’s populist book on 
neuroscience, in which she describes religion, among other things, as “an 
opportunist infection of our mental equipment” and as “a monstrosity 
emerging from the depths of the brain” (Frank 2007, 39 and 43). 
Besides these few literary cases the main sources of the new atheism in 
Denmark are a substantial number of interviews and letters in various 
papers, plus the websites of various atheist societies. When looking into 
the activities and agendas of Danish atheists, two issues immediately 
come to mind: firstly, these atheists are engaged in a campaign to exclude 
any sort of religion from the public square; and, secondly, they work 
industriously to design atheist rituals in order to provide a non-religious 
alternative to the rituals of the National Church. I will now discuss these 
issues in turn. 
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Society without God 
In Denmark some of the strongest endorsers of atheism are organised in 
various societies – the exact number of these societies remains uncertain. 
The two largest and most influential of these are Ateistisk Selskab and 
Humanistisk Samfund. Judged solely on the basis of the numbers of 
membership it would be an exaggeration to claim that these societies for 
the moment are very successful. Compared to the Norwegian atheist 
society, Human-Etisk Forbund, which counts more than 75.000 
members, Ateistisk Selskab and Humanistisk Samfund are almost 
insignificantly small, counting only about 1000 and 500 members 
respectively. The general population, whether secular or religious, 
continues to belong to the Danish National Church, which currently has 
about 4 million members or about 80 percent of the population. In regard 
to these numbers, the atheist societies must be said to represent a very 
small minority of the population. However, they have often skilfully been 
able to create headlines in the media and influence the public debate. So, 
shortage of membership and popular support does not necessarily mean a 
shortage of interest. 
For a foreign observer it may seem very odd that atheists in the 
Scandinavian countries complain about the presence of religion in public. 
According to a recent survey, Denmark and Sweden are two of the most 
secular countries in the world; they are almost already “societies without 
God” (Zuckerman 2008). Today, Denmark must be regarded as a post-
Christian society in the sense that Christianity has ceased to be a 
formative, cultural factor. Danish society would most likely look very 
different today if the Christian religion had not been the main cultural 
force since the ninth century, but the inspiration to the ongoing formation 
of Danish society in the present has many other sources – e.g., 
nationalism, Enlightenment values, socialism etc. The post-Christian 
condition reveals itself in various, perhaps somewhat trivial, forms: 
people in general no longer believe in the Christian doctrines; they do not 
go to church, except on certain occasions like Christmas and weddings; 
the pastor is hardly regarded as an authority anymore; the spiritual or 
religious attitudes of the citizens are considered to be private matters; the 
religious or non-religious positions of politicians are completely 
irrelevant to the voters etc. The population continues to maintain a few 
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Christian traditions, but in reality Denmark is a meticulously secularised 
society. Atheism and secularism have been victorious to the degree of 
reducing Christianity to a symbolic and cultural heritage that only a small 
handful of people take seriously as a source of orientation and elucidation 
of life. The National Church and its employees don’t have any more 
political influence than any regular voter, and its economic privileges are 
almost insignificant. The pastor was once an authority who could instruct 
the population in everything from the salvation of the soul to the 
cultivation of the soil; today the pastor is largely an administrator of 
rituals who is needed in order to make the family occasion more festive. 
The common population knows almost nothing about Christianity and is 
therefore inclined to take ‘The Da Vinci Code’ for granted as the 
historical truth about Jesus. The white cross in the national flag is hardly 
noticed by anyone anymore, and it might as well have been a line, a 
number, or an x. Of course, some people still believe in God, but in 
practice Danes are all atheists. In other words: the Christian period is 
over. 
Accordingly, there is really not much for the Danish atheists to 
fight against anymore. This is presumably one of the reasons why the 
atheist societies appear rather comical when they continuously complain 
about the presence of too much religion in the public square in Denmark. 
A main target for Danish atheists is, of course, the National Church. One 
of the central concerns of, not least, Ateistisk Selskab is to accomplish a 
complete separation between state and Church. From a principled point 
of view this might seem sound enough. And one must at the very least 
grant to the atheists that there certainly are some economical issues that 
need to be taken care of in regard to the National Church. For instance, it 
doesn’t seem particularly fair that non-members are forced to contribute 
economically to the National Church through the taxes that are paying 
the salaries of the pastors. However, aside from this economic 
favouritism, it might be argued from a democratic perspective that it is 
only fair that an institution which is backed by among 80 percent of a 
given population is given certain privileges over against other religious 
or non-religious associations. 
When looking more closely into some of the cases that the Danish 
atheists have been promoting, it becomes evident that it is not merely the 
National Church that is targeted but religion in the public square as such. 
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Cases are numerous and often rather trivial. Let me present two examples 
instar omnium. The first one presents a rather extreme case. Around 
Christmas 2008, a spokesman of Humanistisk Samfund, Dennis 
Nørmark, complained about the present calendar system, which forces 
people to adjust their life in accordance to various “holy seasons” that are 
based on “superstitious ideas” (Politiken December 20th 2008). 
According to Nørmark, such a calendar is utterly improper to “modern 
life” because it “troubles the citizens with religion in their everyday life.” 
Nørmark therefore suggested a rationalisation of the calendar: the 
Christmas holyday, for instance, should in the future be called “family 
vacation” and Easter renamed “spring vacation”. If such calendar 
alterations were implemented, Nørmark’s argument went, Danish society 
would be better adjusted to modern life; a life, one understands, with no 
room for any public manifestations of religion – not even manifestations 
as trivial as names on a calendar. 
The second case concerns the debate in the spring of 2009 that 
arouse when a few parents began complaining about the tradition in a 
small handful of public schools of reciting The Lord’s Prayer at their 
morning assemblies. Shortly after New Year’s Eve, a parent on 
Houlkærskolen in Viborg made contact with Humanistisk Samfund 
complaining about the practice of that school of letting the pupils say The 
Lord’s Prayer during the daily morning assemblies. According to 
Humanistisk Samfund’s representative Erik Bartram Jensen’s public 
comment this practice is nothing less than “an assault on small children” 
(Kristeligt Dagblad January 3
rd 
2009). A few days later another parent 
complained to Humanistisk Samfund. Now it was the mother of a pupil at 
Nørre Nissum Skole in Lemvig who felt offended by the daily “assaults” 
against her son. Jensen now argued that it is “offensive and a complete 
lack of respect” for non-believers if they and their children are exposed 
to religion in that manner: “it puts psychological pressure on those 
children who do not want to say The Lord’s Prayer” (Kristeligt Dagblad 
January 6
th
 2009). The inspectors from the two schools in question 
explained that the reciting of The Lord’s Prayer at the morning 
assemblies wasn’t meant to cause offence, neither was it an attempt to 
advance the Christian faith; it was merely an old tradition with a cultural 
pedagogical purpose. Moreover, Jens Jørgen Porup from Nørre Nissum 
Skole referred to the Danish legislation, which states that it is up to 
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individual school leaders to decide whether The Lord’s Prayer is to be 
recited or not. 
This appeal to the legislation didn’t satisfy the atheists from 
Humanistisk Samfund. Instead they attempted to escalate the conflict by 
appealing to the spokespersons of education from the different political 
parties, the president of school leaders, and the president of the parent 
organisation. These officials, however, almost unanimously agreed that 
the case wasn’t grave enough for them to deal with. The ambitious 
objective of the complaints that Humanistisk Samfund directed to the 
official representatives was to achieve an amendment which would 
disallow any recitation of The Lord’s Prayer in public schools. In the 
meantime, Houlkærskolen in Viborg had initiated a sober and democratic 
hearing among its parents, pupils, and teachers. If the general opinion 
was in favour of preserving the tradition of reciting The Lord’s Prayer 
the school would continue that practice, since, according to the president 
of the school board, Ole Trier Nørskov, “it is neither Humanistisk 
Samfund nor a solitary parent who are to decide what is going on at 
Houlkærskolen” (Kristeligt Dagblad February 18th 2009). This 
democratic procedure and willingness to engage with the opinions of 
those actually involved didn’t affect the atheists of Humanistisk 
Samfund: instead they simply chose to submit a complaint letter to the 
municipalities. 
The whole case about The Lord’s Prayer in public schools suggests 
itself as a telling example of the way the Danish atheists have been 
combating religion in recent years. They appeal to offended feelings 
instead of arguments; they ignore the initiative of others to engage in 
serious dialogue; and they attempt to influence politicians and other 
officials to assume a more hostile approach towards religion. As already 
mentioned, the atheist societies are not simply opposing the 
contemporary institution of the National Church; they attack religion as 
such and want to exclude it from the public. In connection to the case 
about The Lord’s Supper, Ateistisk Selskab published a press 
announcement on their website stating that “religion and associated 
religious practices should be something one as an individual has to 
choose – it should not be something one has to positively reject in the 
public square.” This is the way, the announcement continues, “freedom 
of religion functions in practice”. It seems that according to Ateistisk 
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Selskab’s representatives freedom of religion implies that one should 
never really be exposed to or confronted by religion or religious practices 
in public at all. The principle of freedom of religion is here being 
interpreted in a way that comes closer to meaning freedom from religion. 
One gets the impression that the new atheists in Denmark want an atheist 
state that maintains a public exclusion of religion: religious symbols, 
utterances, and practices are to be kept inside in the private sphere. If this 
is correct, it looks as if the new atheists are not content with Denmark 
being a secular society; rather, they would prefer it to be an atheist or 
anti-religious society (Gey 2007). 
 
Atheist Rituals 
One of the more curious features of recent atheism in Denmark is the 
attempt of atheist societies to design atheist or secular rituals.
26 
Intuitively 
such attempts might seem self-contradictory because rituals and 
ritualised activities are mainly associated with religious practices. Yet, if 
one endorses a wider description rituals may also be very profane 
activities like, for instance, singing at a football match or dancing at a 
party. But remarkably enough Ateistisk Selskab and Humantisk Samfund 
want to develop atheist rituals in relation to the naming of the child, the 
transition from child to adult, and marriage and death. These rituals, of 
course, coincide with the four major rituals of the church: baptism, 
confirmation, wedding, and funeral. The occasions that correspond to 
these rituals are, perhaps, universally considered to be natural transitory 
events of life. Every human being, notwithstanding a small number of 
tragic exceptions, is born, grows up and dies; and throughout the history 
of the human race marriage seems to be universally accepted as the most 
efficient method of instituting the family. But from these trite facts it 
does not necessarily follow that we as humans are ontologically 
predestined to employ rituals to mark out these occasions. If atheists 
were indeed “recently evolved mutants”, whom nature had favoured and 
made into “independent free human beings”, as Erik Bahn claimed, then 
one would certainly expect that atheists, of all people, would be able to 
                                           
26 For a critique of the Danish atheists’ ritual designing activity, see (Christiansen 
and Sandbeck 2009, 45-66). 
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break free of these bio-sociological impediments. If you are really free, 
why, then, would you need to follow in the footsteps of previous 
generations? And why, if you are a free atheist, would you want to 
imitate the ritual practices of a religious institution? There are 
presumably two answers to that question: the Danish atheists want to 
design atheist rituals firstly for strategic reasons and, secondly, for 
psychological reasons. 
The strategic reason relates to the new atheists’ battle against the 
National Church. By offering non-religious alternatives to the rituals of 
the church, the atheists are attempting to hijack the large group of so 
called “four wheel Christians”, that is, the vast majority of members of 
the National Church who only attend church at Christmas, baptisms, 
weddings, and funerals (Jensen 1995). Maybe it would be more fitting to 
speak about “five wheel Christians”, because a great many also attend 
confirmations. In any case, the point is that Danish atheist societies want 
to hijack members. Jonathan Szpirt from Ateistisk Selskab confirmed the 
strategy in an interview: “we want to offer the same range of products as 
the communities of believers in order to present an alternative to those 
who don’t believe in a god or religious power.” (Kristeligt Dagblad July 
8
th
 2008). Ateistisk Selskab are therefore going hunting for the 
“economical members” of the National Church, that is, the “four wheel 
Christians” who represent the group of members that are not “serious” 
believers, but who nonetheless continue to pay church taxes in order to 
be able to make use of the church’s services. In other words, Ateistisk 
Selskab wants their share of the market. The “serious believers”, those 
who, so to speak, buy the entire religious package, are most likely 
beyond the reach of the atheist campaign; the “economical members”, in 
contrast, are potential clients, Szpirt claimed. Thus, Ateistisk Selskab 
wants to “educate their own masters of ceremonies who can conduct the 
new rituals, and who can offer counselling and expertise.” 
The psychological reasons are more complex. We may ask: why 
do naturalist atheists, who by definition don’t believe in gods or other 
supernatural powers, who only believe in “objective” reality and in what 
can be investigated scientifically, why do these atheists have the need of 
rituals? Is it simply for sociological reasons, e.g., to strengthen the sense 
of community in the atheist societies? Or maybe the atheist rituals are 
only being invented for strategic purposes? In a comment in Politiken 
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(Martz 20
th
 2009) Dennis Nørmark from Humanistisk Samfund pointed 
toward another, more psychological reason in regard to the coming 
atheist wedding ritual. According to Nørmark, it is a very inadequate 
experience for atheists when – because they don’t want to be married in a 
church – have to be married at the town hall where all they receive is a 
“congratulation from the municipality.” The municipality, Nørmark 
further describes as “an empty legal institution”, and he then continues: 
“We [: atheists] like everybody else want the events of our life be 
celebrated as something larger and more meaningful.” Please note how 
Nørmark in these few lines effectively contrasts “an empty legal 
institution” with “something larger and more meaningful.” 
The interesting question is, of course, what in an atheist’s universe 
might count as something larger and more meaningful than “an empty 
legal institution”? Which higher or larger powers (institutions, beings, 
energies etc.) may the atheists invoke in order to implement the sense of 
something larger and more meaningful during the performance of the 
ritual? The obvious answer is, of course: none! All we have is the 
legislation which is made up by humans, and which the municipality 
administrates. For religious people, who believe in God, there obviously 
exists a non-municipal being that may be invoked during the ritual; 
hence, religious people are able to celebrate the events of their life as 
something larger and more meaningful because the events get filled with 
a kind of sacred aura when the transcendent in and through the ritual is 
drawn into the immanent plane of everyday life. Apparently, the atheists 
from Humanistisk Samfund also have a psychological need for the 
invocation of a meaning larger than what the individual is capable of 
producing her-/himself. This need is, it seems to me, utterly inconsistent 
with the naturalistic worldview that is commonly endorsed by new 
atheists. If naturalism is true, then there is in the universe “no design, no 
purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind pitiless indifference” 
(Dawkins 1995, 133). Such a worldview would, of course, affect the 
question of meaning too. Here is what Darwinian naturalism has to say 
about meaning, according to Janet Browne: “Where most men and 
women generally believed in some kind of design in nature – some kind 
of plan and order – and felt a deep-seated, mostly inexpressible belief 
that their existence had meaning, Darwin wanted them to see all life as 
empty of any divine purpose” (Browne 1995, 542). If naturalism 
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excludes meaning from existence, thus stressing the blind pitiless 
indifference of being, how, then, are we to understand a naturalistic 
atheist’s need for something larger and more meaningful? 
The Danish atheists’ need for rituals as a means of celebrating 
certain life events as something larger and more meaningful is, I 
maintain, interpretable as an example of fetish religiosity. A fetish is an 
object or a “thing” (in a broad sense) that enables the one clinging to it to 
rationally accept the traumatic loss of someone/something (see Žižek 
2001, 13ff.). The meaning and significance of what one has lost is 
transferred to the fetish object, so that one on a very unconscious level 
still experiences that meaning and significance. On a conscious, rational 
level one fully accepts the loss and may even talk about it unaffectedly – 
because one clings to the fetish. But if the fetish dies/gets destroyed the 
world collapses and the trauma begins to dominate. 
It is hard not to view the atheists’ ritual designing activity as some 
sort of fetish. These atheists are, on one level, able to accept very 
rationally the loss of meaning (God) that their naturalistic atheist 
worldview provokes. But the ritual fetish grants the atheists access to 
something larger and more meaningful without reference to the lost 
object/meaning/God that is the logical precondition of such a claim for 
meaningfulness in the first place. There is no meaning, no purpose, 
nothing but blind indifference in the universe, the naturalistic atheists 
claim unaffectedly, almost apathetically – but in the ritual they keep on 
experiencing something larger and more meaningful. Take away their 
rituals, and watch their world collapse. 
 
Closure 
 
Allow me to close this essay on a more personal note. A year ago I was 
asked to give a lecture at Ateistisk Selskab in Copenhagen. In the 
subsequent discussion with the about 50 attendants I realised how 
strongly these atheists despise religion and the National Church. To them 
it is an outright provocation that religion is still around, and they truly 
and honestly believe that Danish society is not secular enough. Hatred is 
a strong word to use, but I think it appropriate to characterise these 
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atheists’ attitude towards religion as a deeply passionate loathing. They 
not merely think that religion is stupid and wrong, they actually hate it. I 
kind of suspected that in advance, but I was nevertheless surprised by the 
measure of their hostility – not towards me, but towards religion. But 
what really surprised me was that the strongest reaction against my 
lecture concerned what I had said about their ritual designing project. 
Clearly, I had here walked right into a minefield. Again and again I was 
told that it was rude and offensive to criticise what they were doing, and 
that I should accept that they – as everybody else – want to celebrate 
marriage or non-firmation or whatever. Some of them even told me to 
leave them (or rather their rituals) alone and to mind my own business. I 
am not proud to admit it, but in some sick and perverted way I was 
deeply satisfied with these powerful emotional reactions. Not only did 
they confirm me in my suspicion that the rituals they were so protective 
of functioned very much like a fetish. Their reactions also reminded me 
of how obnoxiously difficult it is for us human beings to face up to the 
terrors of an entirely meaningless universe. We may affirm 
meaninglessness in theory, but in our practices we tend to smuggle back 
meaning through the backdoor.   
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Three Neoatheistic Arguments. A Critique 
Carl Reinhold Bråkenhielm 
 
Introduction 
 
The present article will deal with some lines of thought which have been 
of significance in contemporary neoatheism. I shall focus my attention on 
three different arguments, all of which claim that natural science refutes 
certain religious belief. A shorthand formulation of these three 
arguments could be made in the following way.  
 
1. The biological theory of evolution shows that supernatural/theistic 
explanations of the world are untenable.  
2. Neurophysiological theories show that “we are nothing but 
neurons”.   
3. Physical theories show that matter is the ultimate stuff of reality. 
 
1, 2 and 3 may also be based on philosophical, metaphysical or ethical 
considerations. Such arguments will not be discussed in the present 
context.  Needless to say, the distinction between natural science, on the 
one hand and philosophy, metaphysics and ethics, on the other hand, is 
not perfectly clear. But this will not be a great problem in the present 
context. I am interested in claims to the end that natural science refutes 
central religious beliefs. Whether or not these claims are “contaminated” 
by philosophy, metaphysics and/or ethics is one or another matter.  
The first argument is influential in the writings of Richard 
Dawkins. The second argument has been elaborated mainly by Steven 
Pinker. And the third can be found in works of Daniel Dennett. In turn 
these writers have influenced neoatheism in Sweden, but I will not 
digress into a study of how this process has evolved and what particular 
shape and form these arguments have taken in the Swedish context. 
However, one observation is of significance. 
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In Sweden, 1, 2, and 3, have been publicly advanced and supported 
by members of the Swedish Humanist Association. They have also been 
addressed in some academic publications, which address these arguments 
(for example, Stenmark 2001, Runehov 2007, Bråkenhielm & 
Fagerström 2007,  and Jonsson 2008), but the critical remarks made in 
these publications have not received much attention from Swedish 
neoatheists. Surely, there has been a lot of public debate between 
neoatheists and their opponents. But this debate has almost without 
exception taken the form of a confessional dialogue, where each partner 
has witnessed about his or her own convictions. There is almost no 
example of at truth-seeking dialogue with an emphasis on mutual 
understanding and attention to the basic methodological principles of the 
dialogue (Hick 1977). I will refrain from any speculation about the 
reasons for this situation and instead concentrate on the main theoretical 
ideas and the claim that these ideas are supported by natural science. 
There is one particular argument frequently advanced by 
neoatheists, which will not be addressed in the present context. It is the 
argument that scientific explanations of belief in God (such as Marxist, 
Freudian or evolutionary arguments) show that it is false that God exists. 
This is a vast topic, but a large part of the area is addressed by Daniel 
Dennett´s notice “that it could be true that God exists, that God indeed is 
the intelligent, conscious, loving creator of us all, and yet still religion 
itself, as a complex set of phenomena, is a perfectly natural 
phenomenon” (Dennett 2006: 25). Of course, it may still be questioned 
(as it seems to be by Dennett himself in Dennett 2007: 147 f.), but this is 
a too broad and deep problem in the present context. 
The theory of evolution and the belief in God creation 
 
One of the basic tenets of neoatheistic humanism is that evolution is 
incompatible with a Christian belief in creation. This is in line with a 
significant part of the general public. In a survey of 2006 the following 
proposition was presented to a representative sample of the Swedish 
population:  
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Christian belief in creation is incompatible with the biological 
doctrine of evolution.  
Needless to say, “Christian belief in creation” is a general and vague 
expression that may be interpreted in many different ways. The intention 
of the survey was not to map the public perception of Christian belief, 
but to reveal to what degree this belief was perceived as being 
incompatible with Christian belief. 27 % agreed completely or partially. 
Moreover, about 40% of urban men believed that evolution was 
incompatible with the Christian belief in creation. 
The theory of evolution may be claimed to be incompatible with 
the Christian belief in creation for several reasons.  One common reason 
is based on a particular interpretation of this Christian belief in the world 
as a creation of God, i.e. that it is synonymous with the claim that God 
created all life on earth at a particular time by a special and direct 
intervention. The different species were fixed and ready from the 
beginning. A certain form of evolution may have occurred within these 
respective species. But the different species are what they are “from the 
beginning”. This type of understanding is commonly called creationism. 
Creationism can be relaxed in various ways. One could, for 
example, assume that life development has proceeded according to the 
classical theory of evolution, but that the first cell or the first 
human/human pair was created at a particular time by a special divine 
intervention. At a special occasion God selected a naturally arising 
primate of the genus Homo and breathed the “breath of life” into this 
being (Gen. 2:7). However, this is not creationism in the strict sense; 
rather it is one version of the idea of intelligent design (ID). It may be 
based on divine revelation or on some form of natural theology.  
Either way, neo-atheists in general have raised serious – and to my 
mind valid – objections against strict creationism and ID. I will not go 
into the specifics of this critique but focus on the more general 
background theory for some of the versions of strict creationism and ID 
based on natural theology, namely the Argument from Design in the form 
proposed by William Paley in his Natural Theology (1802). Paley begins 
his book in the following way. 
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IN crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and 
were asked how the stone came to be there; I might possibly 
answer, that, for any thing I knew to the contrary, it had lain there 
forever: nor would it perhaps be very easy to show the absurdity of 
this answer. But suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, and 
it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place; I 
should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that, 
for any thing I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet 
why should not this answer serve for the watch as well as for the 
stone?  
Essential to Paley´s answer is the structural difference between object 
such as the watch and objects such as the stone is that objects such as the 
watch have a (1) goal-directed structure (i.e. consisting of smaller parts in 
an intricate interaction for a specific end) and (2) a designer. Now, 
central in Paley´s argument is the claim that there is an analogy between 
things with a goal-directed structure (such as clocks, cars and computers) 
and certain natural objects (such as the human body, the solar system and 
the living cell). On the basis of this analogy Paley concluded that natural 
objects with a goal-directed structure must have a designer. And he 
identified this designer with God. 
David Hume in his Dialogues concerning natural Religion (Hume 
1779, 1945) raised serious objection against this line of thought. I will 
not reiterate those well-known arguments in the present context, but 
focus upon the argument which Richard Dawkins added. In essence, 
Dawkins argued that evolutionary theory provides us with a better 
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explanation of natural objects with a goal-directed structure than that 
these objects are created by God. And the alternative explanation is 
(roughly) that they emerged through natural selection acting on randomly 
mutating organisms. Paley´s Argument from Design was definitely and 
finally refuted by the theory of evolution. Moreover, “ […] Darwin made 
it possible to be an intellectually fulfiled atheist” (Dawkins 1991: 7). 
Dawkins´ claim has been interpreted in different ways. There is the 
possibility that Dawkins means that there are many arguments against 
belief in God, but that evolutionary theory – as it were – tipped the 
balance in favour of atheism. But the context of his argument in The 
Blind Watchmaker makes a stronger interpretation more reasonable: 
evolutionary theory provides us with conclusive evidence that it is false 
that God exists. 
There are many weaknesses in this line of thought. First, Dawkins´ 
argument is an argument of the second order, namely an argument 
against an argument – albeit one of the more influential – for belief in 
God. It is possible that there are other arguments for belief in God or that 
believers are justified to believe in God even if the Argument from 
Design is a failure. One failed argument is not the end of the story. 
Secondly, it is a matter of serious doubt if evolutionary theory refutes the 
Argument of Design. I think that the Argument from Design is a failure 
and that this has been shown by David Hume. But it is wrong to think 
that it has been refuted by Charles Darwin. Take one simple example: the 
first living organism, which is a paradigm example of a natural object 
with a goal-directed structure. It consists of many different parts that are 
linked together in an intricate system with the end to replicate itself. It 
emerged out of non-organic material, and cannot be explained by 
evolutionary theory. Yet it is a paradigm example of a natural object with 
a goal-directed structure. (See further Jeffner 1966: 23 f.) 
Needless to say, the conclusion of these arguments is not that 
theism is justified. The conclusion is that Dawkins´ argument against 
theism are inconclusive. However, there are other arguments against 
theism that need to be considered – especially against the particular form 
of theism that Dawkins focuses on in The God Delusion (2006), namely 
empirical theism. Empirical theism is – to put is simply – the idea that the 
existence of God is a scientific hypothesis. In a later publication, 
Dawkins claims that belief in God is a scientific hypothesis: 
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God´s existence and non-existence is a scientific fact about the 
universe, discoverable in principle if not in practice. If he existed 
and chose to reveal it, God himself could clinch the argument, 
noisily and unequivocally, in his favour. And even if God´s existence 
is never proved or disproved with certainty one way or the other, 
available evidence and reasoning may yield an estimate of 
probability far from 50 per cent. (Dawkins 2006: 50)  
William Paley and Richard Dawkins disagree on the probability of the 
existence of God. Paley relies on the analogy between goal-directed and 
natural objects and claims that this makes the existence of God highly 
probable. Dawkins position is that “I cannot know for certain, but I think 
God is very improbable, and live my life on the assumption that he is 
not” (Dawkins 2006: 50-51). But this disagreement hides a deeper 
sympathy. Paley and Dawkins share the same point of departure – the 
existence of God is a scientific hypothesis.  Or to put it more precisely; 
those who affirm belief in God, should give reasons for their affirmation 
which are of the same kind as those given in empirical science (see 
Jeffner 1966: 25 f.). This could be described as the central tenet of 
empirical theism. But why should we believe that this central tenet of 
empirical theism should be accepted? 
There are many arguments in favour of interpreting belief in God 
in the form of a scientific affirmation. Empirical theism subjects religious 
belief to the stringent canons of science. It has the methodological 
advantage of providing us with tools to solve the issue and not content 
ourselves with a lukewarm agnosticism. And – more importantly – it has 
been claimed that empirical theism is also in line with the way religious 
persons understand their faith. The most famous example is the Old 
UNDERSTANDING DARWIN AND DARWINIAN UNDERSTANDING 
 
 
173 
testament-story of Elia and the Prophets of Baal. Elia had a hypothesis 
about God and to verify it he sets up an experiment: 
 
Elijah went before the people and said, “How long will you waver 
between two opinions? If the Lord is God, follow him; but if Baal is 
God, follow him.” But the people said nothing. Then Elijah said to 
them, “I am the only one of the Lord’s prophets left, but Baal has 
four hundred and fifty prophets. Get two bulls for us. Let them 
choose one for themselves, and let them cut it into pieces and put 
it on the wood but not set fire to it. I will prepare the other bull and 
put it on the wood but not set fire to it. Then you call on the name 
of your god, and I will call on the name of the Lord. The god who 
answers by fire—he is God. ”Then all the people said, “What you 
say is good. (1 Book of Kings 18.21-24) 
We all know the result of the experiment; the hypothesis of Elia was 
verified. In essence, the procedure is in accordance with the basic tenet of 
empirical theism. William Paley and Richard Swinburne (to take an 
example from contemporary philosophy of religion) would not go for 
such an experiment, but basically they would argue from nature to God 
as St. Paul did against the heathens in his Letter to the Romans: 
 
For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are 
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even 
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his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse. 
Because that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, 
neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and 
their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, 
they became fools. (Romans 1:20-21) 
In fact however, St. Paul was wrong. “for the unprejudiced know that the 
heavens are quite silent about the glory of God, and that the firmament 
displays nothing of his handiwork” (van Inwagen 2006: 135).  More 
clearly than ever, this problem of divine hiddenness is expresses in the 
dialogue between the Knight and Death at their famous chess play in 
Ingemar Bergman´s The Seventh Seal (1957): 
 
Knight: Why can´t I kill God within me? Why does he live on in this 
painful and humiliating way even though I curse him and want to tear 
him out of my heart? Why, in spite of everything, is He a baffling reality 
that I can´t shake off? Do you hear me? 
 
Death: Yes, I hear you. 
 
Knight: I want knowledge, not faith, not suppositions, but knowledge. I 
want God to stretch out His hand to me, reveal Himself and speak to me. 
 
Death: But He is silent. 
(from the Script of The Seventh Seal) 
 
The problem of divine hiddenness is a stumbling block for empirical 
theism. Religious faith does not (pace Elijah) appear as a scientific 
hypothesis in the lives and reasoning of most religious believers. In 
religion it is praiseworthy, to stand fast to your belief come what may. 
This is an attitude which is foreign to the spirit of science. Moreover, the 
God of empirical theism appears as a thing in the world. This is radically 
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at odds with basic experiences of transcendence common in all religious 
traditions.  There is also the problem of translating religious metaphors 
and stories into clear and verifiable scientific hypotheses. This has been 
tried all through Western history, but it can be argued that something of 
utter importance is lost in these translations. 
My tentative conclusion is, therefore, that empirical theism fails as 
a way to understand religious belief. Religious belief – at least in the 
form it appears in Jewry, Christianity and Islam – is more appropriately 
construed as a non-scientific hypothesis about reality as a whole. This 
comes close to John Hick and his argument in An Interpretation of 
Religion (1989). Religious beliefs are appropriately termed, non-
scientific, because they are hypotheses about a systematically ambiguous 
reality. It is like an ambiguous situation, which admits many different 
interpretations – and none of them can conclusively be deemed justified 
according to canons of science or common sense. Hick writes: 
 
It seems, then, that the universe maintains its inscrutable 
ambiguity. In some respects it invites whilst in others it repels a 
religious response. It permits both a religious and a naturalistic 
faith, but haunted in each case by a contrary possibility that can 
never be exorcised. And realistic analysis of religious belief and 
experience, and any realistic defence of the rationality of religious 
conviction, must therefore start from this situation of systematic 
ambiguity. (Hick 1991: 124. See also Jeffner 1972: chap. 6.) 
If this position is correct, then empirical theism fails as an appropriate 
understanding of religious belief. And if empirical theism fails so do the 
efforts to show that scientific evidence is that which ultimately makes 
religious beliefs rational or irrational. 
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One last qualification needs to be added. There are, clearly, religious 
affirmations, which unambiguously contradict strongly established 
scientific evidence. One example is the central tenet of creationism that 
all living organism were the result of an instantaneous creation God at a 
specific point in history and that none of these organisms have developed 
out of another organism in small intermediary steps. Such beliefs cannot 
be rationally justified, nor can any other that fly in the face of scientific 
evidence. (In a more technical language: the idea of religious belief as a 
non-empirical hypothesis should be combined with the idea of the 
primacy of empirically based knowledge. See Jeffner 1999: 22.) At the 
other end we have beliefs that are clearly beyond science, such as the 
belief in the eternal existence of God. But there is also an intermediary 
zone of beliefs which – pending on particular interpretations of science –
may come into conflict with science, but for which it could be argued 
that this is not the case. It is a matter on continuing scholarly debate. This 
is the case with certain stories of miracles. In most cases there is 
overwhelming evidence that these stories are fabricated or simply false, 
but there are also cases which resist definitive falsification by science - 
save the falsification in principle that no miracles (in the sense of a 
violation of a natural law) occur. There is much more to be said about 
this, but here I must be content to leave the subject.    
You are nothing but a bunch of neurons! 
 
Steven Pinker and others have argued that there is another part of the 
Christian belief in creation, which is contrary to science, namely the 
notion that human beings have a soul (Pinker 2002: 1-2). This idea is not 
a part of original Jewish religion (and perhaps not even of the New 
Testament), but it has become an integral part of a dominant tradition 
within Christianity. The soul is the seat of our moral sense, our ability to 
love, our intellectual capacity and ability to decide how we should act. 
Furthermore, it persists after the body is gone. Steven Pinker believes 
that such an understanding of human nature is completely untenable. 
Pinker refers inter alia to Francis Crick, who discovered DNA 
molecule together with James Watson in 1953. In 1994 Francis Crick 
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published a book with the title The Astonishing Hypothesis about the 
revolutionary idea that  
 
[y]ou, your joys and your sorrow, your memories and your 
ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact 
no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and 
their associated molecules. As Lewis Caroll’s Alice might have 
phrased it, ‘You’re nothing but a pack of neurons’ (Crick 1994: 3) 
One would think that there is a difference between (1) the claim that 
consciousness is nothing but neurons and their activity and (2) the claim 
that neurological activity in the brain is not identical with, but gives rise 
to consciousness. But this distinction matters less to Pinker. "The 
evidence is overwhelming that every aspect of our mental lives are 
entirely determined by physiological processes in the tissues of the 
brain." One page later he adds that "cognitive neuroscience is showing 
that the self, too, is just another network of the brain systems" (Pinker 
2002: 41, 42). 
"You are nothing but a bunch of neurons". This means that 
emotional and mental processes - thoughts, feelings, desires, decisions, 
etc. - are nothing but neurological processes in the brain. Furthermore, 
Pinker claims that neurology has given us reliable knowledge about these 
processes and how they should be described and explained. “Beliefs and 
memories are collections of information like facts in a data base, but 
residing in patterns of activity and structure in the brain” (Pinker 2002: 
32). The brain is certainly far more complex than a digital computer, but 
it works along the same basic principles, i.e. according to data processing 
principles. The brain processes information from the senses in the same 
way as a computer processes data. Our computers serve as information 
processing tools. The incoming information is reduced to ones and zeros 
and processed with incredible speed under a particular program and 
reaches a certain result in the form of an image, a text or a number. It was 
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Alan Turing, who as early as the 1930s described the data processing 
fundamentals and gave us the foundation of modern computer 
technology. He also gave rise to the computational theory of mind. In 
essence, a computer is similar to our brain except for the fact that a 
computer carries out information processing incredibly faster than the 
human brain. Furthermore, the human brain processes the information we 
receive through our senses with the help of other programs than our 
computers. This is the difference. Nevertheless - Pinker writes - it is 
perhaps less different than we imagine. “Recent artificial intelligence 
systems have written credible short stories, composed convincing 
Mozart-like symphonies, drawn appealing pictures of people and 
landscapes and conceived clever ideas for advertisements” (Pinker 2002, 
p. 34). 
The Swedish biologist Torbjörn Fagerström has argued against the 
uniqueness of the human being (Bråkenhielm & Fagerström 2007). 
Pinker´s theory provides him with another nail in the coffin carrying the 
corpse of human uniqueness. Human beings are not only animals among 
all others – they are basically a problem-solving machine, among others. 
In principle, humans have no specific cognitive abilities compared to 
other problem solving animals - and problems solving animals are in 
essence problem solving machines. People, animals and computers are 
very different, but in essence they are all problem-solving devices of the 
kind produced by Alan Turing described. This idea of the mind has been 
termed “functionalism” or “the computational theory of mind”. 
One weakness with Steven Pinker´s book is that he does not report 
the extensive discussion of functionalism and the criticism of "the 
computational theory of mind." One of the main critics is the American 
philosopher John Searle. Searle argues that the functionalists´ 
fundamental mistake is that they do not distinguish between (1) a 
syntactic operation, which - like a computer - replaces some symbols 
with other symbols according to some basic rules, and (2) semantic 
sentence comprehension, which connects a symbol with a specific 
meaning. Our thoughts, feelings, intentions, desires and so on have such 
a semantic content - and this is what functionalism simply misses. 
The point of this objection to functionalism requires some further 
explanation. Searle set out to illustrate this objection with his story about 
the Chinese room. A normally intelligent person is placed in a closed 
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room and receives written questions through a gap. Let's call him Pete. 
The questions are in Chinese - but Pete cannot speak a word Chinese. So 
he cannot understand the questions. Fortunately, at his disposal, he has an 
owner's manual (in English), which helps him to interpret and answer the 
questions. The manual says such that if you get into a question of 
wording 准备 行动, then you should answer 提 万 纳 库. Pete has no 
problem to perform this task. He needs only look up the correct character 
in the manual. He can perform this syntactic operation without any 
semantic understanding of the Chinese expressions. Of course, the people 
outside the Chinese room can get the idea that Pete understands Chinese, 
but if they find out that he just replaces one Chinese phrase with another 
by means of an English manual, they realize that Pete did not need to 
understand a single Chinese character to solve the tasks assigned to him 
by his instructors. 
The story of the Chinese room is controversial in philosophy, but it 
still shows a weak point in functionalism. The distinctive feature of 
humans is actually that they understand the sense not only of linguistic 
signs, but also of meaningful actions and events. This characteristic of 
the human mind cannot be explained by functionalism. Functionalism 
may explain consciousness, but only by reducing it to something more 
limited than it actually is. 
There is yet another objection to Pinker´s reductionism, i.e. that 
mental processes are nothing more than neural processes. There is 
undoubtedly a close connection between the neural processes and mental 
phenomena. Pinker gives many good examples of this. When a surgeon 
with the help of electrodes stimulates a part of the brain, the person may 
have a particular experience, and if another part is stimulated, the person 
has another experience. If the brain is exposed to various chemical 
substances, they will affect the person's perception, mood, personality or 
intellect. “Every emotion and thought gives off physical signals, and the 
new technologies for detecting them are so accurate that they literally 
read a person´s mind and tell a cognitive neuroscientist whether the 
person is imagining a face or a place” (Pinker 2002 –  my italics). 
But it is one thing to accept certain basic facts about the effects of 
stimulating various parts of the brain – and another thing to assert that 
cognitive scientists are “literally” able to read people's thoughts. To be 
UNDERSTANDING DARWIN AND DARWINIAN UNDERSTANDING 
 
 
180 
sure, with objective, scientific methods we can study what happens in the 
brain and how it works. Neurologists can study various processes in the 
brain, how synapses work and the interaction between them and between 
them and our sense organs. But this is not “to literally read another 
person´s thoughts”. Surely, the neurologist must rely on the reports of his 
patient to make any kind of correlation between mental events and 
neurological processes in the first place! Each of us has immediate access 
only to his own mental life or consciousness, not to anyone else´s. (See 
further Thomas Nagel´s famous essay “What is it like to be a bat?” in 
Nagel 1979: esp. 167-168.)  
If we are to test the hypothesis that mental processes are identical 
to some physical processes such as the human brain, we cannot study 
mental phenomena by studying the brain processes. This is to assume 
what would be proved and we end up in circular reasoning. For the same 
reason we must rely on introspection to arrive at what is happening in the 
brain and whether these processes are identical to the mental. However, 
we can compare what a person finds introspectively with what one 
observer finds when he is studying the same person's brain activity. The 
only thing we have discovered so far is that a particular mental event or 
process correlates with a specific neural event or process ... The two 
phenomena are simultaneous is by no means the same as they are 
identical! It seems therefore impossible that in any way empirically 
investigate or determine if mental phenomena are identical with neural 
events or processes in the brain (see Svensson 1993: 93 f.).  
The Swedish philosopher Gunnar Svensson emphasizes three 
fundamental differences between mental phenomena and physical 
processes: (1) Mental phenomena are characterized by intentionality, i.e. 
they have a specific content and focus on a particular item. Furthermore, 
(2) they are private. My mental experiences are mine and no one else: 
they are similar to certain other people but it may of course we never 
know exactly. Finally, (3) mental phenomena have a conscious character. 
I am aware of myself as an act, perceptive and reflective personality. The 
conclusion that immediately comes to mind is, therefore, that mental and 
physical phenomena cannot be identical. In other words, the mind is of 
such a nature that it cannot be reduced to something else. Needless to 
say, this should not be confused with the idea that the mind is something 
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entirely separate from matter, as Descartes thought when he developed 
his dualistic doctrine that mind and body are separate substances.  
My conclusion is that there are no convincing neurological 
arguments for the computational theory of mind. Neurological data are 
consistent with a theory of emergence according to which mental process 
have a different ontological status than neurological processes, but that 
mental processes nevertheless emerge out of neurological processes in 
way that at present is not entirely understood. Neurological data are also 
consistent with the theory of neutral monism according to which the 
mental and material can be reduced to an ultimate reality which is neither 
mental nor material. But this is not the place to embark on an analysis of 
these alternatives to the computational theory of mind.  
 
Scientific materialism 
 
Let me summarize my analysis so far. I have discussed two neoatheistic 
arguments claiming that there are scientific evidence against (1) that God 
is the creator of non-human and human life, and (2) that human beings 
have a soul - and I have argued that these two neoatheistic claims are 
inconclusive. (1) and (2) have reasonable interpretations that withstand 
these arguments. But neoatheists have advanced a third kind of argument 
that undergirds (1) and (2). At least some of them would affirm a version 
of materialism according to which “the world consists entirely of 
particles in motions determined by fundamental physical laws. 
Everything else is just collections, actions, or properties of these 
particles” (van Inwagen 1993: chap. 1). Some of them are identity 
naturalists (such as Pinker) and other genetic naturalists (such as 
Dennett). Let me focus on Daniel Dennett´s position in his classical 
Darwin´s Dangerous Idea (1996). 
Dennett argues that he is a “good” reductionist, but not a “greedy” 
reductionist. Like Darwin, Dennett wants to explain everything 
scientifically, but he does not want to explain away Minds and Purposes 
and Meanings. There are real levels and real complexities, which 
scientific research must respect. Dennett makes an important distinction 
between cranes and skyhooks. Skyhooks are “mind-first force or power 
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or process, an exception to the principle that all design, and apparent 
design, is ultimately the result of mindless, motiveless mechanicity” 
(Dennett, 1996: 76, my italics). There are no such skyhooks, but there are 
cranes, i.e. “a subprocess or special feature of a design process that can 
be demonstrated to permit the local speeding up of the basic slow process 
of natural selection” (Dennett 1996: 76). Sexual reproduction is such a 
crane, and conscious mind another.  
Dennett argues that even if there are cranes, there are no skyhooks. 
This amounts to the claim that everything is ultimately the result of 
mindless, motiveless mechanicity. Later in his book he summarizes his 
argument in the following way: 
 
There must have been a first living thing, but there couldn´t have 
been one - the simplest thing is too complex, too designed, to 
spring into existence by sheer chance. This dilemma is solved not 
by a skyhook, but by a long series of Darwinian processes: self-
replicating macros, preceded or accompanied perhaps by self-
replicating clay crystals, gradually advancing from tournaments of 
luck to tournaments of skill over billions of years. The regularities of 
physics on which those cranes depend could themselves be the 
outcome of a blind, uncaring shuffle through Chaos. Thus, out of 
next to nothing, the world we know and love created itself. 
(Dennett 1996: 185) 
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This claim comes rather close to classical materialism, i.e. the idea that 
the world consists entirely of particles in motions determined by 
fundamental physical laws. Everything else is just collections, actions, or 
properties of these particles (van Inwagen 1993: 5). 
This becomes clearer in another passage of Dennett´s book, where 
he joins forces with David Hume’s thinking in part VIII of his Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion (first published in 1779). Here Hume 
formulates an alternative idea to the theism, which could explain the 
apparent design in and of the universe. Philo proposes a variation of the 
old Epicurean hypothesis:  
 
Instead of supposing matter infinite, as EPICURUS did, let us 
suppose it finite. A finite number of particles is only susceptible of 
finite transpositions: and it must happen, in an eternal duration, 
that every possible order or position must be tried an infinite 
number of times. This world, therefore, with all its events, even the 
most minute, has before been produced and destroyed, and will 
again be produced and destroyed, without any bounds and 
limitations. No one, who has a conception of the powers of infinite, 
in comparison of finite, will ever scruple this determination. (Hume 
1779, 1948: 52) 
Now, Dennett argues that several versions of this speculation have been 
seriously considered by physicists and cosmologists in recent years. 
Dennett mentions John A. Wheeler who 1974 proposed “that the universe 
oscillates back and forth for eternity”. And he continues 
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[…] a Big Bang is followed by expansion, which is followed by 
contraction into a big crunch, which is followed by another big 
bang, and so forth forever, with random variations in the constants 
and other crucial parameters occurring in each oscillation. Each 
possible setting is tried an infinity of times, and so every variation 
on every theme, both those that “make sense” and those that are 
absurd, spins itself out, not once but an infinity of times (Dennett 
1996: 179). 
Dennett argues that this Epicurean universe of eternal occurrence is a 
world picture, which sits better with Darwin´s dangerous idea, than with 
any other world picture, let alone the Christian or for that matter any 
religious one. In reality, it is hard to see how the existence of God could 
explain anything. The ultimate metaphysical question – Why is there 
something rather than nothing? - may not even make an intelligible 
demand at all. And if it does, the answer “Because God exists” is 
probably as good an answer as any, but look at its competition: “Why 
not?” (Dennett 1996: 180 f.). 
Let me make three comments to Dennett´s Epicurean argument. 
The first concerns the scientific evidence he cites, the second is about the 
relationship between the Epicurean and the religious hypotheses and the 
third about Dennett´s arguments against the religious hypothesis. 
 
Dennett’s scientific evidence 
It is clear that Dennett proposes a scientific materialism – of sorts. I think 
it is justified to call it scientific, because Dennett claims that there might 
be scientific evidence for his variety of the Epicurean materialism. This 
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is so because “Consistency and simplicity are in its favour” (Dennett p. 
179). Furthermore, he cites Wheeler´s article from 1974, in which he 
argues for an eternally oscillating universe, a modern version of the 
Epicurean hypothesis. 
But this cosmology has in fact been cast into serious doubt by the 
physicist (and Nobel laureate 2011) Saul Perlemutter and his colleagues. 
In 1998 through studies of super novae they discovered that rather than 
slowing down, the expansion of the universe is accelerating. This could 
be described as evidence against the Epicurean hypothesis, that each 
possible setting of matter is tried an infinity of times. The universe has a 
beginning in time, but also an end. Referring to a poem by Robert Frost, 
the Press release from the Swedish Royal Academy of Sciences states: 
 
For almost a century, the Universe has been known to be 
expanding as a consequence of the big bang about 14 billion years 
ago. However, the discovery that this expansion is accelerating is 
astounding. If the expansion will continue to speed up the Universe 
will end in ice. 
Needless to say, this gloomy outlook challenges traditional Christian 
eschatology. But it is also at variance with the Epicurean hypothesis as 
well as with Wheeler´s and Dennett´s idea of eternal recurrence. 
 
The relationship between the Epicurean and the religious 
hypotheses 
What is the relationship between the Epicurean and the religious 
hypotheses? It would seem that the Epicurean hypothesis implies that the 
universe is eternal, which the religious hypothesis denies. But this is not 
necessarily so. Thomas Aquinas discussed the possibility that the world 
was eternal and argued that, if so, it was not at variance with the claim 
that God exists and created the world. The essential point in the belief 
that the universe is the creation of God is not that the universe had a 
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beginning or it had its origin in the big bang, but rather that it is - 
eternally, at every moment -  kept in existence by God (See St. Thomas, 
De Aeternitate Mundi in Clark 1972: 178 f.). In fact, Aquinas believed 
that the universe did have a beginning, but this belief was not based on 
reason. Aquinas believed that this was revealed by God in the Bible. But 
this interpretation has been challenged by biblical scholars, for example 
Gerhard von Rad (see von Rad 1972: 51.). 
 
Dennett’s arguments against the religious hypothesis 
Dennett has another argument against the religious hypothesis. He 
suggests that the religious hypothesis is unintelligible. It is possible that 
he means that the religious hypothesis is unintelligible as a scientific 
hypothesis, i.e. that it is not clear what actual or possible facts could 
count as evidence for or against belief in God or for the world as a divine 
creation. Here, I would argue, Dennett is correct. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that the religious hypothesis is a non-scientific hypothesis (see 
below p. 6-7). The difference between a scientific and a non-scientific 
hypothesis “does not lie in the kind of explanation provided by the 
hypotheses, rather it lies in the objects they explain”. Non-scientific 
hypotheses explain ambiguous objects, i.e. objects of which different 
people may have exhaustive knowledge, but might still “disagree as to 
the correct description of these objects” (Jeffner 1972: 22). Human nature 
and the empirical universe as a whole might be examples of such objects.  
  
Conclusion 
 
Theism affirms that “[t]he World consists of God and all that He has 
made”. God is infinite, eternal, and nonphysical. God's creations are 
finite; some are physical and others are nonphysical. (van Inwagen 1993: 
4.) These claims could be interpreted as a non-scientific hypothesis. If so, 
the critique of Dennett and other neoatheists that the religious hypothesis 
is unintelligible is unwarranted. Needless to say, non-scientific religious 
hypotheses present us with several other philosophical problems. But it is 
not evident that they contradict science - even if they go beyond science.  
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Music saved my life and Music saves me still. I am Jewish, but 
Beethoven is my religion. I have had such a beautiful life. And life is 
Beautiful, love is beautiful, nature and music are beautiful. 
Everything we experience is a gift, a present we should cherish and 
pass on to those we love. Only when we are so old, only then we 
are aware of the beauty of live. Music is God. In difficult times you 
fell it, especially when you are suffering.  
 
Quotes by Alice Herz-Sommer (Nov. 26, 1903 - ).  
The oldest survivor of the holocaust.  
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Astrotheology 
Ted Peters 
Introduction 
 
The time is ripe for launching a new field of inquiry and reflection, 
Astrotheology. A picture of the cosmos explodes before the eyes of a 
reader of a recent Newsweek magazine cover story, “New Secrets of the 
Universe” (Greene 2012). Astrobiologists are sending probes to Mars as 
well as the moons of Saturn and Jupiter, hoping to find signs of microbial 
life. With the help of the Kepler telescope, discoveries of exo-planets in 
the Goldilocks zone—not too hot and not too cold—occur monthly. SETI 
Institute scientists listen twenty-four hours per day for radio signals 
emitted from extra-solar civilizations. Members of the Mars Society have 
all but packed their bags for the one way trip to their new colony on the 
red planet. The cultural tree is ripe with the new fruits of astro-
enthusiasm. 
Since 1965 scholars in the emerging field of Science & Religion—
sometimes called Theology & Science—have swapped lab coats and 
clerical collars to draw out the implications of new discoveries in 
quantum physics, physical cosmology, evolutionary biology, human 
genetics, neuroscience, and public policy. Perhaps the time is ripe to 
draw out the implications of astrobiology and related enterprises having 
to do with space exploration. One item on this list should be given 
special consideration, namely, the possibility of future contact with an 
extraterrestrial civilization of intelligent beings. Sometimes the religious 
scholar is called to respond to cultural currents. A response theology is 
being called for at this moment. 
The call for a theological response is intensified when we 
recognize that a gauntlet has been thrown down. Religious people, 
especially Christians, are being challenged, virtually threatened. The 
Christian faith is so fragile, say critics, that contact with new neighbors in 
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space will precipitate a crisis, perhaps even a theological collapse. Like a 
sledge hammer, ETI contact will smash the rock of ages into pebbles. 
Physicist turned astrobiologist Paul Davies provides the logic of 
the challenge. “We can expect that if we receive a message it will be 
from beings who are very advanced indeed in all respects, ranging from 
technology and social development to an understanding of nature and 
philosophy” (Davies 1995, 49). He goes on to warn us of our new 
inferiority. “The difficulty this presents to the Christian religion is that if 
God works through the historical process, and if mankind is not unique to 
his attentions, then God’s progress and purposes will be far more 
advanced on some other planets than they are on Earth....It is a sobering 
fact that we would be at a stage of ‘spiritual’ development very inferior 
to that of almost all our intelligent alien neighbors” (Davies 1995, 50). 
The astrotheologian needs to ask honestly: is this really true? Let me 
offer a definition that introduces the task ahead.  
 
Astrotheology is that branch of theology which provides a critical 
analysis of the contemporary space sciences combined with an 
explication of classic doctrines such as creation and Christology for 
the purpose of constructing a comprehensive and meaningful 
understanding of our human situation within an astonishingly 
immense cosmos.  
As you can see, astrotheology should not try to become an independent 
field, in my judgment. Rather, it should see itself as one spoke supporting 
a larger theological wheel.   
As already suggested above, a creative-mutual-interaction (CMI) 
has developed between theologians and selected fields within science: 
physics, cosmology, evolutionary biology, genetics, and neuroscience 
(Russell 2008: 20-24). What interests the astrotheologian are the 
discoveries and  discussions taking place among astronomers, 
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cosmologists, exo-biologists, astro-biologists, astro-ethicists, and those 
scientists searching for extraterrestrial intelligence (ETI). As a response 
theology, astrotheology is at minimum a theology of space science. 
Could astrotheology be more than merely a response? On the one 
hand, it is important for the theologian to respond to culture, especially to 
the role played in culture by natural science. On the other hand, there are 
internal drivers for theological speculation and application. What might 
drive today’s theologian to take up the task of astrotheology? 
I am convinced that within the human soul there lies an openness 
to the beyond, a primitive awareness of the transcendent, a readiness to 
receive a call. God put it there. It belongs to our nature. This openness 
toward what is beyond is a gift of God’s creative grace. And this 
readiness to listen to God’s call does not go away, even if we live lives 
deaf to God’s Word. “Whatever one does, one remains interiorly ordered 
to absolute communion with God,” writes the late Stephen J. Duffy, a 
Roman Catholic theologian at Loyola University in New Orleans. “To 
some degree this existential determination seeps into consciousness. It is 
an attraction and all attractions are necessarily consciously experienced 
in some measure. In this case it is perhaps confusedly experienced as an 
appreciation of the goods of the Kingdom. More often this attraction will 
be lived rather than reflected upon” (Duffy 1992, 23). Perhaps by taking 
up the question of the cosmic beyond, the astrotheologian might aid 
human consciousness in trying to understand itself, to listen for the 
divine call to go beyond even the cosmic beyond. 
In what follows we will first review briefly the twin foci of 
astrobiology and related space sciences, namely, the search for microbial 
life within our solar system and the search for intelligent life elsewhere in 
the Milky Way. Then we will turn to pre-Copernican and post-
Copernican versions of astrotheology, noting how openly the question of 
sharing our cosmos with space neighbors has been posed. This will lead 
to the astrotheologian’s immediate agenda, to four questions that need 
theological attention. These four will deal respectively with the (1) scope 
of creation? (2) one incarnation or many? (3) making a theological 
critique of astrobiology? and (4) preparing for contact?  
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Astrobiology and the Search for E.I. 
 
Notre Dame University astrotheologian Thomas O’Meara sets the 
agenda. “Faith follows science’s suggestions that on other planets 
something awaits us terrestrials: star-colleagues, star-mentors, and star-
friends” (O’Meara 2012, 61). Just what is the science to which 
astrotheology responds? Among the space sciences, astrobiology stands 
up and says: look at me! 
Astrobiology is “the study of the origin, nature, and evolution of 
life on Earth and beyond,” writes University of Arizona astrobiologist 
Chris Impey (Impey 2004, 4). Lucas John Mix adds, “Astrobiology is the 
scientific study of life in space. It happens when you put together what 
astronomy, physics, planetary science, geology, chemistry, biology, and a 
host of other disciplines have to say about life and try to make a single 
narrative” (Mix 2009, 4). The science of astrobiology works with two 
foci: the search for microbial life within our solar system and the search 
for intelligent life on exoplanets within the Milky Way. Although a 
second genesis of primitive life forms on Mars or Titan would be 
scientifically exciting, of greater import to the theologian would be 
contact with an intelligent species elsewhere in or even beyond our 
galaxy.  
The NASA Astrobiological Roadmap raises three orienting 
research questions: (1) How does life begin and evolve? (2) Does life 
exist elsewhere in the universe? (3) What is the future of life on Earth 
and beyond? (NASA). Has there been a second Genesis? By second 
Genesis we mean “the emergence of life beyond the Earth” (Chela-Flores 
2009, 2). “Astrobiology aims at the larger questions of modern science,” 
he writes; “while being squarely set on scientific and technological tools. 
Science is searching a second Genesis” (Chela-Flores 2009, 109). Or, are 
we alone? 
Steven Dick and James Strick observe that “these are fundamental 
questions that humanity has asked in increasingly subtle and refined 
forms over millennia” (Dick and Strick 2005: 10). Do these questions 
challenge a geocentric worldview? Yes. “As Darwinism placed humanity 
in its terrestrial context, so exobiology will place humanity in a cosmic 
context. That context—a universe full of microbial life, full of intelligent 
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life, or devoid of life except for us—may to a large extent determine both 
humanity’s present worldview and its future” (Dick and Strick 2005: 9). 
As the astrobiologist looks beyond Earth, the first thing he or she 
looks for is microbial life within our solar system. One question nags the 
astrobiologist: if there has been a second genesis of life on another 
heavenly body such as Mars or Titan, what if it is so different from life 
on Earth that we might find it hard to recognize? What if extraterrestrial 
microbial sized life does not rely on DNA or contain protein? One clue 
that it is life and not non-life could be found in its effects. Life on Earth 
has altered our planet’s chemistry. Could we look at an environment that 
looks like it has been influenced by life and then work backwards? Could 
we start with a biosignature and work backward to the pen that wrote it? 
Amino acids might provide researchers with an indicator. In a 
strictly abiotic or lifeless environment, amino acids are typically six 
carbon atoms or less long. In biota, we expect acids up to thirty carbon 
atoms long, with a preference for even-numbered chains. By measuring 
amino acid structure, we may be able to identify the presence of life 
forms that differ significantly from life as we have known it on Earth. 
Could we expect to see on other planets what we have seen on Earth? 
Yes, answers NASA’s Chris McKay. “The chemical signatures we see on 
Earth are not a quirk of Earth biology but a universal principle” (Mckay 
2011, 10). Working with the assumption that the same physics and 
chemistry we witness here on Earth would apply to every object in space, 
scientific sleuths are dropping probes and rovers and shovels along with 
on-site chemical labs onto the surface of every suspected home for life.  
When it comes to searching for intelligent life or ETI, searchers 
look first for a habitat and then try to find out who lives there. Extrasolar 
planets are thought to provide just such a habitat. Scientists are just at the 
stage of identifying the extrasolar addresses. 
Two methods for detecting extrasolar planets are currently 
employed by researchers. First, radial-velocity surveys analyze the 
motion of a star induced by its orbiting partner—that is, by measuring a 
star’s wobble astrophysicists can speculate that it might be caused by the 
gravitational pull of an orbiting planet.  Second, star watchers can engage 
in visual searches for planets that transit in front of their primary star. 
When locating a black dot (the shadow side of an orbiting planet?) in 
front of a brightly lit star, telescope viewers can make a series of photos 
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over a period of time to see if it moves in a regular pattern. If so, the 
black dot might be considered a transit—that is, a planet in orbit. Direct 
imaging is difficult, as one might imagine, because each star is bright 
whereas each planet only reflects the star’s light. High contrast 
techniques are being developed. At the present time, these two methods 
can detect only large planets, the size of Jupiter. If the technology 
improves, we may in the future find ourselves able to detect earth sized 
and biophilic objects as well. 
Some astronomers believe they are actually seeing them. Here is 
one example. Formalhaut is a bright star about 25 light years distant 
surrounded by a dust belt. Looking with the aid of the Hubble Space 
Telescope, photographic observations in 2004 and 2006 have led 
researchers to believe they have found evidence of a number of orbiting 
objects. Optical observations of one, Fomalhaut b, suggest it is a planet 
with three times the mass as our Jupiter (Kalas et. al. 2009). And, here is 
another example. HR 8799 is a star in the Pegasus constellation around 
which astrophysicists believe they have seen three planets in a counter 
clockwise orbital motion. The direct imaging technique employed can 
detect Jupiter sized objects, which these three must be (Marois et.al. 
2008). 
What about an Earth-sized planet in the habital zone? In 2009 
David Charbonneau at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics 
and his co-investigators reported their discovery of a near earthlike 
exoplanet, GJ 1214b. This “transiting planet” has “a radius 2.68 times 
Earth’s radius, indicating that it is intermediate in stature between Earth 
and the ice giants of the Solar System” (Charbonneau 2009, 891). 
Scientists believe this planet contains a huge amount of water 
surrounding an inner core of iron and nickel with an outer mantle of 
silicate rock. Its atmosphere is likely made up of hydrogen and helium. 
This is not yet a duplicate Earth, but it is getting closer. 
With the logging of each new exoplanet, astrobiologists give us the 
sense that we are getting closer and closer to learning the answer to the 
nagging question: are we alone in the universe? As of this writing, no 
empirical evidence confirms that we share our universe with second 
genesis neighbors. Curiously, despite the advances in astronomy and 
astrophysics, our pre-Copernican ancestors found themselves in almost 
the same position. They looked at the starry heavens and wondered. 
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The vault of the night heaven elicits within us this sense of 
wonder. “Cosmology is a voyage of the human spirit,” says Harvard 
astronomer Owen Gingerich (Gingerich 2009, 29). Julian Chela-Fores, a 
Venezuelan astrobiologist, remarks, “The depth of the questions in 
astrobiology should be the source of a fruitful dialogue with other sectors 
of the humanities, including theology” Chela-Flores 2009, 2). Might we 
suggest that an incipient spirituality lurks already within the astro-
imagination? Might the science itself give birth to an astro-spirituality? 
David Toolan thinks so. “What, I ask myself, is the effect of post-
Einsteinian cosmology on my spiritual practice--and by that I mean both 
the inward work of prayer and contemplation as well as the outward 
work of social action? Does the expanding, replenishing universe of the 
big bang, black holes, and "dark matter" make a real difference to the 
way in which we believers pray and work?... A post-Einsteinian universe 
is unimaginably vast and ancient, is blessed with steadfast stability; still 
more remarkably it is also graced with process, self-organization, 
interconnection, communication, fluctuation, and openness. This is a 
universe whose fullness, diversity, promise, and risk simply dazzle. 
Given all that, it has to make a difference to our conception of God, our 
prayer life, our work and action” (Toolan 1997). 
Paul Davies challenged the Christian faith coming from one 
direction: duck because ETI is going to crash into you! Now, David 
Toolan challenges the faith from the opposite direction: astro-
consciousness will enrich your spirituality! Lucas Mix adds, “As a 
Christian, I think of astrobiology as a way to better understand how God 
created the world” (Mix 2009, 6). Did our theological ancestors 
experience astro-awareness and respond? Yes, indeed. We today are heirs 
to a tradition in astrotheology. 
 
Astrotheology’s Seeds and Sprouts 
 
Fortunately, we have two hard working historians who have traced the 
Western history of concerns regarding extraterrestrial friends and 
enemies: Michael J. Crowe at Notre Dame and Stephen J. Dick at the 
National Air and Space Museum. These two make it clear that the 
UNDERSTANDING DARWIN AND DARWINIAN UNDERSTANDING 
 
 
198 
questions raised by today’s astrotheologian are not new. They go back as 
far as ancient Athens. The seeds of astrotheology were already sprouting 
in the days of the Parthenon and the peripatetic philosophers. 
A controversy broke out between the atomists and the 
Aristotelians. Atomists such as Leucippus (d. 480 BCE) and Democritus 
(d. 361 BCE) along with Epicurus (c. ca. 270 BCE) and Lucretius (d. 55 
BCE) held that our cosmos is infinitely large with an infinite number of 
patterns. They posited a plurality of worlds (aperoi kosmoi). Somewhere 
out there in space there might be another world complete with 
intelligence. Aristotle (d. 322 BCE) and his disciples, in contrast, argued 
for one world and one world only, ours (Crowe and Dowd 2012). The 
finite and visible world is all there is, and the Earth is the center. The 
Christians sided with Aristotle, at least for the most part. From Aristotle 
medieval Europe inherited the centering principle, what pundits later 
called geocentrism.   
 Geocentrism and the question of many worlds did not sit on top of 
the Christian theologian’s priority list in the pre-Copernican era. 
However, without much debate, Aristotelian Earth-centrism seemed to 
make sense in the emerging Christian worldview. The Angelic Doctor, 
St. Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274), weighed the issue of many worlds 
carefully. He temporarily entertained an argument in favor of pluralism: 
“it is better that there be many worlds than there be one because many 
good things are better than a few” (Summa Theologiae.I:Q47; A3). 
Thomas, to the contrary, determined that one world is the superior 
option. “It is necessary that all things should belong to one world,” he 
said. Why? Because of what Plato and Aristotle had previously said. 
According to Plato’s Timaeus 31, the oneness of God makes it 
appropriate for God to create but one world. And, according to Aristotle 
(“On the Heavens” I: 8: 276-277; “Metaphysics” XII: 8:33), perfection is 
associated with oneness (all things in the world tend to center around a 
single center) and this implies that one world would better testify to 
God’s perfection.  
 To the authority of the Greeks Thomas added a scientific argument 
based on the law of gravity. “For it is not possible for there to be another 
earth than this one, because every earth, wherever it might be, would be 
born by nature to this middle point. And the same reason applies to the 
other bodies which are parts of the universe” (Summa Theologiae 
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I.Q47.A3; O’Meara, 2012, 69-70). All heavy items—including other 
planets—would be drawn toward the single center of gravity, so to speak. 
This means we have one and only one world. 
Let us notice two things here. First, Thomas does not appeal to 
Scripture to trump reason. Second, Thomas registers no shock or 
revulsion at the question. Rather, he even-handedly debates the matter 
before drawing a negative conclusion. 
 Thomas Aquinas took one side of the debate, the geocentric side. 
John Buridan (1295-1358) took the opposite side, the many worlds side. 
He subjected Aristotle to critical examination, just as Thomas had; but he 
drew the opposite conclusion. Aristotle, arguing from nature, had 
prohibited the creation of multiple worlds, because nature obeys the 
centering principle. But, rather than appeal to nature, could we by faith 
assert that God could create other worlds of a different type or different 
species? Yes, says Buridan. “We hold from faith that just as God made 
this world, so he could make another or several worlds” (Dick 1982: 29).  
Buridan was by no means alone with this idea. Nominalist William 
of Ockham (1280-1347) similarly affirmed that God could create other 
worlds, even worlds better than the one in which we live (Dick 1982: 33).  
In his De docta ignorantia of 1440, pre-Copernican Nicholas of Cusa 
affirmed belief in ETI and—apparently overcoming his 
anthropocentrism--speculated that perhaps extraterrestrials are of higher 
nobility than we earthlings, that “the earth is perhaps inhabited by lesser 
beings” (Lovejoy 1936: 115). The pre-Copernican tendency to support 
geocentrism was based upon loyalty to Aristotle; and this could be offset 
by appeal to the principle of plenitude, according to which God’s 
gracious love would naturally lead to the creation of as many creatures as 
possible to benefit from this love. All of this was speculation, of course. 
The theologians knew this. In certain ways the question of many worlds 
provides a screen on which we can project the implications of prior 
theological commitments. 
Did the Copernican revolution shock the medievals into what we 
today deem the heliocentric truth about the universe? No. At least not 
immediately. The revolution began, of course, with Copernicus’ book on 
revolution, De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium (On the Revolutions of 
the Celestial Orbs). It was published in Nuremburg by the German 
Lutherans in 1543. Copernican cosmology advanced among the Germans 
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with the work of Johannes Kepler (1571-1630); and it leaped forward in 
Italy with that of Galileo Galilei (1564-1642).  
But the father of Danish astronomy, Tycho Brahe (1546-1601), 
slowed the spin of the Copernican revolution. Although he granted that 
the other planets might circle the sun, the sun still circled the Earth. The 
problem with Copernican heliocentrism, he thought, was that it implied 
that the fixed stars would be very distant. This distance meant they would 
be disconnected with Earth’s system and, hence, useless. At least useless 
to Earthlings. They would be useful if peopled with their own 
inhabitants, of course. But Tycho denied that such creatures could “be 
conferred upon those bodies,” and added that “nothing is idle, nothing in 
vain”—the principle of plenitude. This led him to the conclusion: the 
Copernican model must be false (Dick 1982, 74). In contrast to Kepler, 
with whom he worked in Prague, Tycho could not affirm either complete 
heliocentrism or the existence of extraterrestrial life. 
Copernicus, Brahe, and Kepler used their naked eyes to study the 
stars. Galileo began the new era of telescope viewing. In a letter to 
Galileo, Kepler wrote, “I must point out that there are inhabitants not 
only on the moon but on Jupiter too” (Dick 1982: 59). Copernicus’ 
universe was teeming with life, thought Kepler. 
We should observe that neither the ancient Athenians nor the 
medieval scholastics nor the Copernicans used the term astrotheology. 
This label had to wait for post-Copernican times and the work of an 
Anglican clergyman, William Derham (1657-1735). His book, Astro-
Theology, or a Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God from a 
Survey of the Heavens, was published in 1714. Our use today of this term 
now has a three century history. 
Derham speculated. He contended that each star is itself a sun like 
ours with a family of orbiting planets, also like ours.  These planets 
orbiting fixed stars, he declared “to be habitable worlds; 
places...accommodated for habitation, so stocked with proper 
inhabitants” (Crowe 2008: 125). Derham could not prove this. So, he 
asked for either a direct divine revelation or better scientific instruments 
to confirm or disconfirm his speculation. The task of astrotheology in 
Derham’s era was to glorify God by stressing the immensity and 
magnificence of God’s creation. When we turn to the 21st century, 
astrotheology’s task has become a bit more modest by asking: just how 
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should theologians assess and interpret the findings of astrophysics and 
astrobiology; and how might theological reflection be affected by these 
findings? 
 
Astrotheology’s Buds and Blooms 
 
Like any other branch of Christian theology, astrotheology must take into 
account the four primary sources: scripture, history, reason, and 
experience. Incorporating advancing scientific knowledge into 
theological knowledge makes proper use of reason and experience; and 
examining the history of precedents in philosophy and theology opens 
the astrotheologian to incorporating history. But what about scripture? 
What does the Bible say about extraterrestrial aliens? Nothing. 
“At no point in Christian Scriptures do we learn that there is 
another race of knowing corporeal beings in the universe—or that there is 
not” writes O’Meara (O’Meara 2012, 43). Pre-Vatican II Roman Catholic 
giant Yves Congar weighed in, suggesting the absence of biblical 
material provides an opening for addressing the matter of extraterrestrial 
beings. “Revelation being silent on the matter, Christian doctrine leaves 
us quite free to think that there are, or are not, other inhabited worlds” 
(Congar 1961, 185). No contemporary theologian would require that the 
Bible address directly each and every new understanding gained by the 
modern world. Our theological task is to interpret scripture, to 
extrapolate and apply what we interpret. Such interpretation requires a 
certain level of imagination, speculation, and anticipation. The product of 
interpretation is not apodictic dogma but rather hypothetical or tentative 
probabilities. This by no means weakens speculative theology, but it does 
provide us with a meaningful framework within which to live our lives in 
faith. 
When we turn to theological anthropology, we need to speculate 
about alien nature. Will extraterrestrials be like us or different? Will we 
share the same nature, the same status before God? Karl Rahner 
emphasized two attributes belonging to human nature: intelligence and 
freedom. Intelligence and freedom open us to transcendence, open us to a 
relationship with God. Might this apply to our new neighbors in space? 
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Rahner addressed the matter. Beings living among the stars who are 
intelligent and free are “not distinguished in an important way by where 
they are located in the cosmos... [but rather by] “their intellectual 
subjectivity determining the reality of space and time” (Rahner 1964, 
1061-1062). 
Biblical anthropology includes the concept of the imago Dei. We 
human beings are created in God’s image. Adam and Eve are given the 
imago Dei in Genesis; and the risen Jesus Christ becomes the 
eschatological image of God (eikon tou Theou) in the New Testament, 
drawing us into the divine reality itself. Will either the inborn imago Dei 
or the sanctified imago Dei apply to extraterrestrials? Yes, says Thomas 
O’Meara. “Jesus’ teaching and life bring an eschatology for  Earth and 
not an astronomy for the Milky Way;...however...the union of the Logos 
and a terrestrial human would be a strong affirmation of the dignity of 
corporeal, intelligent life wherever it is found” (O’Meara 2012, 50). 
In Western theology and Western culture more generally human 
dignity is not only an ontological category; it is also a moral category. 
Dignity implies inviolability. We treat a person with dignity as a moral 
end, never merely as a means to some further end. Dignity is our 
birthright. According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
General Assembly of UN, 1948: “All human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and 
conscience and should act toward one another but in a spirit of 
brotherhood.”  
One theological problem with this concept of dignity, in my 
judgment, is that the presence of dignity is contingent on possession of 
certain attributes. If one has intelligence and the capacity for moral 
freedom, then there exists a warrant for being treated with dignity. An 
intelligent creature earns the right, so to speak, to be treated as a moral 
end. 
Yet, biblically speaking, the imago Dei and its accompanying 
dignity is a gift of God; it is not a human attribute that warrants God 
treating us as an end rather than a means. Dignity derives from God’s 
grace, I believe. Brent Waters emphasizes the role of grace here. “Human 
dignity is not an inherent quality, but is derived from the gift of grace 
given by God in Christ” (Waters 2006, 190). Like other gifts of God’s 
grace, the imago Dei comes to us from beyond us; it is not ours to claim 
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as a byproduct of our capacity to reason. Despite this caveat, I forecast 
that most astrotheologians will rely upon the previous view, namely, the 
absence or presence of intellectual reason will provide the criterion for 
attributing dignity to our friends and neighbors in space. 
Be that as it may, Boston University’s John Hart draws out the 
implications of alien dignity based upon intelligence for an ethic of the 
commons. Space will become a common moral arena for earthlings and 
spacelings. “The cosmic commons is the spatial and local context of 
interactions among corporeal members of integral being who are striving 
to meet their material, spiritual, social, and aesthetic needs, and to satisfy 
their wants....The cosmic commons includes the aggregate of goods 
which, beyond their intrinsic value, have instrumental value in universe 
dynamics or as providers for the well-being of biotic existence. In the 
cosmic commons, goods that will eventually be accessible on the moon, 
asteroids, meteors, or other planets should prove useful to humankind, to 
other intellilife, and to biokind collectively” (Hart 2010, 377). 
Note how for Hart moral responsibility is contingent upon 
intelligence. “In the cosmic commons...intelligent life has particular 
responsibilities, including respect for forms of life less complex than it is, 
and regard for common habitat” (Hart 2010, 377). Even so, the 
speculative vision of an interstellar community of intelligent beings can 
be inspiring to the new breed of astrotheologians. O’Meara exhibits this 
enthusiasm. “Interactivity and community are patterns in reality reaching 
from the Trinity to the families of stars. Possibly there lies ahead in 
Earth’s future not only the knowledge of individual planets with their 
societies but also an awareness of galactic communality” (O’Meara 2012, 
38-39). 
 
The Scope of God’s Creation 
 
Imagining a galactic community or a cosmic commons brings me to the 
first of four agenda items I would like to pose to today’s astrotheologian. 
First, Christian theologians along with intellectual leaders in each 
religious tradition need to reflect on the scope of creation and settle the 
pesky issue of geocentrism (Peters 2010, 2013). Critics within and 
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without Christian theology allege that this faith is geocentric and 
anthropocentric. This makes the Christian faith anachronistic and out-of-
date due to increased awareness of the vastness of our universe and the 
possibility that we share it with other sentient creatures. 
We can see from the discussion above that pre-Copernican 
geocentrism was something shared between European Christians and all 
those who inherited the ancient Athenian worldview. The Aristotelian 
centering principle dominated. Even so, some pre-Copernican 
theologians had gone against the stream and argued for other worlds and 
for neighbors in space, all of whom would be creatures of the one God of 
the cosmos. As geocentrism fell in science it fell also in theology; but 
theological interest in extraterrestrial neighbors continued without 
significant change from pre-Copernican to post-Copernican times. 
The anthropocentrism of our medieval ancestors was similarly 
founded on ancient Athenian values, especially the value attributed to 
intellectual capacity, intelligence, and reason. This human attribute 
continues to dominate contemporary anthropology in both theological 
and secular worldviews. The Enlightenment doctrine of human dignity 
depends upon the high value we place on this attribute. I recommend that 
the Christian theologian provide a critical examination of the 
assumptions at work here; but we can at least cease blaming an atavistic 
Christian faith alone for holding to such an anthropocentrism. 
With geocentrism and anthropocentrism in mind, the 
astrotheologian can evaluate the critique lodged by Paul Davies cited 
above. Is the Christian faith fragile? Will it collapse at contact? There is 
no evidence to support Davies here. To the contrary, just the opposite 
seems to be the case. Michael Crowe makes this clear. “It is sometimes 
suggested that the discovery of extraterrestrial life would cause great 
consternation in religious denominations. The reality is that some 
denominations would view such a discovery not as a disruption of their 
beliefs, but rather as a confirmation” (Crowe 2008: 328-329; Peters 
2009). Among the tasks for the astrotheologian, then, is the need to 
clarify if not correct the regnant opinion on the matter of geocentrism. 
This correction can take the form of enlarging the scope of the concept of 
creation. Our world is the universe; the upper limit or totality of all 
physical things including the solar system, the Milky Way, the systems of 
galaxies. 
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There is nothing that lies beyond the scope of God’s creation 
according to the People of the Book: Jews, Christians, and Muslims. God 
is the creator of all things, visible and invisible, known and unknown. 
When biblical Christians speak of creation, it includes all of physical 
reality. The immensity of God surpasses the immensity of the universe. 
After all, since Anselm we have thought of God as that than which 
nothing greater can be conceived. Therefore, says Georgetown 
University’s John Haught, “All possible worlds have a common origin 
and depth in the oneness of God” (Haught 2003, 179). 
 Expanding the scope of creation from planet Earth to include the 
entire cosmos, including space neighbors, has already been addressed by 
many of our most respected theologians. Karl Rahner acknowledged that 
there are “many histories of freedom which do not only take place on our 
earth” (Rahner 1978: 446). Hans Kűng holds that “we must allow for 
living beings, intelligent—although quite different—living beings, also 
on other stars of the immense universe” (Kűng 1984: 224). Paul Tillich 
asked: how should we “understand the meaning of the symbol ‘Christ’ in 
the light of the immensity of the universe, the heliocentric system of 
planets, the infinitely small part of the universe which man and his 
history constitute, and the possibility of other worlds in which divine 
self-manifestations may appear and be received?” (Tillich 1951-1963, 
2:95).  Geneticist and Evangelical spokesperson, Francis Collins, 
explodes: “If God exists...why would it be beyond His abilities to interact 
with similar creatures on a few other planets or, for that matter, a few 
million other planets” (Collins 2006, 71). 
The ETI question is by no means the only one to ask when 
expanding the scope of the concept of God’s creation. The issue has to do 
with the three hundred billion stars within the Milky Way and the fifty 
billion galaxies beyond the Milky Way. It has to do with a 13.7 billion 
year history and perhaps a 100 billion year future. It has to do with both 
the personal and non-personal history of our cosmos in light of God’s 
providence and promise. Robert John Russell argues strenuously for 
God’s providential action at the sub-atomic quantum level and—even 
though atoms are small they are everywhere!—divine action applies to 
Andromeda as it does here. “When we shift to an indeterministic world, a 
new possibility opens up: One can now speak of objective acts of God 
that do not require God’s miraculous intervention but offer, instead, an 
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account of objective divine action that is completely consistent with 
science” (Russell 2008: 128). An astrotheologian is a cosmic theologian. 
Still, breadth is no substitute for depth. God may be beyond, but 
God is also intimate. Astrotheologian David Wilkinson broadens the 
scope of the concept of creation to include extraterrestrials; but he 
reminds us that the deeper dimensions of the human soul remain the 
focus of God’s redemptive work. “We are not alone. The God who made 
the Universe wants to be in relationship with us. There is a purpose to our 
existence. We are created as an act of extravagant love by 
God....Extraterrestrial life may exist and even intelligent life...But such 
life will never deliver answers to loneliness, purpose, identity, fear and 
salvation” (Wilkinson 1997, 146). 
 
Planet-Hopping Incarnations? 
 
The second of the four initial questions on the astrotheologian’s agenda is 
the Christological question. Will the divine become incarnate on many 
planets for many species of aliens? Or, is one incarnation—Earth’s 
incarnation in Jesus Christ—enough? Here is the directive: the 
astrotheologian should set the parameters within which the ongoing 
debates over Christology (Person of Christ) and soteriology (Work of 
Christ) are carried on. It should be dubbed a mistake to connect the 
incarnation with geocentrism. The question of multiple incarnations is a 
reasonable one, but not if the negative answer justifies geocentrism. 
O’Meara sizes up the issue. “As incarnation is an intense form of 
divine love, would there not be galactic forms of that love? An infinite 
being of generosity would tend to many incarnations rather than to 
one....A succession of incarnations would give new relationships and new 
self-realizations of God....Incarnations among extraterrestrials would not 
be competing with us or with each other” (O’Meara 2012, 47). 
 Jesuit evolutionary theorist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin would likely 
side with O’Meara. He affirmed multiple incarnations while decrying 
geocentrism. “The hypothesis of a special revelation...teaching the 
inhabitants of the system of Andromeda that the Word was incarnate on 
Earth, is just ridiculous. All that I can entertain is the possibility of a 
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multi-aspect Redemption which would be realized on all the stars” 
(Teilhard 1971, 44). Similarly, Tillich argued that we should expect 
divine self-manifestations among intelligent species on other planets. He 
granted the necessity for speculation here. “Incarnation is unique for the 
special group in which it happens, but it is not unique in the sense that 
other singular incarnations for other unique worlds are excluded...Man 
cannot claim to occupy the only possible place for incarnation” (Tillich 
1951-1963, 2:95-96). 
 Rejecting multiple incarnations in favor of only the one on Earth, 
Wolfhart Pannenberg acknowledges that the “discovery of nonterrestrial 
intelligent beings” is a matter of theological concern. Then the Munich 
theologian argues that “the Logos who works throughout the universe 
became a man and thus gave to humanity and its history a key function in 
giving to all creation its unity and destiny” (Pannenberg 1991-1998, 
2:76). The history of salvation on Earth will eventually converge with the 
history of the entire universe, and the redemptive work of Earth’s Christ 
will be efficacious for the entire cosmos. 
 O’Meara takes a puzzling stand on this issue. On the one hand, he 
seems to affirm multiple manifestations of a revelatory or disclosure sort. 
On the other hand, he denies that these would constitute additional 
incarnations of Jesus Christ. “Incarnation in a human being speaks to our 
race. While the possibility of extraterrestrials in the galaxies leads to 
possible incarnations and alternate salvation histories, incarnations would 
correspond to the forms of intelligent creature with their own religious 
quests. Jesus of Nazareth, however, is a human being and does not move 
to other planets....If the risen Jesus Christ visited another planet, it would 
be a celestial disclosure, but it would not be a further incarnation....The 
possibility of incarnation for extraterrestrials does not diminish the reality 
of Jesus Christ” (O’Meara 2012, 48-49). What O’Meara seems to be 
saying is this: God’s eternal logos might manifest itself multiple times on 
many planets, but the historical Jesus Christ (the human hypostasis) 
would not be duplicated. Perhaps this is what each theologian means 
when he or she supports the idea of multiple incarnations. 
 The astrotheologian should be cautious here. An argument for a 
single incarnation ought not to double as an argument in favor of 
geocentrism. Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560) provides a misleading 
example. Despite the fact that the Lutherans at Wittenberg and 
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Nuremberg had been responsible for the publication of Copernicus’ De 
Revolutionibus, Reformer Melanchthon argued against the plurality of 
worlds on Christological grounds. “The Son of God is One; our master 
Jesus Christ was born, died, and resurrected in this world. Nor does He 
manifest Himself elsewhere, nor elsewhere has He died or resurrected. 
Therefore it must not be imagined that there are many worlds, because it 
must not be imagined that Christ died and was resurrected more often, 
nor must it be thought that in any other world without the knowledge of 
the Son of God that men would be restored to eternal life” (Dick 1982: 
89). Despite what the first Protestant systematic theologian says here, the 
existence or non-existence of other inhabited worlds with intelligent 
creatures is not a Christological question. It is a scientific question. Or, 
within theology, it is a question about the scope of creation.  
The question of multiple incarnations depends in part on whether 
one thinks of soteriology in terms of revelation or in terms of atonement. 
If the work of Christ is primarily that of a teacher who reveals the truth 
about God, then one would tend to embrace multiple incarnations, one 
for each intelligent species whom God wishes to invite into the divine 
fellowship. If, on the other hand, one thinks of the work of Christ in 
terms of atonement—as a work of redemption accomplished on behalf of 
the entire fallen creation—then a single incarnation would suffice.  
Let us compare John Polkinghorne with George Coyne. 
Polkinghorne seems to embrace the first option, Christ as revelatory. 
Therefore, he needs to affirm species-specific appearances on various 
planets. “God’s creative purposes may well include ‘little green men’ as 
well as humans, and if they need redemption we may well think that the 
Word would take little green flesh just as we believe the Word took our 
flesh” (Polkinghorne 2004: 176). In contrast, former Vatican Observatory 
director George Coyne opts for the second, for a single work of 
atonement efficacious for all. “How could he be God and leave 
extraterrestrials in their sin? After all he was good to us. Why should he 
not be good to them? God chose a very specific way to redeem human 
beings. He sent his only Son, Jesus...and Jesus gave up his life so that 
human beings would be saved from their sin. Did God do this for 
extraterrestrials?...There is deeply embedded in Christian theology…the 
notion of the universality of God’s redemption and even the notion that 
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all creation, even the inanimate, participates in some way in his 
redemption” (Coyne 2000: 187).  
Whether an astrotheologian sides with multiple incarnations or a 
single one, the key is that God’s redemption is cosmic in scope. Citing 
the patristic tradition, Keith Ward rightly foresees God’s eschatological 
future as “the uniting of all things—all galaxies and whatever beings 
there are in them—in Christ, the creative Word of God” (Ward 2002: 
244). 
 
Should Theology Critique Science? 
 
The third item on the astrotheologian’s To Do list includes analyzing 
what we receive from the work of our scientists. Should we accept what 
natural scientists say about our world without criticism? Or, should the 
theologian provide an analysis of scientific claims that may reveal hidden 
matters relevant for theological assessment? With the latter in mind, here 
is the third agenda item: theologians should analyze and critique 
astrobiology and related space sciences from within, exposing extra-
scientific assumptions and interpreting the larger value of the scientific 
enterprise. Although scientists should be respected and honored for what 
they know and for what they promise, scientific claims should not be 
given a free pass. Scientific claims should be subjected to critical review 
by religious thinkers.  
The theological critique of science targets two domains: first, 
mistaken images held within the scientific community of theological 
matters and, second, assumptions and trajectories that frame the scientific 
picture itself. Regarding the first, Heidelberg theologian Michael Welker 
speaks forcefully: “Theology can and must challenge the natural sciences 
to correct their false perceptions of theological themes and contents” 
(Welker 2012: 14). Correcting mistaken views of what religious believers 
actually believe—mistaken by both scientists and theologians in some 
cases--warrants the theologian’s attention. The distortions proffered by 
scientist Paul Davies, referred to above, should receive just this kind of 
critical review so as to get clear on just what is at stake theologically. 
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In addition, the theologian may on occasion need to enter the 
internal domain of science with analytical and critical tools. Quite 
frequently extra-scientific or even ideological commitments slip into 
scientific frameworks at the level of assumption. Materialism and 
ontological reductionism, among other ...isms, are common. Even 
atheism in many cases. In the field of astrobiology and its sister, SETI, an 
over-interpreted variant of Darwinian evolution frames and guides the 
research program. Despite the fact that leading evolutionary biologists 
decry the presence of a progressive entelechy or directional purpose in 
evolution, space researchers frequently work on the assumption that life’s 
genesis is almost inevitable where pre-biotic chemistry is present and, 
even more suspiciously, that once life gets going it will progress toward 
increased complexity, toward intelligence, and toward science and 
technology as we know it. In short, the presumed purpose of the entire 
history of our natural cosmos is to produce the very persons studying the 
cosmos, our scientists (Peters 2008; 2009). This is a disguised form of 
geocentrism, now transformed into scientist-centrism. Religious 
intellectuals may wish to point this out from time to time. 
A close look will show that mythical elements are alive and well 
within the scientific worldview. The extra-scientific leaven here I dub the 
ETI myth (Peters 2009). James Herrick substitutes the term “Myth of the 
Extraterrestrials.” Because science fiction has influenced science proper, 
he contends, this myth includes “the idea that intelligent extraterrestrials 
exist and that interaction with them will inaugurate a new era in human 
existence” (Herrick 2008: 51). Spiritually deprived modern culture is 
thirsting for superior entities in space who can save our planet and, 
according to Herrick, this is a poor substitute for the classic God of 
theism and its genuine promise of redemption. Herrick fears that the ETI 
Myth--replete with the alleged evolutionary promise that we can employ 
science and technology to achieve our own redemption and that our more 
highly evolved ETI neighbors are already where we are going—will 
replace the Christian faith, not augment it. “This is the Christian church’s 
challenge today—to reclaim its story and tell it in such a way that it 
stands out among all the others as authentic, as the Great Story that other 
stories have often sought to imitate” (Herrick 2008: 252). Or, “The 
biblical message is that transforming grace rather than an evolving 
human race is the means of discovering our spiritual destiny. Salvation is 
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the liberating gift, not of benevolent aliens, but of a preexistent, creating 
and redeeming God” (Herrick 2008: 261). The astrotheologian should 
subject astrobiology to careful scrutiny, because embedded in the science 
just might be a pseudo-theology, a mythical hope for secular salvation. 
This certainly seems to be the case in many versions of the space 
sciences. It just may fall to the theologian to distinguish sharply between 
what counts as good science and what counts as disguised religion. It is 
the former that we want from the scientific community, not the latter. 
In sum, astrobiology and sister fields should be celebrated for the 
fertile science that continues to produce new knowledge about our 
immense and complex universe. However, this celebration is limited to 
science that remains science. The theologian should offer a critique when 
the science drifts toward disguised ideology or substitute religion. 
 
The Place of the UFO Phenomenon 
 
The astrotheologian partners primarily with the astrobiologist. 
Astrobiology is a growing field within natural science, and it is gaining 
public as well as private financial support. Astrobiologists and other 
space scientists are appropriate partners for today’s astrotheologian to 
pursue his or her work. 
 Still we must ask: should the astrotheologian address matters 
arising from the UFO phenomenon? Yes. This is because the UFO 
phenomenon is a cultural phenomenon, and culture belongs on the list of 
sources demanding theological analysis and interpretation. In addition, 
UFO believers believe, among other things, that they belong to science. 
Science and UFO belief overlap at the cultural level. 
The worldwide UFO phenomenon began in June 1947 with pilot 
Kenneth Arnold’s sighting of nine mysterious “flying saucers” near 
Mount Rainer in the state of Washington; the news waves for half a 
century were abuzz almost daily with Unidentified Flying Objects or 
UFOs. Might they be crafts visiting earth from outer space? Awareness 
of possible alien intelligence became enhanced with extravagant reports 
by alleged contactees, thriller movies, television sit-coms, conferences, 
controversies, and icons of little green men (Peters 1977). Revivalist 
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preacher and purported leader of American evangelical Christianity, Billy 
Graham (1918- ), responded. In his book on angels, the beloved 
evangelist writes, “Some...have speculated that UFOs could very well be 
part of God’s angelic host who preside over the physical affairs of 
universal creation. While we cannot assert such a view with 
certainty...nothing can hide the fact that these unexplained events are 
occurring with greater frequency around the entire world....UFOs are 
astonishingly angel-like in some of their reported appearances” (Graham 
1975: 9-14 passim).  
Some fundamentalists to Graham’s right, in contrast, identify 
flying saucers with Lucifer’s angels, with demons, and seek to 
discourage fascination with these mysteries in the sky (Allnutt). To 
Graham’s left is Barry H. Downing, a Presbyterian minister with a 
doctorate in science, who seeks to bring harmony with his book, The 
Bible and Flying Saucers. Downing offers a hermeneutic of scripture 
based upon an extraterrestrial interpretation (Downing). He endorses the 
ancient astronaut theory, according to which technology and even life 
itself has been seeded and cultivated on earth by extraterrestrial 
gardeners. What ancient Christians thought were visits from supernatural 
beings were in fact natural—though extraterrestrial—beings. 
Are visiting ufonauts divine or demonic? Orthodox interpreter of 
culture Seraphim Rose contends that the UFO phenomenon is demonic. 
The devil has placed what looks like spaceships in our skies to satisfy the 
hunger of modern spiritually starved earthlings with a meal of naturalistic 
and futuristic religious belief.  The eschatological utopia offered by 
alleged aliens who are more evolutionarily advanced than ourselves is a 
delusion, a temptation to take us away from the true revelation in Jesus 
Christ. “Dabbling with UFOs can be as dangerous as dabbling with black 
magic” (Rose 2004: 12). 
For the most part today’s astrotheologians dodge the 
extraterrestrial hypothesis associated with Ufology and side primarily 
with what they deem the more credible sciences of space exploration. 
Why? Because, as Albert Harrison reports, “Almost sixty years of 
energetic research has failed to convince scientists that UFOs transport 
visitors from our own future, carry beings from another dimension, or 
bring us aliens from outer space” (Harrison 2007: 79). Like Jacob and 
Esau, ufologists and astrobiologists are rival siblings, seldom seen 
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together at the same family barbecue. The split between ufologists and 
establishment scientists signals to the theologian that he or she must 
apply a more comprehensive hermeneutic of culture just to understand 
what the deeper issues are that lie beneath this secular split. 
 
Getting Ready for Contact 
 
As of this writing, no empirical evidence exists that confirms the 
existence of microbial life on other planets or moons let alone off-Earth 
intelligent beings. Still, we cannot predict what will happen tomorrow. 
We need to speculate and anticipate. This brings us to the fourth 
astrotheological agenda item: theologians and religious intellectuals 
should cooperate with leaders of multiple religious traditions and 
scientists to prepare the public for the eventuality of extraterrestrial 
contact. No one can predict with precision exactly what is coming. If the 
day of extraterrestrial contact arrives, re-thinking our terrestrial 
worldviews should follow. This is likely to be complex, not simple. 
Albert Harrison observes, “we cannot simply incorporate extraterrestrial 
ideas without thinking them through, because our systems (supranational, 
societal, and organismic) have highly interrelated parts, so changes in 
one arena yield changes in another” (Harrison 1997: 298). Religion is 
one of those parts, perhaps even foundational for revised worldview 
construction. John Hart foresees that “the collaboration of scientists, 
ethicists, and theologians will enhance both reflection on Contact, and 
terrestrial-extraterrestrial interaction when Contact occurs” (Hart 2010: 
390). Cooperation and collaboration are the watchwords.  
Planetary readiness informed by wisdom drawn from Earth’s 
historic religious traditions is being called for here. Secular or scientific 
anticipations are not enough. Religious readiness will be helpful to both 
religious and non-religious sectors alike. For public policy theorists 
anticipating the impact of contact, it would behoove them to engage 
theologians. We might “gain insights from theology into the possible 
nature of extraterrestrials that we might not consider if we focused only 
on human nature as studied by science,” says SETI’s Douglas Vakoch 
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(Vakoch). It appears clear that today’s astrotheologian can contribute to 
wider public policy concerns. 
Sometimes theology is demeaned or ridiculed for following 
science, and for following it too slowly. Science is frequently described 
as progressive while religion is pictured as behind, recalcitrant, 
obstructive. Whether this caricature is accurate or not, the excitement 
over the prospects of extraterrestrial contact with a second genesis should 
prompt in the theologian a sense of responsibility. Whether the day of 
contact comes or not, no harm will be done if we ready ourselves. More 
can be said. Christians are future-oriented because of God’s promised 
eschatological kingdom. We expect the new. So it fits the Christian 
profile to ready ourselves for what might be new and fascinating. 
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Life in the Universe: Philosophical and 
Theological Issues drawn from, and influencing 
Scientific Research
1
 
Robert John Russell 
Introduction 
 
Over the past half century, the interdisciplinary field of ‘theology and 
science’ has undergone tremendous growth involving scholars from 
philosophy of science, philosophy of religion, the natural sciences, 
theology, ethics, history of science and related fields.
2
  Surprisingly 
underrepresented in this rapidly growing interaction, however, is a focus 
on the philosophical and theological issues raised by the possibility of 
extraterrestrial life (EL) and extraterrestrial intelligent life (ETI).
3
 This is 
particularly curious since historians of science have shown that Christian 
theology contributed in significant ways to the assumption that ETI does 
in fact exist.
4
 It is particularly timely, then, that these issues be addressed. 
   There are, in fact, a wealth of topics which could be discussed 
here.
5
 For the purposes of this short presentation, I will focus on the 
following: In the first part, I will look at the scientific search for ETI and 
discuss its philosophical and theological implications. In the second part, 
I will turn the method on its head and ask about philosophical and 
theological assumptions and presuppositions which lie within, and in 
some ways shape, the ongoing scientific research for intelligent life in the 
universe.  The latter move reflects the method by which my research in 
theology and science currently operates, one in which the implications of 
science are taken critically, via their careful philosophical analysis, into 
theology and in which theological insights are then allowed to suggest 
new questions for scientific research, a method which I call Creative 
Mutual Interation (CMI).
6
 
 First, two caveats: 1) I will speak from the context of Christian 
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theology and welcome others to widen the circle of religious discussions 
of EL/ETI.   2) I will assume that for some forms of ETI the ‘contact’ 
scenarios are reasonable.  It may be that some extraterrestrial 
civilizations are millions of years older than ours; for such advanced ETI, 
these scenarios may simply not apply.
7
 
 
 
Seven issues in science and their philosophical and 
theological implications.  
 
In the first part of this essay I look at the philosophical and theological 
implications of the possible discovery of intelligent life in the universe.  
This is a standard method in “theology and science,” one which Ian 
Barbour calls a “theology of nature”8 and which I call “constructive 
theology in light of the natural sciences.” I start with issues which seem 
to lie, in principle, at the empirical end of the spectrum (even though we 
as yet have no evidence about them!), and move from there to 
implications which are more philosophical and theological.  
   
Is Life in the Universe rare or abundant? 
The relative abundance of life in the universe is one of the pivotal issues 
of our time, and a key question in the burgeoning new field of 
astrobiology.  Is life rare or abundant in our solar system, our galaxy, and 
our universe?  Hopefully, we will learn the answer in the reasonably near 
future at least regarding our solar system. Projects such as the exploration 
of Mars now underway through NASA’s Curiosity9 and future plans for 
the exploration of Jupiter’s moon Europa might well shed light on the 
question of pre-biotic and microbial life in our solar system.  On the 
other end of the life-spectrum, projects which listen for signals using 
radiotelescopes might find evidence of advanced life in the nearby arms 
of our Milky Way galaxy.  A notable example is the SETI Institute
10
 in 
Mountain View, California (SETI is the acronym for “the search for 
extraterrestrial intelligence”).    
 Until the results of these projects are conclusive, we must be 
satisfied with theoretical attempts at estimating the relative abundance of 
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life in the universe, and these attempts remain highly controversial.  On 
the one hand, Stephen Jay Gould has stressed the unlikeliness of 
intelligent life elsewhere in the universe given the overwhelming role 
that chance has played in the evolution of life on earth.
11
   If life has 
evolved elsewhere, we should expect radical diversities in its 
morphologies, diversities reflecting the vastly differing evolutionary 
histories as shaped by strongly contingent events.  Francisco Ayala has 
gone further and argued that life beyond the microbial stage is extremely 
unlikely even in our galaxy of several hundred billion stars, given the 
number of steps from simple living organisms to sentient creatures.
12
  On 
the other hand, Paul Davies
13
 and Christian DeDuve
14
 have argued that 
since evolution is tightly governed by the laws of physics and biology, 
and since these laws produced life on earth, they should produce life in 
abundance throughout the universe. Julian Chela-Flores has taken De 
Duve’s point one step further, arguing that once life originates, the 
evolution of eukaryotes will lead to procaryotes.  From there the 
‘convergence’ of life towards intelligence is assured, although there may 
well be significant diversities in the morphologies which underlie 
intelligence.
15
   
 
Will the answer influence life’s value or meaning? 
Underlying these issues, however, is a more fundamental question:   Is 
the meaning and value of life a function of its abundance in the universe, 
or is it essentially meaningful or meaningless regardless of what we find 
through the exploration of our solar system or deep space via projects 
like SETI?  It is this question which has received considerable 
philosophical and theological reflection.   
 Arguments for meaninglessness. Some scientists have suggested 
that biological life per se has little significance whether or not we are 
alone in the universe.   They see life as essentially meaningless, a random 
product of physics and chemistry of no more significance than the 
wetness of water or the structure of Saturn’s rings.  Biological processes 
are just what matter does when really unusual conditions occur, but the 
universe, “at rock-bottom”, is just endless mass-energy and curving 
spacetime.  
 Such ‘cosmic pessimism’ is of course a philosophical 
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interpretation of nature.  It is not science, per se, nor is it one which can 
be ‘proved’ by science, but it is one that has been widely propounded by 
such eminent scientists as Bertrand Russell
16
 and Jacques Monod
17
.  It is 
certainly the impression Steven Weinberg gave in his often-quoted 
conclusion to The First Three Minutes: “(H)uman life is ... just a more-
or-less farcical outcome of a chain of accidents reaching back to the first 
three minutes ...The more the universe seems comprehensible, the more it 
also seems pointless.” 18 
 Arguments for meaningfulness.  Other scientists disagree with this 
view, arguing instead for a philosophy in which the evolution of life is, in 
some modest ways at least, a clue to the meaning of the universe.  Paul 
Davies has depicted the evolution of life in terms of what he 
provocatively calls “teleology without teleology”19 Here the emergence 
of what Davies calls the “order of complexity” is a genuine surprise, 
arising out of the “order of simplicity” described by the laws of physics.  
In a related way, William Stoeger has pointed to what he calls the 
“immanent directionality” of evolution. Stoeger’s aim is to show that 
there is a directionality, perhaps even a teleology, immanent in nature 
that can be discovered through the natural sciences as they study the 
emergence of physical and biological structure, complexity, life, and 
mind.
20
 More pointedly in his 1985 Gifford Lectures, Infinite in All 
Directions, Freeman Dyson explicitly rejects Weinberg’s opinion, telling 
us instead he sees “...a universe of life surviving forever and making 
itself known to its neighbors across the unimaginable gulfs of space and 
time...Twentieth-century science provides a solid foundation for a 
philosophy of hope.”21   
 
What accounts for this difference in views? 
Clearly the question of the relative abundance of life in the universe is an 
empirical one.  But until the hard data come in, the differences we have 
heard above about the value and meaning of life based on the empirical 
facts, since they are missing to date, are --- not surprisingly --- largely 
philosophical and theological.   
 The philosophical difference --- meaninglessness or 
meaningfulness --- may stem in part from a further division between 
reductionist and non-reductionist philosophies, since these philosophies 
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underlie the discussion.   If one assumes that the processes and properties 
characteristic of living organisms can be fully explained by physics and 
chemistry as Richard Dawkins does, there may be little, if any, basis for 
attributing meaning and value to life.
22
 Non-reductionist arguments on 
the other hand, such as those deployed by Francisco Ayala
23
, Ernst 
Mayr
24
, and Charles Birch
25
, offer a basis within natural processes for 
attributing varying degrees of meaning and value to organisms with 
differing levels of complexity and organization.   
 These non-reductionist epistemologies, in turn, play a crucial 
theological role in a variety of views often referred to collectively as 
“theistic evolution.”26  This perspective includes two central themes: 
creatio ex nihilo and creatio continua.  1) God as transcendent (wholly 
other, not spatially distant) creates the universe out of nothing (creatio ex 
nihilo), holding it in existence at each moment and maintaining its law-
abiding character which we express scientifically as the laws of nature.
27
   
2) God as immanent (wholly present but not pantheistically identified 
with nature) creates the universe continuously in time (creatio continua), 
working “in, with, under and through” the processes of nature28, as 
Arthur Peacocke nicely phrases it. In short, God creates the complex 
diversity of living species (theistic evolution) by working in and through 
the natural processes whose very possibilities God created ex nihilo.  
 Scholars in theology and science have developed these themes in 
light of physical cosmology, quantum physics, chaos and complexity 
theory, evolutionary and molecular biology, anthropology, the 
neurosciences and cognitive sciences, etc.  Arguably the most remarkable 
construction in the galaxy is the primate central nervous system: The 
number of connections between the neurons of the human brain is greater 
than the number of stars in the Milky Way. This staggering complexity 
makes possible the almost unimaginable feat of self-consciousness, of 
knowing oneself as a free, rational and moral agent in the world.  Thus 
on our planet, at least, we are privileged to discover a hint of what God’s 
intentions might have been in creating a universe like ours, with its 
particular laws of physics.  For when the evolutionary conditions are 
right as they have been on Earth, and as they may be elsewhere in our 
universe, God, the continuous, immanent, ongoing creator of all that is, 
working with and through nature, creates a species gifted with the “image 
of God” (the imago dei) including the capacities for reason, language, 
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imagination, tool-making, social organization, and self-conscious moral 
choice, a species capable of entering into covenant with God and in turn 
with all of life. 
Thus if it took the precise characteristics of this “fine-tuned” 
universe to allow for the possibility of the evolution of life, then even if 
life is scarce in the universe
29
 it is life as such that gives significance to 
our universe --- and even if ours is only one of a countless series of 
universes, as some inflationary and quantum cosmologies depict.   In 
short, I see life as the enfleshing of God’s intentions through biological 
evolution which, in turn, is possible because of the physics God gives 
this universe, and together biology and physics are the ongoing 
expression of God’s purposes in creating all that is.  God thus offers to 
nature a special conscious experience of the God who acts immanently 
within nature as the transcendent ground of its being.   
 
Will intelligent life be capable of both rationality and moral 
reasoning? 
We turn here to the question of the biological origins of ethics.
30
  If our 
human experience of moral capacity, like our capacity for rational 
thought and relationality, is a gift of God, the imago dei, rooted in our 
biological nature and bequeathed us by God acting in and through 
evolution, does this suggest that wherever evolution results in creatures 
capable of rationality they would also be equipped by God with a 
capacity for relationship and moral reasoning?  
 Sociobiologists and, more recently, behavior geneticists, have 
explored the biological basis of human social behavior in order to 
determine the relation between evolutionary and genetic constraints on 
the one hand and their cultural expression on the other.  Many of them, 
such as E. O. Wilson, Richard Dawkins and Michael Ruse, are 
unabashedly reductionistic, interpreting their scientific research in strictly 
deterministic and functionalist accounts of human behavior.  Ruse, for 
example, has argued extensively that both the capacity and the content of 
human morality are entirely the products of evolution.
31
   He defines 
biological altruism as any cooperative behavior between organisms that 
increases ‘evolutionary gain’, while moral altruism refers to our 
considered choices to help others because it is seen as ‘right’ to do so.   
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For Ruse, moral altruism is a product of (non-moral) biological altruism 
with “... no objective foundation.  It is just an illusion, fobbed off on us to 
promote ‘altruism’”.32  
 Geneticist Francisco J. Ayala takes a very different position.   For 
nearly three decades he has argued against reductionism in biology
33
, 
disagreeing dramatically with Ruse over the evolutionary origins of 
human moral capacity.  According to Ayala, evolution selected for 
intelligence in our ancestral hominid line; one of the many byproducts of 
intelligence is ethics.  “Ethical behavior came about in evolution not 
because it is adaptive in itself, but as a necessary consequence of man’s 
(sic) eminent intellectual abilities, which are an attribute directly 
promoted by natural selection.”34  Our ethical behavior, and the norms 
which we use to govern it, are not determined by our genes or our 
evolution.  Instead ethics is open to cultural, philosophical and religious 
sources. Similar arguments against reductionism have been developed by 
a wide range of scientists and philosophers, including Arthur Peacocke
35
, 
Ian Barbour
36
, Nancey Murphy
37
 and George Ellis.
38
  
 How does this bear on the question of ETI?  If what we have found 
out about life on earth can be generalized, we may expect that moral 
capacity will be present wherever life has evolved to the point of 
intelligence in the universe and biological evolution will predispose but 
not determine its contents. 
 
What are the theological implications for Christianity? 
What sorts of responses might Christian theologians offer to the 
discovery of ETI with rational and moral capacities? Physicist Paul 
Davies predicts it would “(shatter) completely the traditional perspective 
on God’s relationship with man (sic).”39  But theologian Ted Peters finds 
“little or no credible evidence” for Davies’ view.40  Instead there is rich 
evidence in the history of Christian thought in support of a “plurality of 
worlds” and extraterrestrial life in the universe.41  Contemporary 
theology, too, has been genuinely open to the possibility of rational and 
moral ETI.  In support of this position Peters cites Roman Catholics, such 
as George van Noort, Theodore Hesburgh, Hans Küng, Karl Rahner, and 
Francis J. Connett, conservative Protestants such as Billy Graham, and 
liberal Protestants such as Krister Stendahl, A. Durwood Foster, and Paul 
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Tillich.
42
  And in a recent poll
43
, Peters reports that it is by and large the 
critics of religion who claim that the discovery of ETI would challenge 
religious faith, not those who espouse that faith! 
 Personally I would find the discovery of ETI endowed with 
rational and moral capacities to be a wondrous exemplification of the 
intentions of God in creating a universe like ours, namely in order to 
achieve the evolution of creatures capable of bearing the imago dei and 
entering into genuine community and covenant with God.  I am also 
persuaded by the philosophical arguments of non-reductionists that 
ethical choice and the contents of our moral codes remains at least 
partially a ‘free variable’.  I would  therefore expect that ETI will be 
‘accountable’ for its choices in some way even as humanity is.  This 
leads directly to the challenge of moral failure, our final issue in this 
section of my chapter. 
 
Will ET experience moral failure or be entirely benign? 
This question embodies a tragic reality at the heart of human existence.  
Why do we act with a level of violence against our own kind and other 
species which far exceeds the needs of survival and far exceeds the level 
of violence of all other forms of life on Earth? Of course there are 
evolutionary precedents for such violence, particularly in mammals with 
whom we share a distant common ancestor.  But the level of violence in 
humankind seems more like a qualitative, rather than a mere quantitative, 
difference in comparison with, say, tribes of warring chimpanzees. And 
when it comes to human culture, why do we lust after unlimited power 
and indulge in travesties like racism, sexism and specism?  Put 
theologically, why do we sin?  Why do we fail to love and serve God 
above all else and instead indulge ourselves in unbridled pride and 
inordinate sensuality?   
 One form of Christian response to this foundational question has 
been to assert with Reinhold Niebuhr the paradox that sin is not an 
intrinsic part of human nature and yet it is an inevitable component of 
human behavior.  Indeed its only remedy is the grace of God freely given 
us.
44
  Making it intrinsic would rob us of our individual and corporate 
responsibility on which our legal and political systems are built; failing to 
recognize its inevitability would lead to the false hope that we can free 
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ourselves through one of countless ‘self-help’ movements without 
depending radically on the grace of God.  In sum, each of us inherits both 
the imago dei, the ‘image of God’, and the inevitability of sin, and both 
are unique to our species. 
45
  
 This traditional response conforms nicely to our contemporary 
scientific understanding of biological evolution, particularly with the 
philosophical theme of ‘novelty within continuity.  Thus we as a species 
inherit diverse propensities from our pre-hominid past, but in homo 
sapiens something strikingly new emerges.  This ‘newness’ is manifest 
both in the imago dei, including our capacity for relationship, abstract 
thought, formal language, complex technologies, art, ethics and science, 
and in the reality of human sin, including ruthless violence and our 
insatiable appetites for power and control.  It is only through the grace of 
a loving God that our lives can be transformed into the fullness of what it 
truly means to be human.  Conversely, the formation of authentic human 
personhood requires a lifetime of genuine wrestling with tough moral 
choices and the repentance of moral failure.    
 What then about ETI and the ‘domain’ of moral failure: is it truly 
universal or is it limited to terrestrial history? I have suggested for 
scientific, philosophical and theological reasons that the essential 
characteristics of human life are a genuine clue to the nature of life in the 
universe and not just an evolutionary fluke of the evolutionary processes 
on Earth.  I therefore expect that ETI will experience a kind of moral 
dilemma that in many ways resembles the moral quagmire of human 
experience, though obviously differing in its ‘moral morphology’ --- the 
personal and social form of ethics.  Jill Tarter has argued that 
extraterrestrial civilizations will be far older than ours, and to achieve 
such longevity, they will have had to overcome the temptation to 
warfare.
46
  I tend to agree with her observation, but it still leaves open the 
question of how such temptation is overcome?  
 My assumption is that ETI will experience an empowering for their 
struggle by a source which transcends ETI’s natural capacities.  Put into 
theological language, I believe --- perhaps I should say I predict! --- that 
God will be present to the struggles of life everywhere, and that God’s 
grace will redeem and sanctify every species in which reason and moral 
conscience are kindled.  
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Will ET need redemption? 
As a Christian theologian and scientist, this leads me to a final question: 
should Christians expect that a single Incarnation of Christ in the person 
of Jesus is sufficient for the redemption of all life in the universe, or 
should we expect there to be an Incarnation of Christ in each species of 
ETI that is gifted by reason and challenged by moral ambiguity? An 
adequate discussion would take us far beyond the limits of this essay, but 
I do want to note in closing that modest support for both options can be 
found among Protestants and Roman Catholics: a single, universally 
efficacious Incarnation is suggested by Protestants Ted Peters and 
Wolfhart Pannenberg and Roman Catholics L. C. McHugh and J. Edgar 
Bruns, while multiple Incarnations have been considered by Protestants, 
such as Paul Tillich and Lewis Ford and by Roman Catholics, including 
Karl Rahner, E. L. Mascall and Ernan McMullin.
47
   All agree, however, 
that wherever ETI exists, it will be the creation of a loving and 
redeeming God.   
 
 
Four philosophical and theological presuppositions 
underlying the scientific search for intelligent life in the 
universe 
 
In the first part of this paper I looked at the scientific search for 
extraterrestrial intelligent life in the universe and developed a number of 
philosophical and theological implications based on that research.  This 
method of reflecting theologically on a philosophical interpretation of the 
results of science represents the standard way theologians incorporate 
scientific theories and their philosophical implications into theology, an 
approach which Ian G. Barbour calls a “theology of nature.”48  
 Now I would like to do something rather unusual: reverse the 
direction of inquiry and ask whether there are philosophical 
presuppositions lying within the scientific search for extraterrestrial 
intelligent life, presuppositions which actually shape its research 
strategies?  And are there, in addition, theological presuppositions 
underlying the philosophical ones which also play a role, however 
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dimunitive, in influencing this scientific research?   
 I am certainly not suggesting that ETI researchers per se are 
necessarily aware of either of these sets of presuppositions or that, if they 
were, they would agree with them.  In fact I would expect strong 
disagreement by some of them, especially with the theological 
presuppositions I will discuss below.  But I am suggesting that the 
philosophical presuppositions, and possibly the theological ones as well, 
are effectively present in some way, even if only implicitly, within ETI 
research and that they tend to play a role in shaping this research whether 
or not they are explicitly acknowledged --- or even repudiated.  I would 
even suggest that it is hard to understand how such research could get 
launched in the first place without something like these philosophical 
presuppositions and, perhaps, their underlying theological ones.   
 
Philosophical presuppositions underlying ETI research. 
First I will identify four philosophical presuppositions which I believe 
underlie, even if only implicitly, the scientific search for intelligent life in 
the universe. Again I take these to be presuppositions without which it is 
hard to see how ETI research as we know it could proceed --- even if few 
if any of the scientists participating in this research explicitly 
acknowledges them and even if, upon reading this essay, they would 
reject them. In the second part below I will explore their underlying 
theological presuppositions.   
 
The four philosophical presuppositions are: 
 
 1) ETI exists in relative abundance. 
 2) ETI can be recognized by their signal. 
 3) ETI wants to be discovered. 
 4) ETI is more likely benign than malevolent. 
 
Let’s look at these philosophical presuppositions in some detail before 
moving on to their possible theological underpinnings. 
 
 1) ETI exists in relative abundance.  I call the first philosophical 
assumption the “ontological assumption.” It goes like this: The laws of 
UNDERSTANDING DARWIN AND DARWINIAN UNDERSTANDING 
 
 
230 
nature, as found in physics and biology, are uniform and universal.  Since 
they produced intelligent life on earth, they will lead to intelligent life 
throughout the universe.   
 This is a very natural assumption for scientists to make, and for 
several reasons.  First, how else can we allow data to falsify our theories 
if we don’t presuppose that these theories hold everywhere?  Second, 
why make things more complicated than they need be?  Here is a quote 
from an interview by Michael Meyer posted on July 15
th
, 2012, on 
Astrobiology Newsline online.
49
  First we hear from David Grinspoon, 
Principal Scientist in the Department of Space Studies, Southwest 
Research Institute in Boulder, Colorado: 
 
David Grinspoon: It is always shaky when we generalize from 
experiments with a sample size of one. So we have to be a bit 
cautious when we fill the cosmos with creatures based on the time 
scales of Earth history (it happened so fast here, therefore it must 
be easy) and the resourcefulness of Earth life (they are everywhere 
where there is water). This is one history, and one example of life. 
When our arguments rest on such shaky grounds, balancing a 
house of cards on a one-card foundation, we are in danger of 
erecting structures formed more by our desires than the 
"evidence." 
Then we hear from legendary Frank Drake, Professor of Astronomy and 
Astrophysics at the University of California at Santa Cruz and Chairman 
of the Board of Trustees of the SETI Institute: 
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I think this is an occasion where that old principal of good science, 
Occam's Razor, is helpful. Apply Occam's Razor to the question of 
the origin of life on Earth. We look at the Earth, and with regards to 
that origin, as best we know, no special or freak circumstances 
were required. It took water, organics, a source of energy, and a 
long time. Deep-sea vents are the current favorite and a reasonable 
place for the origin. But even if they weren't the culprits, the 
chemists have found a multitude of other pathways that produce 
the chemistry of life. The challenge seems to be not to find THE 
pathway, but the one that was the quickest and most productive. 
The prime point is that nothing special was required. There will be 
a pathway that works, on Earth and on similar planets. Then, by 
Occam's Razor, the origin of life on Earth is nothing more than the 
result of normal processes on the planet. Furthermore, life should 
appear very frequently on other Earth-like planets. (Italics added.) 
So the point here is that scientists like Drake routinely appeal to Occam’s 
Razor because it feels natural to the way they do science and chose 
between competing ideas.  My point is not to dispute their use of 
Occam’s Razor; it seems to work very well in a whole range of the 
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natural sciences.  My point is simply to point out that Occam’s Razor is 
not a scientific theory like quantum mechanics or general relativity.  
Instead it is a philosophical claim, one concerned about how to chose 
between competing scientific theories using criteria that transcend both 
the empirical date on which these competing theories are based and the 
theoretical explanations of these data which are in dispute. It is a vivid 
example of philosophy playing an active if intrinsic role in research 
science.   
 
 2) ETI can be recognized by us by their signal. I call the second 
philosophical assumption the “universal rationality assumption.” It is the 
philosophical assumption that various forms of rationality that have 
evolved by distinct ETIs in the universe have more in common than they 
do in their diversity.  The contrary assumption is that ETIs on radically 
planetary systems will reason in radically different, even 
incommensurate, ways.  The common assumption among scientists is 
that if distinct and diverse ETIs are able to discover enough about nature 
that they can produce scientific theories, and their technological products, 
these theories and products will be in essence the same as ours.  Not 
‘morphologtically’, anymore than the proposal that ETI will ‘look’ like 
us, a proposal no one but Hollywood occasionally purports, but ‘in 
principle,’ one in which the theories and discoveries of ETI will be 
deeply analogous to those of humankind.  
    
 3) ETI wants to be discovered.  The third philosophical assumption 
is that relationality, the thirst to overcome life’s isolation, is something to 
be sought overwhelmingly.  It starts with the elementary assumption that 
intrinsic relationality is of far more importance to human life than radical 
individuality.  It then extends this to life wherever it is in the universe. 
Why else would we assume that life beyond our solar system has any 
interest in reaching out to other, potentially very different, forms of life 
such as us?  Instead the assumption in ETI research is that living 
creatures throughout the universe have a deep hunger to reach out and 
discover their very distant “cousins” in the immense swaths of inter-
stellar space.  
 
 4) ETI is more likely to be benign than malevolent.   Here we 
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come to the fourth philosophical assumption: love between families, 
communities, and evolutionary ancestors is stronger than hate.  Scientific 
evidence can be appropriated from studies in altruism in pre- and non-
human species.  But at bottom this is a philosophical assumption which is 
required if one is to pursue SETI research.  Hollywood gives us two stark 
alternatives which, while grossly overdrawn, serve to put the assumption 
into stark relief
50
:  the 1982 movie ET: The Extraterrestrial
51
 and the 
1996 movie Independence Day.
52
  In the former, an angelic alien seeks a 
peaceful encounter with humans even while longing to journey home.  In 
the latter, a monstrous alien race invades earth to commandeer its natural 
resources with no consideration for its inhabitants.  Which portrayal is 
more likely?   
 Clearly, short of an actual encounter, all we can do is speculate 
philosophically.  But that is exactly my point.  I believe the implicit 
assumption made by the ETI research community is by and large that 
ETI will be benign, even angelic.  While I tend to agree with this 
assumption, I want to stress that it is a philosophical assumption, not a 
scientific fact, and it is one which tends to govern and even guide ETI 
research.   
 
Theological assumptions underlying the philosophical assumptions 
governing ETI research 
Previously I identified four philosophical presuppositions or assumptions 
which seem to underlie the search for intelligent life in the universe, 
assumptions without which it is hard to see how such research could 
proceed.  Now I want to identify four theological assumptions which I 
believe underlie these philosophical ones and which in this way support, 
even if indirectly, the scientific research. As with the previous discussion 
of philosophical assumptions, I do not mean to suggest that some --- or 
perhaps any --- scientists involved with the search for intelligent life in 
the universe intentionally make these theological assumptions.  Many, in 
fact, would most likely reject them --- some vigorously. I also admit that 
here I am going to identify theological assumptions which are 
distinctively Christian.  It would be wonderful to see how scholars of 
other religions might unearth differing theological assumptions at work 
in the ETI research community.  But I do feel that it is hard to see how 
research as we find it by scientists searching for intelligent life in the 
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universe could proceed without something like the following theological 
assumptions underpinning the philosophical presuppositions of their 
research.  
   It might be helpful to start by restating the four philosophical 
assumptions explored above before turning to what I take to be their 
theological underpinnings: 
 
 1) ETI exists in relative abundance. 
 2) ETI can be recognized by their signal. 
 3) ETI wants to be discovered. 
 4) ETI is more likely benign than malevolent. 
 
 1) ETI exists in relative abundance.  This first philosophical 
assumption regards the uniformity and universality of the laws of nature.  
If we assume that the laws of nature, as found in physics and biology, are 
uniform and universal, and if they lead to the evolution of intelligent life 
on earth, they we can conclude (pace the discussions in the first part of 
this essay) that they will lead to the evolution of intelligent life 
throughout the universe.  It is a further, but small, step to assume that 
such life will be in relative abundance.  But why should the laws of 
nature be universal and uniform?   
 The theological presupposition which addresses this question is 
that God intentionally created the universe with the right “fine-tuned” 
laws and constants of nature so that life could evolve into creatures 
capable of self-conscious relationship with God.  In addition these laws 
must hold, and be the same, everywhere.   
 I have discussed the ways the laws and constants of nature are 
“fine-tuned” for the evolution of life elsewhere.53  But the assumptions 
that the laws of nature must hold, and be the same, everywhere are 
important theological assumptions to explore here. They can readily be 
found in the logos tradition borrowed from Greek philosophy and 
imported into Christianity as early as the end of the first century C.E. 
Here the logos, or the Word of God, is that through which all things were 
made (see for example John 1:3).  The logos accounts for the rationality, 
and in turn the intelligibility, of nature as expressed through the laws of 
nature as found in physics and biology.  The uniqueness of the divine 
logos leads to the uniformity of the laws of nature; since there is only one 
UNDERSTANDING DARWIN AND DARWINIAN UNDERSTANDING 
 
 
235 
divine logos, there is no principle by which the laws of nature which 
express its rationality could vary in any non-trivial ways.  The ubiquity of 
its effects, the fact that all things were created through the unique divine 
logos, leads to the claim that nothing will be found in the universe that 
does not bear the mark of having been created in keeping with these same 
natural laws.   
 2) The second philosophical assumption is that life throughout the 
universe can recognize the signals sent by ETI civilizations.  In essence, 
even if there is some degree of diversity in the forms of rationality that 
various species of ETIs possess, their rationalities have so much in 
common than they will all have discovered the underlying laws of nature 
even when these laws are expressed in different mathematical 
formulations.   
 The theological assumptions supporting this philosophical 
assumption have several parts.  The first is the assumption that there will 
be a commonality among the forms of rationality of intelligent species in 
the universe.  This assumption of commonality is a sign of the logos 
tradition inherent, though implicit, in secular / scientific culture.  This 
tradition provides a theological warrant for the secular expectation of the 
commonality of all forms of creaturely rationality in the universe. The 
second is that all intelligent species, if they are indeed created in the 
imago dei, will discover the same laws of nature because the imago dei is 
the presence of the universal divine logos in human nature, and by 
extension, in ETIs who will also bear the divine image.  Finally the third 
is the assumption that all ETI, created in the imago dei, will use these 
laws to build instruments capable of signaling that they are alive in the 
universe. 
 3) ETI wants to be discovered. The third philosophical assumption 
is that relationality, the thirst to overcome life’s isolation, is something to 
be sought after as one of life’s highest values.  In our context this 
assumption may seem obvious: why wouldn’t ETI reach out to whoever 
might be listening?  But I believe there is an underlying theological 
assumption active here which funds the philosophical assumption of 
ETI’s all-consuming quest for contact. This might be the most 
controversial theological assumption I will point to, and again, if it exists 
it is implicit, even unnoticed, by the community of scientists searching 
for ETI.  Still I believe it is present in much of Western culture and I 
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view it as seeping into the scientific community in subtle ways. This 
theological assumption is that all life in the universe has been created by 
the God who is Trinity, a God who is intrinsicly relational. (For an 
excellent discussion of relationality in the divine Trinity see Ted Peters’ 
God as Trinity
54.) If this is so, then God’s creatures, in turn, reflect this 
intrinsic relationality.  If this in turn is so, then it is no wonder that ETI 
wants to make its presence known to other intelligent life in the universe. 
 
 4) ETI is more likely to be benign than malevolent.  The final 
philosophical issue is that love is stronger than hate.  Here I want to 
suggest that a theological grounding for this philosophical assumption is 
provided by the belief that God, the Creator of all life in the universe, is 
love (1 John 4.8), that God creates all things through love, and that love 
ultimately overcomes hatred, sin and evil.  Of course this is a huge 
assumption which must take on board the enormous problem of human 
evil over the past millennia, and natural evil (as it were) over millions, 
even billions, of years
55
.  Nevertheless, my expectation is that while ETI 
might appear, and at first even act, in ways reminiscent of the movie 
Independence Day, ultimately that will not be the whole story of 
humanity’s encounter with ETI.  If I am right theologically, that story 
will be much more the story of the movie ET: The Extraterrestrial. 
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